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The allocation of fishing opportunities is one of the most difficult challenges for high 
seas fisheries management. There is an ongoing search for equitable and transparent 
allocation frameworks. This thesis explores whether, under what conditions, and with 
what shortcomings, a legal concept of equity can provide assistance in the development 
of such a framework. To this end, it reviews the historical origins of allocation of quotas 
in international fisheries, and summarizes the current global and regional legal 
frameworks for allocation and regional practices. It then analyzes whether 
intergenerational and intra-generational equity is considered in the international legal 
framework for high seas fisheries, and what the legal and practical implications of their 
inclusion are. It provides some suggestions on how to integrate intergenerational and 
intra-generational equity more effectively into allocation decisions. It concludes by 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
High seas fisheries are in a crisis. Numerous recent studies demonstrate that high 
seas fisheries resources are declining,
1
 that management regimes are ineffective,
2
 and that 
international fisheries management is scientifically unsound
3
 and economically wasteful.
4
 
The sources of the difficulties to achieve effective management in international 
fisheries are both economic and legal. From an economic perspective, high seas fish 
stocks are renewable, but exhaustible, natural resources. In addition, they have a high 
economic value and are, therefore, in high and increasing demand. These two 
characteristics make them scarce resources. From a legal perspective, the regime for high 
seas governance is founded on four pillars codified in international conventions: freedom 
of the high seas, States‘ sovereignty, States‘ equality, and States‘ cooperation. 
Accordingly, high seas fisheries are open to all States, while restrictions on fishing 
activities require agreement of the participating States.
5
  
Those economic and legal features are the underlying cause of the many 
difficulties of the high seas regime.
6
 One of those difficulties, and indeed a crucial one, is 
the problem of participation and access to high seas fisheries resources. The fact that high 
seas fisheries resources are both open access (or ―common pool‖)
7
 and scarce resources 
                                                          
1
 See, for example: FAO, The state of world fisheries and aquaculture 2008 (Rome: FAO, 2009) [hereafter 
SOFIA 2008], particularly at 35; Sarika Cullis-Suzuki and Daniel Pauly, ―Failing the High Seas: A Global 
Evaluation of Regional Fisheries Management organizations‖ Marine Policy [forthcoming in 2010], in 
particular at 5-7. 
2
 See, for example: Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly, ibid; Robin Allen, International Management of Tuna 
Fisheries: Arrangements, Challenges and a Way Forward, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Technical 
Paper Nr. 536 (Rome: FAO, 2010), in particular section 3 and 41.  
3
 See, for example: Allen, ibid, at 41; Marjorie L. Mooney-Seus and Andrew A. Rosenberg, Regional 
Fisheries Management Organizations: Progress in Adopting the Precautionary Approach and Ecosystem-
Based Management, Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, 
Technical Study Nr. 1, (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2007), online Chatham House 
<http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers>. 
4
 See: World Bank and FAO, The Sunken Billions: The Economic Justification for Fisheries Reform, 
(Washington DC: World Bank, 2008), as cited by Allen, ibid, at 5. 
5
 This description is deliberately over-simplistic. The legal framework will be analyzed with more details in 
chapter 3 of this thesis.  
6
 Some of those problems are: lack of accurate and timely data, scientific assessment, technical capacity, 
decision-making, monitoring, controlling and surveillance activities, non-cooperation by non-parties to 
cooperative regimes (―free riders‖), non-compliance by, and enforcement problems with, parties and 
cooperating non-parties to cooperative regimes, and lack of transparency. 
7
 Gordon Munro, Annick Van Houtte, and Rolf Willmann, The conservation and management of shared 
fish stocks: legal and economic aspects, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 465 (Rome: FAO 2004), at 11. 
2 
 
implies that not all States can fish all they want (at least not sustainably). Restrictions are 
necessary, and those restrictions imply the need for a distribution of the available fish. 
Paraphrasing Franck, the high seas fisheries regime presents the two conditions that make 
distribution (or allocation) of the scarce resource ―possible and necessary‖.
8
 Those two 




Allocation of high seas fishing opportunities has been singled out as the most 
difficult aspect of the international fisheries management regime.
10
 The regional fisheries 
organizations established to provide a forum to manage fish resources in the high seas 
have faced significant challenges and conflicts in allocating fishing opportunities among 
participating States.
11
 Allocation mechanisms in those organizations have been criticized 
by members and non-members as inequitable and non-transparent. There is an ongoing 
search for a more objective, transparent, predictable, reasonable and fair allocation 
framework. 
The problem of allocating high seas fisheries opportunities has been the subject of 
a number of studies. Most of them address the allocation problem from an economic 
                                                          
8
 Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) at 9. 
9
 Ibid, at 9-10. 
10
 Ted L. McDorman, ―Implementing existing tools: Turning words into actions – decision-making 
processes of regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs)‖ (2005) 20 Int‘l J. Mar. & Coast. L. 
423, at 425; D. J. Agnew, D. Aldous, M. Lodge, P. Miyake, and G. Parkes, ―Discussion Paper: Allocation 
Issues for WCFPC Tuna Resources,‖ prepared for the WCFPC Secretariat by MRAG Ltd., October 2006, 
at 15, online: WCFPC <http://www.wcpfc.org>. Willock and Lack state: ―The allocation of fishing 
opportunities, or participatory rights, within RFMOs has proven to be one of the most contentious issues 
dealt with in these forums. Experience  as shown that it has the potential to dominate debate, undermine 
conservation measures and virtually render an RFMO moribund‖ (A. Willock and M. Lack, Follow the 
leader: Learning from experience and best practice in regional fisheries management organizations (WWF 
International and TRAFFIC International, 2006) at 26, online TRAFFIC 
<http://www.traffic.org/fisheries>). 
11
 Cullis-Suzuky and Pauly, supra note 1, at 6. Lodge et al., citing Fisheries and Ocean Canada (DFO), note 
that the most common objection to conservation and management measures in the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries Organization (NAFO) has been with respect to national quota allocations. The objection rate is 
not insignificant: on average 10 objections per year were filed against NAFO decisions in the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s, dropping to two and four objections per year in more recent years (Michael W. Lodge, 
David Anderson, Terje Løbach, Gordon Munro, Keith Sainsbury, and Anna Willock, Recommended Best 
Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Report of an independent panel to develop a 
model for improved governance by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (London: The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 2007) at 39, online Chatham House 





 In particular, game theory has been resorted to as an analytical tool 
addressing the conflicts of cooperation, participation and access in high seas fisheries.
13
 
There are also a number of analyses from the perspective of political science.
14
 And of 
course, allocation has been included in several studies that provide policy advice on high 
seas fishing.
15
 Legal studies have been, however, relatively scarce.
16
 The scarcity of legal 
studies is probably the result of the widespread opinion that allocation of fishing 
opportunities is a political rather than a legal issue.
17
 Allocation is a matter to be 
                                                          
12
 See, for example: R. Quentin Grafton et al., The Economics of Allocation in Tuna Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations (RFMOs), Australian National University, Economics and Environment 
Network Working Paper EEN0612, 14 December 2006, online: Australian National University, Economic 
and Environment Network <http://een.anu.edu.au>; Allen, supra note 2.  
13
 See, for example: Munro, Van Houtte and Willmann, supra note 7, at 10-11; Gordon Munro, ―Game 
theory and the development of resource management policy: the case of international fisheries‖ (2008) 14 
Environment and Development Economics 7; T. Bjørndal, V. Kaitala, M. Lindroos, and G. Munro, ―The 
management of high seas fisheries‖ (2000) 94 Annals of Operations Research 183; P. Pintassilgo, ―A 
coalition approach to the management of high seas fisheries in the presence of externalities‖ (2003) 16 
Natural Resource Modeling 175. 
14
 See, for example: Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir, Who Gets What?: Domestic Influences on International 
Negotiations Allocating Shared Resources (New York: State University of New York, 2008); Arild 
Underdal, The Politics of International Fisheries Management: The Case of the Northeast Atlantic (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1980); Alf Håkon Hoel and Ingrid Kvalvik, ―The allocation of scarce natural 
resources: The case of fisheries‖ (2006) 30 Marine Policy 347. 
15
 See: Lodge et al., supra note 11; Mooney-Seus and Rosenberg, supra note 3; Willock and Lack, supra 
note 10; OECD, Strengthening Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (OECD, 2009); Douglas S. 
Butterworth and Andrew J. Penney, ―Allocation in high seas fisheries: avoiding meltdowns‖ in A.I.L. 
Payne, C.M. O‘Brien and S.I. Rogers (eds.), Management of Shared Fish Stocks (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Pub., 2004) 165.  
16
 See: Erik Jaap Molenaar, ―Participation, Allocation and Unregulated Fishing: The Practice of Regional 
Fisheries Management Organizations‖ (2003) 18 Int‘l J. Mar. & Coast. L. 457 [Molenaar, ―Participation‖]; 
Rosemary Rayfuse, ―Regional allocation issues or Zen and the art of pie cutting‖ University of New South 
Wales Law Research Paper Nr.  2007-10 (paper presented at the Sharing the Fish Conference 06: 
Allocation Issues in Fisheries Management, Perth, 26 February – 2 March 2006); Daniel Owen, Practice of 
RFMOs Regarding Non-members, Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations, Technical Study No. 2 (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2007), online 
Chatham House <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers>. Important analysis on allocation 
of fishing opportunities was also included in Erik Jaap Molenaar, ―The South Tasman Rise Arrangement of 
2000 and other Initiatives on Management and Conservation of Orange Roughy‖ (2001) 16 Int‘l J. Mar. & 
Coast. L. 77 [Molenaar, ―The South Tasman Rise Arrangement‖]. Some mentions to allocation of high seas 
fishing opportunities are also included in general studies on the law of the sea or high seas fisheries, and in 
particular in legal studies on the United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 4 August 1995, 34 ILM 1542 
(1995); 2167 UNTS 88 (entered into force 11 December 2001)  [hereafter UNFSA].  
17
 Lodge et al. note: ―The allocation of participatory rights and the mechanisms used to assimilate the 
dynamics of both the fisheries themselves and the broader geopolitical landscape invariably result from a 
negotiated outcome between sovereign States. (…) [E]xperience to date has been that allocation is 
invariably a political decision‖ (Lodge et al., supra note 11, at 34). Molenaar, in turn, considers that ―[t]he 
allocation process is to a large extent governed by political and negotiating factors, and constrained only by 
very general rules and principles of international law‖ (Molenaar, ―Participation‖, ibid, at 479). 
4 
 
negotiated and agreed upon by the involved parties without significant guidance in the 
form of substantive rules. Oda has categorically asserted that in the issues of allocation of 
benefits and burdens of ocean management and conservation,  
the concept of equity has a predominant impact, while legal norms play little or 
no role. Equity comprises no objective legal criterion and varies in each 
circumstance. Its evaluation or determination is not a simple matter. Solutions in 
the above categories nonetheless will need to be found; but they will not be found 




This dismissal of the discipline of law in the resolution of allocation problems 
seems at odds with several recent developments in international law and in international 
fisheries law. First, and perhaps most importantly, it contradicts the increasing role of 
equity and equitable principles as a legal standard for the allocation of scarce resources in 
international law. This role has been recognized by several scholars. Schachter, for 
example, identified five manifestations or uses of equity. One of those manifestations is 
to provide a legal standard for allocation of scarce resources. Furthermore, he asserts that 
―[e]quitable principles of a more specific substantive character have come to have an 
especially significant role in regard to shared resources and delimitation problems‖ 
(emphasis added).
19
 Shelton, in turn, considers that there are three categories of 
substantive legal norms that promote the idea of justice: norms addressing the 
consequences of wrongful actions; norms of humane treatment; and norms allocating 
scarce resources.
20
 Furthermore, the concepts of equitable delimitation and equitable use 
have been widely considered as the legal substantive norms governing the delimitation of 
maritime areas and the apportionment of shared resources. As such, they have been 
applied by the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in the legal resolution of disputes between parties. 
                                                          
18
 Shigeru Oda, ―Some reflections on recent developments in the law of the sea‖ (2002) 27 Yale J. Int‘l L. 
217, included in Shigeru Oda, Fifty Years of Law of the Sea, with a special section on the International 
Court of Justice: selected writings of Shigeru Oda  (The Hague; New York: Kluwer Law International, 
2003) 685, at 690. 
19
 Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (Dordrecht, the Netherlands; Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991) at 58. 
20
 Dinah Shelton, ―Describing the elephant: international justice and environmental law‖ in Jonas Ebbesson 
and Phoebe Okowa (eds.), Environmental Law and Justice in Context (Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press 2009) 55, at 65. 
5 
 
The dismissal of legal principles from allocation of fishing opportunities also 
ignores the importance of equity as a component of the concept of sustainable 
development, which in turn has an increasing influence in the interpretation and 
implementation of international law. The concept of sustainable development recognizes 
a particularly important role to be fulfilled by the principle of intergenerational equity, 
which addresses the fair allocation of resources between present and future generations, 
and the principle of intra-generational equity, which address the fair allocation of 
resources within current generations.
21
  
Equity is also considered an element of the ecosystem approach to natural 
resource management, defined as ―a strategy for the integrated management of land, 
water and living resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an equitable 
way.‖
22
 The ecosystem approach has been explicitly accepted as a guiding principle and 
objective for fisheries management for both areas under national jurisdiction and the high 
seas,
23





instruments at the global and regional level. In the particular context of ecosystem 
                                                          
21
 See, for example: New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable 
Development, adopted by the 70
th
 Conference of the International Law Association, held in New Delhi, 
India, 2-6 April 2002, included in (2002) 2 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics 211 [hereafter ILA New Delhi Declaration], at 212-213. The role of intergenerational equity 
and intra-generational equity in international law in the field of sustainable development will be addressed 
in detail in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
22
 Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Decision V/6 adopted during 
Fifth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Nairobi, Kenya, 
15 - 26 May 2000 (CBD COP 5 Decision V/6), section A paragraph (1), online: CBD 
<http://www.cbd.org>. 
23
 S.M. Garcia, A. Zerbi, C. Aliaume, T. Do Chi, and G. Lasserre, The ecosystem approach to fisheries: 
Issues, terminology, principles, institutional foundations, implementation and outlook, FAO Fisheries 
Technical Paper No. 443 (Rome: FAO, 2003). 
24
 See, for example: UNFSA, article 5 subparagraphs e) and d); Convention on the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, 5 September 
2000, 40 ILM 278 (2001) [hereafter WCFPC Convention], articles 5 subparagraph d) and 12(3) 
subparagraphs b) and c). More importantly, the recently adopted Convention for the Conservation and 
Management of High Seas Fisheries Resources in the South Pacific makes and explicit reference to 
―ecosystem approach‖ and considers it as a necessary means to achieve the objective of the Convention 
(Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific 
Ocean, adopted at Auckland, November 14, 2009, online: South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management 
Organization (SPRFMO) <www.southpacificrfmo.org> [hereafter SPRFMO Convention] preamble para. 9 
and articles 2, 3(1) subparagraph b) and 3(2) subparagraph b).    
25
 Reykjavik Declaration on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem, adopted by the FAO 
Conference in its Thirty-first session, Rome, 2-13 November 2001, online: FAO <http://www.fao.org>; 
FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, FAO Doc. 95/20/Rev/1; UN Sales No. E98.V.11 (1998); 
1995 WTS 3, online: FAO <http://www.fao.org/fishery/en> [hereafter FAO Code of Conduct], in particular 
article 6.  
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Furthermore, the assertion that allocation is a political and not a legal issue 
appears to ignore that there is a perceived need for a framework for allocations of fishing 
opportunities that is objective, transparent, predictable, reasonable, and fair. Those are, 
precisely, roles that law fulfills in the organization of society. 
Section 1. Objective and Structure of the Study 
The starting point of this thesis is, therefore, that equity plays an important role as 
a legal standard for allocation of scarce resources in international law; a legal standard 
which has been defined and refined in the context of international law, international 
environmental law, and international law in the field of sustainable development. The 
purpose of this thesis is to explore whether, under what conditions, and with what 
shortcomings, a legal concept of equity can provide assistance for the allocation of high 
seas fishing opportunities. This analysis is undertaken both from the perspective of 
allocation of fishing opportunities between generations (intergenerational or inter-
temporal allocation), and from the perspective of allocation within generations (intra-
generational allocation). It should be noted from the outset, though, that as the thesis 
progresses, this over-simplified starting point will be qualified and clarified precisely to 
answer those questions. 
To achieve the objective of this thesis, this study is divided in three main parts: a 
first part providing a background on allocation; a second part analyzing allocation from 
the perspective of intergenerational equity; and a third part analyzing allocation from the 
perspective of intra-generational equity.  
The first part has the objective of providing an in-depth understanding of the 
current status of allocation of fishing opportunities in the high seas, both at the level of 
global and regional legal framework and at the level of regional practices. This in-depth 
analysis is undertaken in chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 provides an historical recount of the 
emergence of total allowable catches (TACs) and allocation of national quotas as a 
                                                          
26
 See: Garcia et al., supra note 23, at 26; FAO, The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries, Technical 
Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No. 4 Suppl.2 (Rome: FAO, 2003) at 15 and Annex 2 on Principles of 
Relevance to an Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries. 
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fundamental conservation and management measure for international fisheries 
management, and of its evolution to this day. Emphasis is placed on the rationale behind 
the implementation of TACs and allocation of national quotas, its recognition in legal 
frameworks, and the role of equity in this evolution. Chapter 3 analyses the current legal 
framework for allocation of fishing opportunities, and the current regional allocation 
practices. An emphasis is put on the shortcomings of the existing legal framework to 
solve the different conflicts of interests involved in an allocation issue. 
These preliminary chapters provide the foundation to address allocation from the 
perspective of intergenerational and intra-generational equity. Chapter 4 addresses the 
legal linkages and the practical impacts of allocation of fishing opportunities on 
intergenerational equity. For this purpose, it analyzes the concept of intergenerational 
equity, its status in international law, and how the concept is recognized in international 
fisheries law. It then addresses the practical implications of allocation of fishing 
opportunities for intergenerational equity.  
Chapter 5 addresses allocation of fishing opportunities from the perspective of 
equity within the present generation, or intra-generational equity. As in the preceding 
chapter, it starts by analyzing the concept of equity and its status in international law and 
in international law in the field of sustainable development. This analysis provides an 
opportunity to understand the richness of the concept of equity, its different meanings or 
emphasis, its current acceptance in international law, and its evolving status. It is with 
this deeper understanding of equity that the thesis addresses its recognition in 
international fisheries law.  
The previous analysis allows concluding that equity – and in particular 
autonomous equity - can be considered a fundamental norm for allocation of fishing 
opportunities. This conclusion only opens the door for furthering the comprehension of 
the legal concept of equity and its normative content. For this purposes, the chapter 
analyzes three equitable principles identified and applied in other areas of international 
law. These three equitable principles are: equitable delimitation, equitable use, and 
common but differentiated responsibility. These three analyses provide valuable lessons 
for the construction of a normative concept of equity. They also provide valuable insights 
on the influence and evolution of certain categories of factors that are traditionally 
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considered relevant in the distribution of resources, and that have been also considered in 
the legal framework for the distribution of high seas fishing opportunities. Those are: 
historical or prior use, geographical and jurisdictional considerations (or zonal 
attachment), and socio-economic factors. This information allows re-examining the 
conflicts involved in the allocation of fishing opportunities in the high seas in the light of 
an evolving concept of equity. 
To complete the analysis of allocation of high seas fishing opportunities in the 
light of a normative concept of equity, the thesis addresses two final topics in chapters 6 
and 7. Chapter 6 considers the institutional and procedural implications of the adoption of 
a normative concept of equity for allocation of fishing opportunities. Finally, chapter 7 
addresses one emerging and particularly important aspect of allocation - the tradability of 
national quotas - in light of equity considerations. 
Before undertaking this analysis, however, some background information on high 
seas fisheries resources and high seas fisheries governance is needed. This background 
information will be provided in the next section of this chapter, which also serves to 
specify the scope of this thesis.  
Section 2. High Seas Fisheries Management: Basic Concepts  
This section provides an overview of important concepts of international fisheries 
management that are required as a conceptual framework for the subject of TAC and 
allocations. Those elements are: the different jurisdictional areas in the law of the sea; the 
classification of resources according to their distribution between those areas; the 
economic importance of high seas resources; the role of regional fisheries bodies and 
regional fisheries management organizations in high seas fisheries management; and the 
conservation and management measures that these organizations may adopt for the 
sustainable management of high seas fisheries. It is also considered relevant to give a 
wider perspective on the sharing of ocean resources, albeit this approach will not be 
pursued further in the thesis. The analysis undertaken here is neither novel nor extensive, 
since its objective is only to provide necessary background for the following chapters. 
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High Seas and High Seas Fisheries Resources  
The law of the sea, which has developed over many centuries, is currently 
reflected mainly in the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC).
27
 The 
LOSC adopts a geographical and jurisdictional approach to oceans management. As 
stated by van Houtte, ―the main trust (sic) of the 1982 Convention is the division of the 
ocean space into different jurisdictional areas and the identification of the rights and 
duties of States within those various areas.‖
28
 These various ocean areas are: internal 
waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), archipelagic 
waters, continental shelf, high seas, and the Area (seabed and ocean floor and subsoil 
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction). For purposes of fisheries jurisdiction, 
however, the relevant areas are the territorial sea, the EEZ, and the high seas.  
The territorial sea is an area of up to 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines 
determined in accordance with the LOSC.
29
 In this area, the coastal State exercises 
sovereignty, subject to the provisions of the LOSC and other rules of international law.
 30
 
The main limitation imposed by the LOSC is the coastal State‘s obligation to allow the 
innocent passage of vessels flying the flag of another country.
31
 Thus, in exercising 
sovereignty, the coastal State has exclusive jurisdiction for the conservation and 
management of the living marine resources that occur in this ocean belt.  
                                                          
27
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3; 21 ILM 1261 
(1982) (entered into force November 16, 2004) [hereafter LOSC]. 
28
 Annick Van Houtte, ―Legal Aspects in the Management of Shared Fish Stocks‖, in FAO, Papers 
presented at the Norway-FAO Expert Consultation on the Management of Shared Fish Stocks, Bergen, 
Norway, 7-10 October 2002, FAO Fisheries Report Nr. 695Suppl. (Rome: FAO, 2003) 30, at 30.   
29
 LOSC, article 5: ―Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for 
measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale 
charts officially recognized by the coastal State.‖ LOSC, article 6: ―In the case of islands situated on atolls 
or of islands having fringing reefs, the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the 
seaward low-water line of the reef, as shown by the appropriate symbol on charts officially recognized by 
the coastal State.‖ LOSC, article 7(1): ―In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or 
if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines 
joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured.‖ Article 7 of the LOSC provides guidance and conditions to draw straight 
baselines. 
30
 LOSC, article 2(1) and 2(3): ―The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and 
internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, 
described as the territorial sea. (...) The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this 
Convention and to other rules of international law.‖ 
31
 LOSC, article 17: ―Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy 
the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.‖ 
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The EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, extending up to 200 
nautical miles from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured.
32
 In this area, 
the coastal State exercises sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the 
waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to 
other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the 
production of energy from the water, currents and winds.
33
 It also exercises jurisdiction 
with regard to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations, and structures; 
marine scientific research; and the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment; as well as other rights and duties provided for in the Convention.
34
 
The sovereign rights that coastal States exercise in their EEZs over natural 
resources entail the right to determine the TAC of the fish stocks within this zone (thus 
defining the conservation goals independent of other States) and to optimally use those 
stocks. However, ―[w]here the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the 
entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements (…) give other 
States access to the surplus of the allowable catch‖.
35
 In so doing, some particular 
provisions should be taken into account by the coastal State.
36
  
The high seas encompass ―all parts of the sea that are not included in the 
exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the 
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.‖
37
 It includes, therefore, the water column 
over the extended continental shelf claimed by States in accordance to article 76 of 
LOSC, and the water column above the Area. This vast maritime space is open to all 
                                                          
32
 LOSC, articles 55 and 57. The EEZ breadth is, therefore, only 188 nautical miles. 
33
 LOSC, article 56. 
34
 LOSC, article 56(1). 
35
 LOSC, article 62(2). 
36
 These are: the significance of the living resources of the area to the economy of the coastal State 
concerned and its other national interests (including the fishing communities or fishing industries of the 
coastal State); the rights of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States; the requirements of 
developing States in the sub-region or region in harvesting part of the surplus; the need to minimize 
economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone; and the need to 
minimize economic dislocation in States which have made substantial efforts in research and identification 
of stocks. In particular relation to landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States, the LOSC 
considers: the need to avoid a particular burden for any single coastal State or a part of it; the nutritional 
needs of the populations of the respective States; and the rule that developed States can only participate in 
the exploitation of living resources in the EEZ of developed coastal States of the same subregion or region 
(LOSC, article 62).  
37
 LOSC, article 86. 
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States, whether coastal or land-locked.
38
 In this area, every State has the freedom of 
navigation; the freedom of overflight; the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; 
the freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under 
international law; the freedom of fishing; and the freedom of scientific research.
39
 The 
freedoms of the high seas must be exercised with due regard for international law and the 
provisions of the LOSC;
40
 and with due regard for the interests of other States in their 




Figure 1. Maritime Zones 
 
Source: R.R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3d ed. (Oxford: 
Manchester University Press, 1999) at 30.   
 
The spatial jurisdiction of the LOSC does not coincide with the biological 
distribution or migration patterns of fisheries resources. There are, therefore, some fish 
stocks
42
 that are distributed over, or migrate across, ocean areas under different 
                                                          
38
 LOSC, article 87(1). 
39
 LOSC, article 86(1). 
40
 See: LOSC, article 86(1). 
41
 LOSC, article 86(2). The article adds that the freedoms of the high seas must be exercised with due 
regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area. Since the management 
regime for the seabed beyond areas under national jurisdiction is not analyzed, this reference has been 
omitted. 
42
 A fish stock is a ―subset of a species with similar growth and mortality parameters within a given 
geographical area and with negligible interbreeding with other stocks of the same species in adjacent areas‖ 
(Jean-Jacques Maguire, Michael Sissenwine, Jorge Csirke, Richard Grainger, and Serge Garcia, The state 
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jurisdiction. These are usually classified in four categories: transboundary stocks, highly 
migratory stocks, straddling stocks, and discrete stocks.  
The fish stocks that straddle between the EEZ of two or more States are usually 
known as transboundary stocks.
43
 Article 63(1) of the LOSC, in establishing the regime 
for these stocks, refers to them simply as ―stock or stocks of associated species [that] 
occur within the exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States‖. 
Some stocks also straddle or migrate between the EEZ of one or more States and 
the high seas: highly migratory and straddling stocks.
44
 The LOSC does not contain a 
conceptual definition of highly migratory stock. However, Annex I of the LOSC contains 
a closed list of resources that are legally considered highly migratory. This list includes 
all tuna and tuna-like fish stocks (marlins, sailfishes, swordfish),
45
 as well as some other 
species that have similarly wide distribution and migration patterns.  
The LOSC does not contain a legal definition of straddling stocks, either. 
However, following the wording of article 63(2) of LOSC, it is generally understood that 
a straddling stock refers to "the same stock or stocks of associated species [which] occur 
both within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the 
zone"
46
 and that are not included in Annex I of the LOSC. A straddling stock may be 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of world highly migratory, straddling and other high seas fishery resources and associated species, FAO 
Fisheries Technical Paper No. 495 (Rome: FAO, 2006), at 3). Given its independence from other groups of 
the same species, the stock is usually chosen as a unit for management purposes.  
43
 According to Munro, Van Houtte and Willman, the fish stocks that are distributed over, or migrate 
across, areas of the ocean under different jurisdiction, or occur in the high seas, are known as shared stocks 
(Munro, Van Houtte, and Willmann, supra note 7, at 3). Van Houtte, in a previous work, noted that 
fisheries lawyer use the generic term transboundary resources to refer to fish stocks that can be found on 
two sides of a boundary, and the specific term shared stocks to refer to those stocks that distribute over, or 
migrate across, the EEZ of two or more States (Van Houtte, supra note 28, at 30). The term shared fish 
stock has not been used by international practitioners, however. The FAO Code of Conduct refers to 
transboundary stocks to refer to stocks that occur in the EEZs of two or more States (FAO, Code of 
Conduct, supra note 25, article 7.1.3). In addition, the term ―shared resource‖ has been subject to an 
extensive debate in the International Law Commission (ILC). For this reason, this thesis follows the 
terminology of the FAO Code of Conduct. 
44
 It has been noted that the distinction between highly migratory stocks and straddling stocks followed 
political, rather than biological, imperatives (Munro, Van Houtte and Willmann, ibid, at 36, citing William 
T. Burke, The New International Law of Fisheries: UNCLOS 1983 and Beyond (Oxford: Clarendon Press; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 200). Maguire et al., in turn, note that the definition of highly 
migratory stock is a legal rather than a scientific definition based on the actual migratory behavior of the 
species (Maguire et al., supra note 42, at 4). 
45
 See: Maguire et al., ibid, at 10. 
46
 Ibid, at 4. 
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distributed mostly inside the EEZ, or mostly in the high seas; as long as there is directed 
fishing effort on either side of the EEZ, the stock is considered to be straddling.
47
 
It is worth mentioning, at this point, that the limited provisions of the LOSC for 
the conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory stocks have been 
further developed by the United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA).
48
 The Agreement, however, does not define either of 
these concepts. There are also stocks that occur only or exclusively in the high seas. 
These are known as ‗discrete stocks‘. Fishing for ‗discrete stocks‘ is relatively recent. 
The fishery was first developed off New Zealand and Australia in the late-1970s and 
1980s, and expanded rapidly elsewhere since the 1990s.
49
 Most of the known discrete 
stocks are deep-water species: orange roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus), oreos (Allocyttus 
spp., Neocyttus spp., Pseudocyttus spp.), alfonsinos (Beryx spp.), Patagonian toothfish 
(Dissostichus eleginoides) or armourhead (Pseudopentaceros spp.).
50
 It has been noted, 
however, that ―several others may exist for pelagic species.‖
51
 The term ‗discrete stock‘ 
is also recent and does not appear in the LOSC, although it refers to high seas living 
resources in Part VII. The term has been subject to criticism, and the term ‗high seas fish 
stock‘ has been preferred.
52
 However, since straddling and highly migratory stocks also 
have a high seas component, the term discrete stocks will be used in this thesis. High seas 
fisheries resources in this thesis will encompass, therefore, straddling, highly migratory 
and discrete stocks. 
 
 
                                                          
47
 Ibid.  
48
 See: UNFSA, supra note 16. 
49
 Maguire et al., supra note 42, at 50. 
50
 Ibid, at 49-55. It should be noted, however, that their condition as discrete stock depends on the stock 
distribution. This has often been source of contention between parties. See, for example: Erik Jaap 
Molenaar, ―South Tasman Rise‖, supra note 16, at 85. 
51
 Maguire et al., ibid, at 49.  
52
 FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 25, article 7.1.3; Maguire et al., ibid, at 4. Maguire et al. note note 
that ―the discreteness of such stocks is generally unknown (e.g. fish caught on distinct seamounts hundreds 
or thousands of kilometres apart may not necessarily belong to discrete/separate biological units)‖ (Maguire 
et al., ibid). Munro, Van Houtte, and Willmann use the term discrete stock (Munro, Van Houtte, and 
Willmann, supra note 7, at 3 and 55). 
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Figure 2. Types of stocks occurring partially or entirely in the high seas.  
Top panel: 1. Highly Migratory; 2. Straddling (extensive distribution); 3. High seas. 
Bottom panel: 4. Pelagic straddling (mostly within EEZ); 5. Demersal straddling (mostly 
within EEZ); 6. Straddling (transboundary); 7. Straddling (mostly in the high seas); 8. 
Straddling (evenly distributed). 
 
Source: Jean-Jacques Maguire, Michael Sissenwine, Jorge Csirke, Richard Grainger, 
Serge Garcia, The state of world highly migratory, straddling and other high seas fishery 
resources and associated species, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 495 (Rome: FAO, 
2006) at 6. 
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Despite the fact that the LOSC adopts an approach to fisheries jurisdiction that is 





 and marine mammals,
55
 without defining the terms. Anadromous 
and catadromous species refer to those species that migrate between fresh water and the 
oceans. Anadromous species utilize freshwater river and streams for spawning and 
juvenile rearing, and oceanic environments during adult life stages (e.g. salmon and 
sturgeon); while catadromous species spawn in the ocean and use freshwater habitats 
during adult life stages (e.g. most eels).  Marine mammals, in turn, are a diverse group of 
mammals that are primarily ocean-dwelling or dependent on the ocean for food. They 
include cetaceans (whales, dolphins and propoises) and pinnipeds (seals, sea lions, and 
walruses). Anadromous and catadromous species, and marine mammals may, as well, 
have high seas distribution. 
This thesis focuses on TAC and allocation of fishing opportunities for stocks that 
have a high seas component (i.e., straddling stocks, highly migratory stocks and discrete 
stocks) with the exception of anadromous and catadromous stocks and marine mammals. 
It does, therefore, not address the management of stocks occurring within the EEZ of two 
or more States (i.e. transboundary resources).  
 
The Economic Importance of High Seas Fisheries Resources 
High seas areas cover approximately 60% of the oceans.
56
 However, their 
productivity (or at least the productivity of known species with readily available and cost-
effective technology) has been considered, traditionally, much less than in areas of the 
EEZ. The precise economic importance of high seas fisheries is hard to establish.
57
 The 
main reason for this is the structure of the catch statistical system. Marine catches are 
reported by countries to the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) according to statistical areas for fishery purposes established in the 1950s and 
thus, before the codification of the concept of the EEZs in the LOSC in 1982. Because 
                                                          
53
 LOSC, article 66. 
54
 LOSC, article 67. 
55
 LOSC, article 65. 
56
 IUCN, 10 Principles for High Seas Governance, October 2008, online: IUCN <www.iucn.org>.  
57
 Munro, Van Houtte and Willmann, supra note 7, at 6; FAO, SOFIA 2008, supra note 1, at 14.  
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the boundaries of the FAO statistical areas and of the EEZs do not correspond, the data 
on catches in EEZ and high seas are aggregated. As a consequence, the data on catches in 
the high seas cannot be obtained from the data submitted to FAO.
58
 FAO has initiated a 
project in collaboration with RFMOs on the modification of statistical areas, but this 
project is ongoing and has yet to show results.
59
 
Despite this shortcoming, ―there is enough evidence to indicate that the 
significance of shared fish stocks in world capture fisheries is decidedly non-trivial.‖
60
 In 
2003, Munro et al., estimated that the total annual harvest of highly migratory and 
straddling stocks represented approximately 20% of the total harvest of world marine 
capture fisheries.
61
 More recently, Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly have estimated that catches in 
the high seas represents approximately 15% of the world catches.
62
  
The proportion of world catches coming from high seas fisheries may still grow, 
as a consequence of an increased depletion of fisheries in the EEZs and advances in 
technology that makes high seas fishing (and particularly deep-sea fishing) possible and 
commercially viable. For example, FAO has recently estimated at 133 the number of 
species classified as deep-water (thus presumably discrete stocks). This is more than 
double the number of the first classification based on 1999 data.
63
 In addition, catches of 
the highly migratory stocks of tuna continue to grow.
64
 
Most importantly, several high seas fish resources have a significant commercial 
value. That is particularly the case with tuna stocks. While tuna catches represent less 
than 5% of the world catch, ―their landed value has been estimated to account for nearly 
20 percent of the global marine total.‖
65
 Orange roughy, a deep-sea species that may be 
classified as a straddling or a discrete stock, is also an economically important species 
and thus object of increasing demand. 
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 FAO, SOFIA 2008,ibid, at 14. 
59
 Ibid, at 15. 
60
 Munro, Van Houtte and Willmann, supra note 7, at 6. The authors used the term ―shared fish stock‖ to 
refer to transboundary, straddling, highly migratory and discrete stocks.  
61
 Ibid, at 7. 
62
 Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly, supra note 1. 
63
 FAO, SOFIA 2008, supra note 1, at 14. 
64
 Ibid, at 12. 
65
 Maguire et al., supra note 42, at 10.  
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These studies show, therefore, that high seas fish stocks are now, and are expected 
to be in the future, under considerable fishing pressure. 
 
Regional Fisheries Bodies, Organizations and Arrangements 
The LOSC relies, for the conservation and management of high seas fish 
resources, on States cooperation.
66
 Cooperative regimes are usually established at the 
regional level and institutionalized through regional fisheries organizations or bodies, or 
formalized through regional fisheries arrangements.
67
  
A regional fisheries body has been understood as a  
(...) mechanism through which three or more States or international organizations 
that are parties to an international fishery agreement or arrangement 
collaboratively engage each other in multilateral management of fishery affairs 
related to transboundary, straddling, highly or high seas migratory stocks, through 
the collection and provision of scientific information and data, serving as a 
technical and policy forum, or taking decisions pertaining to the development and 
conservation, management and responsible utilization of the resources.
68
 
FAO lists currently 42 regional fisheries bodies.
69
 These bodies differ in their 
mandates, functions, structure and financial resources.
70
 Most importantly for this thesis, 
many of the regional fisheries bodies do not have a mandate to adopt conservation and 
management measures, i.e., they are advisory bodies but without management 
authority.
71
 The regional fisheries bodies that have such a mandate are known as 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). The FAO defines RFMOs as 
                                                          
66
 LOSC, article 118: ―States shall cooperate with each other in the conservation and management of living 
resources in the areas of the high seas. States whose nationals exploit identical living resources, or different 
living resources in the same area, shall enter into negotiations with a view to taking the measures necessary 
for the conservation of the living resources concerned. They shall, as appropriate, cooperate to establish 
subregional or regional fisheries organizations to this end.‖ 
67
 According to article 118 of the LOSC, ―States shall cooperate with each other in the conservation and 
management of living resources in the areas of the high seas. States whose nationals exploit identical living 
resources, or different living resources in the same area, shall enter into negotiations with a view to taking 
the measures necessary for the conservation of the living resources concerned. They shall, as appropriate, 
cooperate to establish subregional or regional fisheries organizations to this end.‖  
68
 FAO, Report of the Meeting of FAO and non-FAO Regional Fishery Bodies or Arrangements, Rome, 11-
12 February 1999, FAO Fisheries Report No. 597, FIPL/R597 (Rome: FAO, 1999), Appendix E, ―Major 
Issues Affecting The Performance of Regional Fishery Bodies‖, para. 1, footnote 3. 
69
 See online: FAO <www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/search/en>. 
70
 Judith Swan, Regional Fishery Bodies and Governance: Issues, Actions and Future Directions, FAO 
Fisheries Circular No. 959 (Rome: FAO, 2000), at 1. 
71
 Of the regional bodies recognized by FAO, 23 have only advisory mandate. See: supra note 69. 
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―intergovernmental fisheries organizations or arrangements, as appropriate, that have the 
competence to establish fisheries conservation and management measures‖.
72
  
The difference between an organization and an arrangement lies in the 
institutional setting: a RFMO is an international organization with a specific operational 
structure (usually consisting of a Commission or Meeting of the Parties, Secretariat, 
Scientific Committee, Compliance Committee, and Financial or Administration 
Committee), while a regional fisheries management arrangement is a management 
agreement between States that does not consider such a structure.  
 
Figure 3. Regional Fisheries Bodies 
 
FAO. © 2008-2010. RFB web site. Regional Fishery Bodies (RFB). In: FAO Fisheries 
and Aquaculture Department [online]. Rome. Updated 20 October 2008. [Cited 26 
August 2010] <http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/en>. 
 
The role and importance of regional fisheries bodies, and of RFMOs and regional 
fisheries management arrangements in particular, as vehicles for oceans governance has 
                                                          
72
  FAO, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing, adopted by FAO‘s Committee on Fisheries (COFI) on 2 March 2001 and endorsed by the FAO 
Council on 23 June 2001, para. 6(c), online: FAO <http://www.fao.org/fishery/en> [hereafter IPOA-IUU]. 
The definition has been recently included in the FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter 
and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, approved by the 36
th
 Conference of FAO held 
in Rome, 18-23 November 2009, online: FAO <http://www.fao.org/fishery/en> [hereafter FAO Port State 
Measures Agreement].  
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been emphasized in the 1993 FAO Agreement,
73
 in the 1995 Code of Conduct,
74
 the 1995 
Rome Consensus on World Fisheries,
75
 the 1995 Kyoto Declaration and Plan of Action 
on the Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security,
76
 and in UNFSA.
77
 It is 
widely accepted that RFMOs and agreements, as the primary mechanisms for achieving 
                                                          
73
 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by 
Fishing Vessels in the High Seas, November 24, 1993, adopted by the FAO Conference at its 27
th
 Session, 
33 ILM 968 (1994), 2004 ATS 26 [hereafter FAO Compliance Agreement] preamble, para. 7: ―The Parties 
to this Agreement, Calling upon States which do not participate in global, regional or subregional fisheries 
organizations or arrangements to join or, as appropriate, to enter into understandings with such 
organizations or with parties to such organizations or arrangements with a view to achieving compliance 
with international conservation and management measures.‖ 
74
 FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 25, para. 7.1.3: ―For transboundary fish stocks, straddling fish stocks, 
highly migratory fish stocks and high seas fish stocks, where these are exploited by two or more States, the 
States concerned, including the relevant coastal States in the case of straddling and highly migratory stocks, 
should cooperate to ensure effective conservation and management of the resources. This should be 
achieved, where appropriate, through the establishment of a bilateral, subregional or regional fisheries 
organization or arrangement.‖ The resolution of the Conference adopting the FAO Code of Conduct also 
included a paragraph stating that the Conference ―[u]rges FAO to strengthen Regional Fisheries Bodies in 
order to deal more effectively with fisheries conservation and management issues in support of subregional, 
regional and global cooperation and coordination in fisheries‖ (FAO Code of Conduct, ibid, Annex 2, para. 
7). 
75
 The Rome Consensus on World Fisheries urges governments and international organizations to take 
prompt action to strengthen and support regional, sub-regional, and national fisheries organizations and 
arrangements for implementing conservation and management measures (FAO, Rome Consensus on World 
Fisheries, adopted by the FAO Ministerial Conference on Fisheries, Rome, 14-15 March 1995, Non-serial 
publications AC441/E, online: FAO <http://www.fao.org/documents>). 
76
 The Kyoto Plan of Action on Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security includes, among 
other, the following actions: enhance subregional and regional cooperation and establish, where it is 
considered appropriate, subregional and regional fishery conservation and management organizations or 
arrangements for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks; and cooperate to strengthen, 
where necessary, existing subregional and regional fishery conservation and management organizations and 
arrangements in order to carry out their assigned tasks (FAO, Kyoto Declaration and Plan of Action on the 
Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security, adopted by the International Conference on the 
Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security, hosted by the Government of Japan in cooperation 
with FAO at Kyoto, 4 to 9 December 1995, Plan of Action para. 2, online: FAO 
<http://www.fao.org/documents>). 
77
 According to article 8 of UNFSA, coastal States and States fishing on the high seas shall, in accordance 
with the LOSC, pursue cooperation in relation to straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks 
either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or 
arrangements, taking into account the specific characteristics of the subregion or region, to ensure effective 
conservation and management of such stocks. According to paragraph 5, ―where there is no subregional or 
regional fisheries management organization or arrangement to establish conservation and management 
measures for a particular straddling fish stock or highly migratory fish stock, relevant coastal States and 
States fishing on the high seas for such stock in the subregion or region shall cooperate to establish such an 
organization or enter into other appropriate arrangements to ensure conservation and management of such 
stock and shall participate in the work of the organization or arrangement.‖ Paragraph 4 adds that ―only 
those States which are members of such an organization or participants in such an arrangement, or which 
agree to apply the conservation and management measures established by such organization or 
arrangement, shall have access to the fishery resources to which those measures apply.‖  
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Furthermore, there have been continuous calls to strengthen the role of RFMOs 
and to improve their performance ―in accordance with the demands of strengthened 
international fishery instruments aimed at better conservation and management of fishery 
resources.‖
79
 According to article 13 of UNFSA, States ―shall cooperate to strengthen 
existing subregional and regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements 
in order to improve their effectiveness in establishing and implementing conservation and 
management measures for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.‖ As a 
consequence of this perception, there have been various initiatives, studies, reports and 
guidelines
80




This thesis focuses on the work of RFMOs in relation to one particular 
conservation and management measure. Nevertheless, not all the RFMOs recognized by 
FAO have been considered in the analysis. Some RFMOs do not have jurisdiction on the 
high seas,
82
 some have jurisdiction over anadromous species
83
 or marine mammals,
84
 and 
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 Lodge et al., supra note 11, at 1. 
79
 Lodge et al., ibid, at vii. 
80
 See, for example: Lodge et al., ibid; Mooney-Seus and Rosenberg, supra note 3; Willock and Lack, 
supra note 10; Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly, supra note 1.  
81
 The RFMOs that have undertaken a performance review are: CCAMLR, ICCAT, CCSBT, NEAFC, and 
IOTC. ICCAT, NEAFC and CCAMLR had a performance review undertaken by an expert panel that 
included external reviewers. CCSBT had a review undertaken by an international committee, reviewed by 
an external expert. The respective reports are: CCAMLR, Performance Review Panel Report, 1 September 
2008, online: CCAMLR <http://www.ccamlr.org> [hereafter CCAMLR Performance Review Report]; 
G.D. Hurry, M. Hayashi and J. J. Maguire, Report of the Independent Review, International Commission 
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), PLE-106/2008, Part I, section 4(4), [hereafter ICCAT 
Performance Review Report]; CCSBT, Report of the Performance Review Working Group, Canberra, 
Australia, 3–4 July 2008, and Report of the Independent Expert, September 2008, online: CCSBT 
<http://www.ccsbt.org> [hereafter CCSBT Performance Review Report]; NEAFC, Report of the 
Performance Review Panel, November 2006, online: NEAFC <http://www.neafc.org > [hereafter NEAFC 
Performance Review Report]; and IOTC, Report of the Performance Review Panel, January 2009, online: 
IOTC <http://www.iotc.org> [hereafter IOTC Performance Review Report]. Among the organizations that 
have postpone the RFMO performance review, for different reasons, are NAFO, IATTC and WCPFC. 
Some other organizations have adopted terms of reference for performance reviews that are currently 
ongoing. SEAFO has recently approved the terms of reference for a performance review that will be 
undertaken in 2010. These terms of reference were drafted mostly considering the terms of reference of 
CCAMLR, which has no allocation procedures in place. As a result, allocation procedures are not in the 
terms of reference of this performance review. 
82




two have jurisdiction over enclosed seas.
85
 For these reasons, they will not be the focus of 
this thesis. The focus will be the on the ten RFMOs that have jurisdiction over highly 
migratory stocks, straddling stocks or discrete stocks. 
The RFMOs considered in this thesis that have jurisdiction over highly migratory 
stocks, or tuna RFMOs, are the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC),
86
 
the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT),
87
 the 
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC),
88
 the Commission for the Conservation of 
Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT),
89
 and the Western Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission (WCPFC).
90
 The selected RFMOs with jurisdiction over straddling stocks, 
and in some cases discrete stocks, are the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR),
91
 the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization 
(NAFO),
92
 the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC),
93
 the South East 
                                                                                                                                                                             
83
 That is the case of the North Pacific Anadromous Fisheries Commission (NPAFC), the Pacific Salmon 
Commission (PSC), and the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO). 
84
 That is the case of the International Whaling Commission (IWC).  
85
 That is the case of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the 
Central Bering Sea (CCBSP) and General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM). 
86
 Established by the Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, 
United States of America and Republic of Costa Rica, 31 May 1949, TIAS 2044, 1UST 230, 80 UNTS 3, 
modified by the Convention for the Strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 
established by the 1949 Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica, 
27 July 2003 (entered into force 27 August 2010), online: IATTC <http://www.iattc.org> [hereafter IATTC 
Convention]. 
87
 Established by International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, 14 May 1966, 20 UST 
2887; 673 UNTS 63 (entered into force 21 March 1969), amended by the Protocol of Paris to Amend the 
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, 10 July 1984 (entered into force 14 
December 1997), and the Madrid Protocol to Amend Paragraph 2 of Article X of the International 
Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, 5 June 1992 (entered into force 10 March 2005) 
[hereafter ICCAT Convention]. 
88
 Established by the Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, 25 
November 1993, 1927 U.N.T.S. 329 [hereafter IOTC Convention]. 
89
 Established by the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, 10 May 1993, 1819 
UNTS 360; 1994 ATS No. 16 [hereafter CCSBT Convention]. 
90
 Established by the WCFPC Convention, supra note 24. 
91
 Established by the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 20 May 1980, 
1329 UNTS 48; 19 ILM 841 (1980) [hereafter CCAMLR Convention]. 
92
 Established by the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 24 
October 1978, 1135 UNTS 369 (entered into force 1 January 1979) [hereafter NAFO Convention]. 
93
 Established by the Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries, 18 




Atlantic Fisheries Organization (SEAFO),
94
 and the recently adopted South Pacific 
Organization (SPRFM, not yet in force).
95
  
The selected RFMOs differ in several respects. Many pre-date the LOSC,
96
 while 
others have been established in recent years.
97
 Most are non-FAO bodies, while one is a 
fishery organization adopted under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution.
98
 Some regulate 
only one stock,
99
 while many regulate all the highly migratory stocks, or all the straddling 
stocks, in their area of competence. Their membership also varies both in number and 
composition. Some have a very limited membership,
100
 while others have more than 25 
member States.
101
 In some cases the member States are predominantly developed 
States,
102
 while in others there is a strong participation of developing States.
103
 
It should be pointed out that some of these organizations have been given more 
attention because of their progress in adopting allocation frameworks or guidelines, and 
allocation practices.
104
 In particular, the analyses of this thesis focus on the efforts 
undertaken by NAFO, ICCAT, CCSBT and WCFPC. Similarly, the research for this 
thesis included the allocation keys and agreements for different stocks under the mandate 
of these RFMOs. However, only a sample of those cases is referred to in the following 
chapters.  
 
Conservation and Management Measures 
As noted earlier, RFMOs are a particular type of regional fishery bodies: 
organizations that have a mandate to adopt binding conservation and management 
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 Established by the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in the South 
East Atlantic Ocean, 20 April 2001, 41 I.L.M. 257 (2002) [hereafter SEAFO Convention]. 
95
 Established by the SPRFMO Convention, supra note 24. 
96
 NAFO, NEAFC, IATTC, ICCAT, IOTC, CCAMLR. 
97
 CCSBT, WCPFC, SEAFO, SPRFMO. 
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 That is the case of IOTC.   
99
 That is the case of CCSBT, which has jurisdiction exclusively over the Southern bluefin tuna stock. 
100
 For example, SEAFO has 6 members (Angola, European Union, Japan, Namibia, Norway, and South 
Africa); CCSBT has 6 members (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, and the 
fishing entity of Taiwan, which is a member of the Extended Commission of the CCSBT). 
101
 ICCAT has 48 members; IOTC has 28 members; WCPFC has 25 members and 7 participating 
territories. 
102
 That is the case, for example, of NAFO and NEAFC. 
103
 That is the case, for example, for ICCAT, WCFPC, and IATTC. 
104
 Among them are NAFO, ICCAT, and CCSBT. 
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measures for the stocks under their jurisdiction. A few words on conservation and 
management measures are therefore required. 
In an unregulated ocean, the enormous wealth of living marine resources is, in 
theory, available to everyone and, in practice, obtained by those who engage in fishing 
activities and to extent of their engagement in those activities. Because living marine 
resources have proven to be exhaustible in face of the incredible fishing capacities 
developed by modern technology, that laissez-faire approach is a matter of the past. 
Restrictions and limitations are necessary to ensure that fish stocks are exploited at levels 
that are sustainable, i.e., in a manner consistent with their renewal. Those restrictions and 
limitations are known as conservation and management measures. 
FAO distinguishes three options for regulating fisheries: a) technical measures 
(e.g. gear restrictions, area and time restrictions, marine protected areas, minimum size 
and maturity restrictions); b) input (effort) control (e.g. restrictions on the number of 
fishing units through limiting the number of licenses or permits, restrictions on the 
amount of time units can spend fishing, and restrictions on the size of vessels and/or 
gear); and c) output (catch) control (e.g. TACs, or quotas).
105
  
All restrictions on fishing activities have a consequence in the way benefits and 
burdens of conservation are shared among users; i.e., they all have distribution or 
allocation implications.
106
 However, there are two measures that not only have an 
allocation implication but also require a precise allocation decision: the quota system, and 
the limitation of fishing effort.  
This thesis focuses on the legal framework for, and regional practices of, TACs or 
quotas in international fisheries management. Some mention is also made to conservation 
and management measures directed to limit fishing effort by restricting the number of 
fishing units (number of vessels or time spent fishing). The term ―fishing opportunities‖ 
                                                          
105
 FAO, Fisheries Management: Technical Guidelines or Responsible Fisheries Nr. 4 (Rome: FAO, 1997), 
at 46-51. 
106
 For example, a minimum size of the mesh for the capture of a specific stock affects differently those 
who fish only for that stock, then those that fish simultaneously for another stock of different size. 
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is thus used to refer to the opportunity to engage in a high seas fishery that has been 
limited through allowable catch or allowable effort.
107
  
There are mainly two ways to distribute the limited living marine resources. One 
way is ―to let free competition among fishing nations determine the share of each 
nation‖.
108
 According to this approach, the ―share of each State is a function of the extent 
to which it undertakes such operations‖
109
, which in turn depends on the fishing 
operations of the other participants. In other words, it is a form of ―first come-first 
served‖ system to decide who gets what. 
A second method to allocate fishing opportunities in the high seas is to agree on 
specific limits to the fishing opportunities of each State. In theory, this limit could be 
agreed by auction, lottery, or an administrative (authoritative) decision. The decision can, 
in turn, take different forms: limiting fishing effort by freezing the existing fishing effort 
or catch to existing levels; by freezing the effort or catch to the levels of a reference 
period; or by limiting the effort or catch to a specified quantity (expressed either in terms 
of percentage of the TAC or in tonnage).  All these forms have been used, and are still 
used, in international fisheries management. However, it is the latter one (establishing a 
specified effort or catch limit) which is the generally preferred management measure. 
In international fisheries management, the TAC is allocated to States. In theory, it 
is possible to think of a management regime that allocates the high seas fisheries quotas 
to fishing companies directly. Such a model has been proposed,
110
 but has not been 
implemented. States, however, mostly do not engage in fishing activities directly. Thus, it 
is the States‘ responsibility to determine how the national quota or effort will be 
distributed among their fishing companies and communities. This latter aspect is mostly 
not considered part of the international regime. Beside a few references precisely to note 
                                                          
107
 Some authors use other terms to refer to the possibility of engaging in fishing activities within a TAC or 
total allowable effort adopted by a RFMO: ―fishing possibilities‖, ―fishing rights‖, or ―participatory rights‖ 
(Willock and Lack, supra note 10, at 26; Agnew et al., supra note 10, at 5).  
108
 Albert W. Koers, International Regulation of Marine Fisheries: A Study of Regional Fisheries 
Organizations (West Byfleet: Fishing News, c. 1973), at 65. 
109
 Koers, ibid. 
110
 See, for example: Allen, supra note 2, at 38; Richard Barnes, ―Entitlement to Marine Living Resources‖ 
in Alex G. Oude Elferink and Erik J. Molenaar (eds.), The International Legal Regime of Areas beyond 
National Jurisdiction: Current and Future Developments (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010) 83, 
at 107. See also: infra note 123 and accompanying text.  
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this particular situation, the national implementation of quotas allocated by RFMOs will 
not be addressed in this thesis. 
The effectiveness of TAC and allocation (as well as any conservation and 
management measure) in achieving sustainable fisheries supposes two relevant elements. 
First, it supposes that the relevant scientific data is available in a timely manner for the 
adoption of the TAC. And secondly, it supposes that the allocated quotas, and thus the 
TAC, are complied with. This, in turn, assumes that members of the RFMO comply with 
their allocated quotas, and that non-members to the RFMO abstain from fishing, or fish 
within the fishing opportunities assigned to non-members. As will be seen in detail in the 
following chapters, the fishing opportunities for new entrants to the fishery is indeed one 
of the key allocation conflicts faced by RFMOs.  
Ensuring that allocations are complied with by both members and non-members 
of RFMOs is an endeavour that faces significant legal and practical challenges, as has 
been widely addressed by the literature.
111
 The international community, both at the 
regional and global level, has undertaken various initiatives in this respect. Examples 
thereof are: the FAO Plan of Action to prevent, deter, and eliminate illegal, unreported 
and unregulated fishing (IPOA-IUU);
112
 FAO International the FAO Compliance 
Agreement;
113
 the RFMOs ―black lists‖ of vessels engaging in IUU fishing, and ―white 
lists‖ of vessels authorized to fish in the RFMO area;
114
 the FAO Global Record of 
Fishing Vessels, Refrigerated Vessels and Fishing Support Vessels;
115
 the recently 
adopted FAO Port State Agreement;
116
 trade-related measures adopted by RFMOs, 
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 See: High Seas Task Force, Closing the Net: Stopping illegal fishing on the high seas, Governments of 
Australia, Canada, Chile, Namibia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, WWF, IUCN and the Earth 
Institute at Columbia University (Bellegarde, France: Sadag SA, 2006); Rosemary Rayfuse, Non-Flag State 
Enforcement in High Seas Fisheries (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004); Rosemary 
Rayfuse, ―The Anthropocene, Autopoiesis and the Disingenuousness of the Genuine Link: Addressing 
Enforcement Gaps in the Legal Regime for Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction‖ in Alex G. Oude Elferink 
and Erik J. Molenaar (eds.), The International Legal Regime of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: 
Current and Future Developments (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010) 165. 
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 FAO, IPOA-IUU, supra note 72. 
113
 FAO Compliance Agreement, supra note 73. 
114
 Rayfuse, ―The Anthropocene, Autopoiesis and the Disingenuousness of the Genuine Link‖, supra note 
111, at 179-180. 
115
 Lugten, as cited by Rayfuse, ibid, at 180. 
116
 FAO Port State Measures Agreement, supra note 72. 
26 
 
including catch documentation schemes and import or export prohibitions;
117
 and the 
FAO Expert Consultation on Flag State Performance.
118
 These initiatives, and in 
particular those directed to non-members of RFMOs, are necessarily linked to allocation 
decisions. Nevertheless, they will not be analyzed further in this thesis. Indeed, the 
interest of this thesis is the framework for the distribution of fishing opportunities, and 
not the enforcement of any given distribution.  
 
Sharing Benefits of the Oceans: A Wider Picture  
Addressing allocation of fishing opportunities, as explained in the preceding 
section, implies addressing the question of how to distribute access to limited fishing 
resources, or how to share limited fish resources. Traditionally, the benefits of the ocean 
(or the participation in the wealth of the ocean) have been reserved to those who actually 
engage in fishing activities. This is the assumption on which this chapter has been 
written.  
It has been proposed, however, that for purposes of sharing marine resources, the 
wealth of the ocean can be divorced from the actual fishing activity.
119
 An example of 
such an arrangement, usually mentioned in the literature, is the North Pacific Fur Seal 
Treaty of 1911.
120
 Japan, Canada, USA and Russia were involved in North Pacific Seal 
hunting, which by the end of the 19th century showed clear signs of overexploitation. The 
four parties agreed to prohibit pelagic sealing, a measure that affected mostly the 
countries that hunted seals in the open sea (Japan and Canada). The treaty, however, 
compensated Japan and Canada for their loss by providing that USA and USSR must 
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 Rayfuse, ―The Anthropocene, Autopoiesis and the Disingenuousness of the Genuine Link‖, supra note 
111, at 179-180. 
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 FAO, Report of the Expert Consultation on Flag State Performance, 23- 26 June 2009, Rome, FAO 
Fisheries and Aquaculture Report No. 918 (Rome: FAO, 2009) online: FAO 
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/en>. 
119
 F. Christy Jr., cited by Koers, supra note 108, at 69; Gordon Munro, ―The Management of Shared Fish 
Stocks‖, in FAO, Papers presented at the Norway-FAO Expert Consultation on the Management of Shared 
Fish Stocks, Bergen, Norway, 7-10 October 2002, FAO Fisheries Report Nr. 695Suppl. (Rome: FAO, 
2003) 2, at 12.  
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 Convention between the United States of America, His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Majesty the 
Emperor of Japan, and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, for the Preservation and Protection of 
Fur Seals (7 July 1911) Treaty Series 564. 
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deliver a certain percentage of the annual harvested skins.
121
 Thus, Japan and Canada 
participated in the economic benefits of the fishery, although they did not actively 
participate in it.  
Following the example of the Fur Seal Convention, it has been suggested that 
divorcing the benefits of the ocean from the actual fishing activity would allow States to 
broaden the scope of negotiation through the establishment of side payments or 
negotiation facilitators.
122
 This, in turn, would improve the possibilities of achieving 
stable cooperative arrangements. 
To date, however, there is no other arrangement that explicitly follows the 
example of the North Pacific Fur Seal Commission. A few reasons can be suggested for 
that: such a system ignores the non-monetary benefits associated with fishing activities 
(employment, food supply, etc.); and it does not take into account the need to establish an 
appropriate international structure.  
A similar idea has been proposed, not for a single stock or at the regional level, 
but on a global scale. In 2007, Crothers and Nelson argued that the existing governance 
arrangements are inadequate and that overfishing on the high seas is a result of the lack of 
incentives for States or RFMOs to act responsibly in dealing with the effects of an 
overcapitalized fisheries sector. They offered an alternative of a governance structure 
based on sole owners (High Seas Fisheries Corporations) with explicit and exclusive 
authority to manage the high seas fisheries under their licence, including the allocation of 
fishing opportunities directly to fishing companies. The High Seas Fisheries Corporations 
would be owned collectively by States, which therefore would benefit from high seas 
fishing according to their participation in the corporation.
123
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 See: Koers, supra note 108, at 85-87; Munro, supra note 119, at 14. According to the 1911 Treaty, ibid, 
of the total number of sealskins take annually on the islands or shores of the waters defined in article I 
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Ideas similar to this have been presented in the past as well.
124
 However, so far 
such proposals have not had political support.
125
 The idea of having a single global 
authority responsible for the management of high seas fisheries was suggested during the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which led to the adoption of the 
LOSC. During the conference, some delegations suggested that high seas fisheries should 
be considered the common heritage of mankind and put under the same regime and under 
the jurisdiction of the Seabed Authority.
126
 As noted by Rayfuse and Warner:  
[a] [common heritage of mankind] regime therefore differs fundamentally from a 
common property regime in that it allows all states to participate in the benefits 




This proposal was, however, blatantly rejected.  
It is important to keep those views in mind when analyzing alternatives for an 
effective regime for the high seas. At least for the moment, however, there does not seem 
to be any support for models of global or centralized management. For this reason, this 
thesis does not focus on such models. Instead, it addresses the potential role of equity in 
allocation of fishing opportunities taking as an initial point of analysis the current high 
seas fisheries model based on cooperative regimes institutionalized through RFMOs. 
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Chapter 2. TAC and Allocation: Its Origin and Evolution in 
International Fisheries Management  
 
The adoption of TAC and national allocations as conservation and management 
measures is generally considered best practice in fisheries management. However, its 
consideration as a management tool is relatively recent, and the evolution of its legal 
recognition and practical implementation reveals that it is still maturing as a management 
measure. The objective of this chapter is to describe that evolution, both in global and 
regional fora.  
The chapter begins with an account of the initiatives and studies that introduced 
TAC and allocations to modern fisheries management, describing its theoretical 
foundations, its main objectives, the assumptions under which it was designed, and the 
challenges foreseen. Then, the chapter describes the early implementation schemes in 
three RFMOs. Afterwards, it analyzes the developments of the measure in the legal 
framework of global and regional instruments. Finally, it summarizes the current state of 
the management measure in the legal framework and practices of RFMOs.  
Section 1. The Theoretical Foundations for a TAC and Allocation of National 
Quotas  
The first international agreements for the conservation of high seas resources had 
a focus on cooperation for scientific purposes, on exchanging data and, in the most 
progressive cases, on the adoption of appropriate technical measures to achieve a 
conservation goal.
128
 Establishing limits to fishing effort or catches, and allocating them 
among participants, was not a standard fisheries management strategy and was simply not 
in their mandates.  
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Three parallel developments in the 1950s and 1960s were to make a significant 
change in the fisheries management approach, including but not restricted to international 
management. The first of those developments related to several advancements in fisheries 
technology and science, which made the environment propitious for the implementation 
of TACs as a management tool. On one hand, the echo sounder and asdic technology 
used in surveys of biomass abundance improved the ability to estimate stock sizes.
129
 In 
turn, during the 1950s, mathematical models of fish population dynamics were developed 
in response to fishing pressures. These models ―allow scientists to calculate quantitatively 
the probable effects of fishing on fish stock and thus provide advice to managers on 
fisheries regulations.‖
130
 Those models were improved by statistical methods for 
calculating strengths of year classes: the Virtual Population Analysis (VPA) and the 
simplified Pope‘s ‗cohort analysis‘. These models improved the scientific tools for 
estimating the actual size of a fish stock. VPA, in particular, allowed scientists to 
calculate stock size in actual tonnage, which in turn suited the political demands for 
simple and ―feasible allocation and administration.‖
131
 
At the same time, contributions were made by the incipient discipline of fisheries 
economics. The work of H. Scott Gordon (1954),
132
 J.A. Crutchfield (1956)
133
 and 
Anthony Scott and Francis T. Christy (1965),
134
 as well as several conferences addressing 
economic aspects of fisheries regulation organized in the late 1950s and early 1960s,
135
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―underlined the economic aspects of fisheries management and the problems of common 




These two parallel developments paved the way for a bio-economic management 
paradigm that was presented to national and international fisheries administrators and 
became dominant in fisheries management.
137
 
The third component in the process was the urgent need to introduce new 
approaches to international fisheries management. By the 1950s, it was clear that the 
conventional fisheries management strategies were failing to avoid over-exploitation of 
stocks. In particular, the depletion of the fish stocks of the North Atlantic made it clear 
that a new strategy was required.
138
 The RFMOs of the North Atlantic (the International 
Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, ICNAF
139
 and the North East Atlantic 
Fisheries Commission NEAFC
140
) began, in an interlinked and mutually supportive 
process, to analyze other conservation approaches. As stated by Gezelius, ―it was the 
discussions in the North Atlantic fisheries commissions in the 1960s which focused the 
attention of administrators and scientists on the need to restrict fishing intensity, and 
which generated the common view that catch quotas were the best way to do this‖.
141
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The initiative was taken mostly by ICNAF. In 1963, the Commission decided to 
task the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics to consider the question of the 
adequacy of the Commission‘s conservation measures. The report was to be presented in 
the 1964 meeting. This was the first time the issue was placed on the agenda of ICNAF.  
At the 1964 meeting, it was recommended that the Chairman of the Research and 
Statistics Committee, Dr. W. Templeman (Canada), and the Chairman of the Assessment 
Subcommittee, Mr. J. Gulland (England), prepare a report on the various kinds of action 
which might be taken by the Commission for the purpose of maintaining the fish stocks 
in the Convention Area at a level which could produce maximum sustained yields. The 
report, entitled ―Review of possible conservation actions for the ICNAF area,‖
142
 was 
presented during the next meeting. 
The Report relied heavily on economic and efficiency considerations. The 
possible conservation measures were analyzed not only considering the benefits arising 
from increased catches (through enhancement of the stocks), but also considering the 
benefits arising from improved fishing efficiency (through reductions of cost of unit 
fishing effort).
143
  The conclusions made it clear that technical measures, such as mesh 
regulations, were not sufficient in a scenario of increasing fishing activities, and that 
―there must be some direct control of the amount of fishing. All methods of doing this 
raise difficulties, but that presenting least difficulties is by means of catch quotas. There 
must be separate quotas for each stock of fish, e.g. for cod at West Greenland, and 
preferably be allocated separately to each section of the industry.‖
144
 The possibility of 
allocating by member countries was also presented as an option, although it was 
recognized that ―difficulties of allocating between countries with a long and stable fishery 
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in ICNAF area and those whose fisheries in the area are developing are obvious.‖
145
 It 
was also mentioned that a national allocation would allow different countries to use the 
potential surplus in different ways.
146
  
Following this report, in 1966 ICNAF resolved to establish a Working Group on 
Joint Biological and Economic Assessment of Conservation Actions, charged with the 
evaluation of management measures based on limitations of either total effort or total 
catch. The working group met twice between 1966 and 1967, and presented its results to 
the 17
th
 annual meeting in 1967.
147
 This Report supported the conclusions of the 
Chairmen‘s Report, and concluded that:  
a) of the methods of reducing the rate of fishing mortality available to the 
international commissions, there are only two that would enable member 
countries to reduce their production costs: i.e. an allocation of definite shares of 
an agreed total amount of fishing expressed in terms of either (a) catch or (b) 
standard units of fishing effort.
148
  
b)  the use of fishing effort, e.g. days on ground, as a measure of the amount of 
fishing under quota control would raise very great problems of inter-gear 
calibration and the like and for that reason, may be set aside for the present.
149
  
c) on the contrary, limiting fishing mortality through quotas could be feasible as 
soon as 1968 since considerable quantity of data was already available to the 
commission.  
d) the method adopted by each country to restrict fishing operations to the 
assigned limit may be chosen to suit national objectives and would be irrelevant 
to the general effectiveness of the management program.
150
 
The reasons provided in the different reports to justify the need to allocate 
national quotas to participating States were varied, but all rooted in the need to eliminate 
the competition among fishing fleets, and thus eliminate the economic interdependence 
arising from the fact that different fleets exploit one common, and limited, asset (the fish 
stock). The first and predominant reason provided in the report was again one of 
economic efficiency: an unallocated quota creates a race to fish, in which every unit 
[State, companies and vessels] strives ―to maximize its share (…) [which] causes most of 
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 Report of the Working Group on Joint Biological and Economical Assessment of Conservation Actions, 
supra note 143, at 48. 
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the potential benefit of reducing mortality to be lost.‖
151
 A second, more subtle, reason 
suggested in the Templeman – Gulland report was to protect particular sections of the 
industry from inequities resulting from rampant competition for a limited resource, or due 
to the design of the measure.
152
 A third reason was that this mechanism allows each 
country to make a sovereign decision on its fisheries management objectives (i.e., on how 
the surplus of the fishery will be used).
153
 As stated by Crutchfield, ―the national quota 
regime provides the maximum possible incentive and opportunity for member nations to 
improve net economic benefits from the fishery while preserving the right of each nation 




The proponents of the national quota system were aware of some drawbacks and 
difficulties in its implementation. From a conservation perspective, a national catch quota 
system ―would not allow the refined biological management that would maximize 
aggregate physical yield from several stocks involved.‖
155 
It could also ―open the door to 
undue concentration of fishing effort on particular stocks either by accident or design‖.
156
 
It was also acknowledged that a catch system would need constant revision and 
adjustment due to either mismanagement or natural fluctuations in stock abundance, 
which affect the fishing mortality rate.
157
 The need for accurate scientific data and 
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analysis was also stressed.
158
 In addition, the difficulties associated with monitoring, 
control, surveillance and enforcement mechanisms were highlighted.
159
 
From an economic perspective, it was noted that the system does not provide 
―significant pressure for reduction of unnecessary inputs‖ (and thus for increasing net 
economic yields).
160
 Nothing, indeed, guarantees that States will not prefer to pursue non-
efficient, albeit rational, objectives.
161
 This was considered, however, unavoidable to 
respect States‘ sovereignty. The Report of the Working Group on Joint Economic and 
Biological Assessment of Conservation Actions explicitly stated that the national policies 
and/or mechanisms to restrict fishing activities to comply with the nationally allocated 
catch or effort limit were irrelevant for the effectiveness of the international management 
program.
162
 In other words, the design and success of the international regime was 
considered to be divorced from the national policies, objectives and regulations (provided 
that the catch limits were complied with). 
Most importantly for this thesis, equity considerations involved in the allocation 
of quotas were raised in those early reports. The mechanism and basis for determining 
national quotas was identified as one considerable problem, particularly in fully utilized 
fisheries.
163
 The problem of new entrants to the fisheries was considered as significant, or 
more so,
164
 with special reference to developing countries.
165
 However, the economic 
emphasis of the studies left the distributional effects of the proposed measure mostly 
unaddressed.
166
 It was acknowledged that ―the losses and gains will not be equal for all 
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 The FAO Study Group on Economic Aspects of Fishery Management stated clearly that ―it must be 
acknowledge, without reservations, that economic analysis as such can provide no basis for distribution 
decisions of this type. It can only clarify the alternatives, and thus improve the essentially political 
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sections of the fishery‖,
167
 and expected that, as long as these differences were small, the 
inequalities could be considered acceptable.
168
  
Section 2. Early Allocation Schemes and Practices  
The numerous reports described above unanimously concluded that the best tool to 
ensure the maximum sustainable yield of international fisheries, was the establishment of 
TAC and its allocation to participating States. However, regional fisheries management 
organizations had to address two pending issues to actually adopt it as management 
measure: a) the legal mandate to do so; and b) the allocation schemes, keys or criteria to 
distribute the TAC among participating States. In most cases, both processes evolved 
simultaneously. 
 
TAC and Allocation in ICNAF 
The fisheries in the North West Atlantic were put under international management 
just after World War II, with the signature and entry into force (in 1949 and 1950, 
respectively) of the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.
169
 This 
Convention established a Commission, which was responsible ―in the field of scientific 
investigation for obtaining and collating the information necessary for maintaining those 
stocks of fish which support international fisheries in the Convention area‖.
170
 In 
addition, the Commission had the function of proposing measures, for joint action by the 
contracting governments, designed to keep the stocks of those species of fish which 
support international fisheries in the Convention area at a level permitting the maximum 
sustained catch.‖
171
 The exhaustive list of possible measures included open and closed 
                                                                                                                                                                             
decision-making that must be involved.‖ (FAO, A Note on Economic Aspects of Fishery Management, 
supra note 135, at 2).  
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seasons, closing spawning areas or areas populated by small or immature fish, size limits, 
prohibiting certain fishing gear and appliances, and prescribing an over-all catch limit for 
any species of fish.
172
 Thus, the allocation of national quotas was not allowed in the 
original Convention.  
To overcome this legal difficulty, the Commission negotiated and adopted the 1969 
Protocol amending its Convention in order to ―provide greater flexibility in the types of 
fisheries regulatory measures which the Commission might propose‖
173
 under the terms 
of article VIII paragraph 1 of the Convention. The Protocol amended articles VII and 
VIII of the Convention to allow the Panels to make recommendations, and the 
Commission to transmit proposals for joint action by the contracting governments 
designed to achieve the optimum utilization of the stocks of those species of fish which 
support international fisheries in the Convention area.
174
 Those measures were 
understood to include TAC and national quotas.
175
 The Protocol entered into force on 
December 15, 1971. 
In parallel to this process, ICNAF resolved to establish a Standing Committee on 
Regulatory Measures (STACREM) with the task of considering the economic and 
administrative aspects of the problems of introducing regulatory measures, including: 
a) procedure for fixing annual catch quotas; 
b) the nature of the quotas to be fixed with respect to species and areas; 
c) problems of enforcement; 
d) principles of distributing quotas between countries; and 
e) administration of quotas within countries.176 
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Most of the work of STACREM was done during a January 1969 meeting, where 
the Committee prepared guidelines for the management, enforcement and monitoring of 
catch limits, including guidelines for the negotiation of quota allocation. The guidelines 
were revised in a June 1969 meeting, in particular in light of developments in the North 
East Atlantic, but no changes were made to them and they were forwarded to the 
Commission, which endorsed the guidelines. In January 1970, the Committee was 
required to revise the guidelines to analyze the ―sliding scale‖ concept revised in the 
North East Atlantic, which was then accepted and incorporated into the guidelines.  
The adopted guidelines considered the following aspects:  
 A catch limit involves the establishment of (a) a total allowable catch, and (b) the 
proportion in which this total catch is to be shared among participating countries.  
 The first decision would be decided by the Commission with some predefined 
conservation objectives, and in light of scientific evidence provided by the 
Standing Committee on Research and Statistics.  
 Shares of the participating countries should be based mainly on historical 
performance (average catches over a datum period(s). 
 Both a short and long term historical performance should be used: 3- year history 
and 10-year history, weighted 40% each.
177
  
 A small proportion of the quota should be set aside for new entrants to the fishery, 
for non-members fishing countries, for member countries with developing 
fisheries, for coastal State preferences, and for the fleets of member countries 
which were incapable of being diverted to other fisheries. Later, the proportion 
was set in 10% for coastal States and 10% for new entrants.  
 There should be a ―sliding scale‖, according to which, were the lower the TAC, 
the greater the degree of preference to those countries having special needs.  
 There was also consensus in the Committee that schemes should be flexible, in 
the sense that the shares initially fixed could not continue in force indefinitely but 
would be capable of adjustment in the light of experience.  
 In cases of over-catches, it was agreed that the share for the subsequent year 
should be reduced. Some countries considered it sufficient to deduct the excess 
catches, while others considered that the reduction should be at least twice as 
great.  
 In case of under-catches, there was consensus in that it would be sufficient to take 
account of under-utilization in general reviews referred to above.  
 Additional guidelines for enforcement and monitoring were offered.  
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The conclusions reached through the deliberations that took place in the STACREM 
meetings in relation to the principles for distribution of quotas among participating States 
are generally known as the 40:40:10:10 formula: 40% distributed according to catches 
recorded on the last 3 years; 40% distributed according to catches recorded on the last 10 
years; 10% for coastal States; and 10% for new interests and non-members.
178
 It was 
understood by STACREM, however, that the distribution could not follow a fixed 
mathematical formula, and that flexibility was required. 
After the entry into force of the 1969 Protocol and the preparation of the allocation 
scheme by the STACREM, the Commission was in the position to adopt a catch 
allocation regime. The opportunity arose during a special joint meeting of panels 4 and 5 
held in January 1972 to analyze management solutions for the declining herring stocks.  
Despite the preparatory work, negotiations were difficult. The meeting discussed the 
application of the STACREM guidelines. However, some of the members of the joint 
panel considered that they resulted in an equal sacrifice and were, thus, unacceptable. In 
order to achieve a solution, it was proposed that a working group be formed by delegates 
of those countries whose vessels fished for any of the three adult stocks of herring in the 
Grand Bank, Gulf of Main and Nova Scotia Bank, and that this working group should 
meet to discuss and agree on a catch limitation scheme.
179
 The group, ―recognizing the 
economic benefits to be gained by the allocation of national catch quota‖,
180
 achieved 
agreement. The allocation was based primarily on the principle of equal sacrifice from 




This was, indeed, an historical moment: for the first time, a TAC and national quotas 
were adopted for multi-national fisheries. This landmark, combined with the declining 
status of most fisheries (and probably also by threats of extensions to national 
jurisdictions)
182
 opened the doors for management of several other stocks. The 1972 June 
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Annual meeting adopted quotas and allocation for 17 other stocks. Again, a ―closed-
door‖ ad hoc committee on quota allocation was necessary to achieve agreement on 
allocation of quotas.
183
 The ad hoc Committee agreed that there should be no record of its 
deliberations, except for the table with national quotas put forward for the consideration 
of the respective panels and Commission.
184
 By 1974, 60 stocks were managed under an 
allocated quota regime.  
It seems evident that the 40:40:10:10 formula provided a general framework used as a 
starting point for the negotiation and led to a more or less acceptable consensus.
185
 The 
formula was generally followed, although adjustments were usually made.
186
 In addition, 
it was acknowledged that ―there was sometimes slippage in the early days of quota 
negotiation and sometimes TACs were changed in order to make it possible to reach 
agreement on sharing‖.
187
 It was perceived, though, that this practice was no longer 
followed at the end of ICNAF‘s existence.
188
  
The new conservation and management measure was not timely and effective enough 
to stop the decline of fish stocks. By 1977, most coastal States had extended their 
fisheries jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles. Fisheries management in the Northwest 
Atlantic was going to undergo a major revision, since many stocks would be under 
national jurisdiction in this new ocean reality.  
 
TAC and Allocation in the North East Atlantic 
The history TACs and allocations in the North East Atlantic developed in parallel 
to that of the North West Atlantic, in a process that is intertwined and constitute really 
one single evolution towards ―modern‖ fisheries management. The process of NEAFC, 
however, faced more difficulties than at the other side of the Atlantic. 
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The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission was established by the 1959 North 
East Atlantic Fisheries Convention,
189
 as a successor of the Permanent Commission 
established under the 1946 Convention for the Regulation of Meshes and Fishing Nets 
and the Size Limits of Fish. As in the case of ICNAF, NEAFC adopted technical 
measures for the protection of the stocks, which soon proved insufficient to avoid over-
exploitation of the high-value stocks of the North East Atlantic. Article 7 of the 1959 
Convention provided: 
1. The measures relating to the objectives and purposes of this Convention which 
the Commission and Regional Committees may consider, and on which the 
Commission may make recommendations to the Contracting States, are 
a) any measures for the regulation of the size of mesh of fishing nets; 
b) any measures for regulation of the size limits of fish that may be retained on 
board vessels, or landed, or exposed or offered for sale; 
c) any measures for the establishment of closed seasons; 
d) any measures for the establishment of closed areas; 
e) any measures for the regulation of fishing gear and appliances, other than 
regulation of the size of mesh of fishing nets; 
f) any measures for the improvement and the increase of marine resources, which 
may include artificial propagation, the transplantation of organisms and the 
transplantation of young. 
2. Measures for regulating the amount of total catch, or the amount of fishing 
effort in any period, or any other kinds of measures for the purpose of the 
conservation of the fish stocks in the Convention area, may be added to the 
measures listed in paragraph (1) of this Article on a proposal adopted by not less 
than a two-thirds majority of the Delegations present and voting and subsequently 
accepted by all Contracting States in accordance with their respective 
constitutional procedures. 
3. The measures provided for in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article may relate 
to any or all species of sea fish and shell fish, but not to sea mammals; to any or 
all methods of fishing; and to any or all parts of the methods of fishing; and to any 
or all parts of the Convention area. 
Albeit paragraph 2 of article 7 allowed the adoption of measures for regulating the 
amount of catch, or any other measure for the purpose of the conservation of the stock 
(which could have included TAC and allocations), it required a proposal adopted by a 
qualified majority. In 1970, NEAFC adopted a resolution to activate the powers of article 
                                                          
189
 1959 NEAFC Convention, supra note 140. The Commission succeeded the Permanent Commission 




7(2) and adding some measures to the list of article 7(1).
190
 The added measures were: a) 
any measures for the regulation of the amount of total catch and its allocation to 
contracting States in any period; and b) any measures for the regulation of the amount of 
fishing efforts and its allocation to contracting States in any period.
191
 The resolution was 
only adopted by the required majority in 1974. While negotiating this resolution, member 
States stressed the need to avoid discrimination in the allocation of catch or effort quotas, 
and the need that quotas be firmly based on scientific advice.
192
 For this purpose, it was 
agreed that the document communicating this decision to the contracting parties should 
make clear that the Commission, in exercising these powers, would ―in accordance with 
normal practice, base its decision on the results of scientific research and investigations, 
after taking into consideration the views and economic interests of all Member States.‖
193
  
In parallel to this process, the adoption of restrictions on fishing mortality for 
particular stocks was discussed. The issue entered formally in the agenda of NEAFC for 
the first time in 1966.
194
 However, the delegates decided to study the issue further 
together with ICNAF and FAO.
195
 The reports presented to ICNAF, indeed, were 
presented almost simultaneously to the NEAFC.
196
 In 1968, NEAFC decided to form an 
Ad Hoc Study Group to examine the possibility of restricting fishing on demersal species 
– Northeast Arctic cod and haddock. The following year, an Ad Hoc Study Group was 
formed to analyze management options for herring. Both groups concentrated their focus 
on a system based on catch quotas, which was recommended as the most effective way to 
protect the stocks.
197
 However, both due to the legal constraints and hesitation on the part 
of member States, the Commission was unable to agree on such measures.
198
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The inability of the Commission to move forward the TAC agenda by adopting 
the amendment to article 7.1 pursuant the mechanisms of article 7.2. led some member 
States to take independent action. The abrupt decline of Norwegian Spring Spawning 
Herring (or Atlanto-Scandian Herring) precipitated this action. Iceland, Norway and 
USSR began discussions outside the NEAFC framework and ultimately agreed on an 
allocated quota for the stock for 1971.
199
 Similarly, the main fishing States for Northeast 
Arctic cod and haddock - Norway, UK, USSR - agreed on a TAC and its allocation 
outside the NEAFC framework. However, the agreement broke down when USSR 
withdrew due to excessive fishing from non-signatories.
200
  
In 1974, NEAFC took over the task of adopting and allocating TACs. In its June 
1974 meeting, the organization established a quota for North Sea herring for the 1974-
1975 fishing season,
201




Contrary to the experience in ICNAF, where STACREM was mandated to 
analyze the best principles for quota distribution, NEAFC proceeded on an ad-hoc basis 
establishing working groups for specific stocks.
203
 The criteria for allocation developed in 
these different working groups shared some common elements; however, they differed in 
the weight they assigned to each criterion. It was agreed that the main criteria for 
allocation should be historical performance. In some cases a 6/4 formula was adopted 
(the story of the first 6 years of the previous 10 year period, and the catches of the latter 4 
of the same period, weighted equally in the distribution of fishing opportunities). It was 
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also agreed that a ―nominal‖ percentage (1% to 5%) should be reserved to new members 
or to provide for special needs. A share was usually allocated to coastal States, and 
distributed among them either on the basis of their historical performance using the 6/4 
formula, or on an egalitarian basis.
204
 
As in the case of ICNAF, the development of guidelines was a useful, but 
insufficient, mechanism. The TACs ultimately adopted and allocated in 1974, although 
negotiated using the criteria developed, were ultimately a compromise among differing 
views on both the weight that should be accorded to each criteria, and particular 
circumstances that needed to be taken into account for a particular stock.
205
 And just as in 
the case of ICNAF, in many cases compromises were made at the expense of the 
allocated stock. The TAC was often increased to satisfy the expectations of the different 
participants.
206





TAC and Allocation for Atlantic Tunas 
In 1966, the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
208
 
was adopted ―to co-operate in maintaining the populations of these fishes at levels which 
will permit the maximum sustainable catch for food and other purposes‖.
209
 The 
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Convention establishes the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic 
Tuna (ICCAT), which general mandate is,  
(...) on the basis of scientific evidence, make recommendations designed to 
maintain the populations of tuna and tuna-like fishes that may be taken in the 
Convention area at levels which will permit the maximum sustainable catch.
210
  
The ICCAT Convention does not refer to TACs or allocation of fishing 
opportunities, and it was never amended to explicitly recognize the possibility of 
adopting TACs and national quotas. The general interpretation seems to be, however, that 
they may be adopted under that general mandate of the Commission. However, it should 
be noted that on different occasions during the early discussions of TAC and national 




The establishment of TAC and allocation for some tuna stocks was considered by 
ICCAT early on. The first stock that concentrated the attention of the Commission was 
yellowfin tuna. In 1971, an analysis was made by the Standing Committee on Research 
and Statistics (SCRS) of the management alternatives for this stock, including: a) no 
regulation, b) direct control of fishing effort, c) assignment of fixed quota, and d) 
assignment of country quotas. This early report of the SCRS concluded that, in view of 
the range of vessels and gears types then employed in the fishery, and the difficulty of 
ensuring that any change in efficiency would be observed and appropriate corrections 
made, a fishing effort control would be impracticable.
212
 Quotas, either as global quotas 
or country quotas, were therefore the alternatives recommended to the Council, although 
with the cautionary advice that the information and statistics needed to be improved for 
these management measures, and that real time catch reporting was necessary in the event 
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that global quotas were preferred.
213
 It is worth mentioning that in these early studies, the 
experiences in the North West Atlantic (ICNAF) were particularly considered.
 214
  
The Commission approached the matter with caution. In 1972, it agreed on 
establishing a working group on yellowfin tuna to ―study the desirability and feasibility 
of concrete measures for the conservation and management of yellowfin stocks in the 
Convention area from a scientific and practical point‖.
215
 The issues to be considered 
included ―the need for regulatory measures, size of total catch quota, ways of 
implementing the total catch quota, for example, free competition, a national catch quota 
system, or any feasible method of implementation; possibility of curtailing fishing effort, 




With the exception of Japan, who had already proposed the establishment of an 
unallocated quota for yellowfin tuna in 1972, the members of the Commission considered 
it premature to establish a definite catch quota for the stock, recognizing the need for a 
more careful review of the subject.
217
 One delegation stated that they were not in the 
position to accept a quota system that ―does not take into account the interests of the 
coastal countries, does not define who should be assigned a quota, and does not mention 
the disproportion in the fishing potential of the countries.‖
218
 Other delegations stated that 
a quota system in itself was unacceptable.
219
 As a consequence, despite the initiatives for 
an early establishment of a quota and allocation scheme and the experiences in other 
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areas of the Atlantic, no such measure was adopted for yellowfin tuna at that time. Still 
today, the stock remains without such management measure.
220
 
The declining Atlantic bluefin tuna stock soon concentrated the concerns of the 
ICCAT members and led to a different result. Again, the increasing exploitation of the 
stock suggested that mechanisms to control fishing mortality were necessary. Not without 
difficulties, the efforts to restrict fishing mortality succeeded in 1974, when a 
recommendation was adopted which established a minimum size for North bluefin tuna 
and, ―as a preliminary step, the Contracting Parties that are or those that incidentally 
catch it in significant quantities shall take the necessary measures to limit the fishing 
mortality of bluefin tuna to recent levels for a period of one year‖.
221
   
Although initially adopted for one year, the measure to limit mortality was 
subsequently extended until 1981. That year, the scientific evidence suggested that the 
West stock of bluefin tuna required further measures. Again with difficulties, a 
recommendation was adopted by which contracting parties committed to ―take measures 
to prohibit the capture of bluefin tuna for a period of two years in the western Atlantic 
Ocean, as defined on the attached map (…), except under conditions to be agreed upon 
by the Contracting Parties whose nationals have been actively fishing for bluefin tuna in 
the western Atlantic; such conditions to be based on the requirement to index the 
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abundance of the stock.‖
222
 For this purpose, the contracting parties actively fishing 
should conclude consultations prior to February 15, 1982.
223
  
That consultation on the Western Atlantic bluefin management measures took 
place in Miami, Florida, on February 8 to 12, 1982, with the presence of the three States 
actively fishing for Northern bluefin tuna (US, Canada, Japan) and one interested 
contracting party, Brazil. The meeting discussed, among other subjects, the allocation of 
quotas among the countries participating in the fishery. A first proposal by USA, with an 
allocation scheme based on the catch reports of the 1970-1974 period, was discussed but 
agreement could not be reached.
224
  To move the agenda forward, closed sessions were 
held with the heads of delegations. The closed session proved to be a useful mechanism 
to achieve agreement. The delegations agreed on limiting annual catch of bluefin tuna 
during 1982 and 1983 to 1,160 t, and dividing it among Canada, Japan, and US (250, 305 
and 605 tonnes respectively). Brazil and Cuba, at that time catching each less than 50 t of 
bluefin tuna, were exempted from catch limitations. The Chair of the working group later 
explained to the Commission that ―various factors were taken into account in determining 
these proportions such as effective monitoring needs, historical catches and economic 
factors. Special consideration was given to the Cuban and Brazilian fisheries, even 
though Cuba did not participate in the Miami meeting.‖
225
 
The adoption of such measure was controversial. During the next meeting of the 
Commission, it was argued by some delegations that such a measure should have not 
been adopted by a small working group.
226
 Others argued that the term quota used in the 
Miami Report is misleading since it was an allowance for scientific purposes only. The 
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very system of quota was also objected.
227
 In addition, the Standing Committee on 
Research and Statistics (SCRS) determined that the assessment on which the 1981 
recommendation was adopted should not be used for 1983 because of two factors: 
changes in the historical data base reported during 1981-1982, and an erroneous stock-
recruitment relation. This served as argument for some delegations to attempt to re-
establish the 1974 fishing mortality measure. Despite this considerable opposition, the 
1982 meeting adopted a similar measure for 1983, albeit increasing the TAC to 2,660. 
The allocation scheme was maintained.  
This first allocation exercise in ICCAT established the precedent for Northern 
bluefin tuna management, which remained mostly unchanged until 1998.
228
 It also set the 
precedent for other allocation exercises that took place in the 1980‘s. In the case of North 
Atlantic swordfish, Eastern and Mediterranean bluefin tuna and North Atlantic albacore, 
agreement was reached first to freeze the fishing mortality to the levels of a certain 
reference point.
229
 Freezing the fishing mortality was an implicit sharing arrangement of 
the stock. However, such arrangements were imperfect due to various considerations. 
First, statistical misreporting and reporting corrections increased the fishing mortality 
beyond the levels upon which the decision was made. Secondly, limitations involving 
number of fishing vessels only indirectly limited fishing mortality. Thirdly, the 
limitations did not necessarily relate to a sustainable pattern of exploitation. And finally, 
the limitations were often not complied with. 
The second regulatory step was the adoption of an explicit TAC and quota 
allocation arrangements. TACs and allocation schemes were adopted for North Atlantic 
swordfish in 1994, for Eastern and Mediterranean bluefin tuna in 1998, and for North 
Atlantic albacore in 2000. In all cases, the allocation arrangements were agreed upon in 
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informal sessions by the contracting parties actively fishing for the stocks. This was 
actually seen as the most effective way to reach agreement.
230
 The results of that 
negotiation were then endorsed by the respective Panel and the Commission.  
The sharing agreements (allocation keys) were usually based on past performance 
and in particular the levels of catches in the period of reference for the measures limiting 
fishing mortality. However, a certain amount of negotiation not reflected in the official 
reports influenced the agreements. Allocation agreements often included exceptions for 
some States or categories of States, which aim was to allow small-scale fishing nations, 
and particularly coastal States, a certain level of development. These exceptions were 
usually introduced due the concern expressed by coastal developing States on the 
limitations that the quota regulations represented for their fishing development 
aspirations. Nevertheless, consent was usually difficult, TAC and allocations were often 
subject to objections, and dissatisfaction with the system, mostly by developing coastal 
States, became evident. 
Section 3. TAC and Allocation in the Advent of the EEZ 
The efforts of the organizations to achieve sound management of international 
fisheries were not timely and successful enough to stop the increasing trend of extending 
national jurisdiction. By 1982, the LOSC incorporated what had become the common 
practice of coastal States by the late 1970s: the right of coastal States to claim an 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
231
 In recognizing an EEZ, the LOSC adopted a 
jurisdictional and spatial approach to the allocation of natural resources of the oceans. It 
was believed that this new distribution of the ocean‘s wealth would solve the cooperative 
problems faced by the international community, since most fisheries were within the EEZ 
of coastal States. In other words, the LOSC was believed to have solved the problems of 
the ―commons‖ by re-allocating jurisdiction over fisheries resources to coastal States.
232
 
                                                          
230
 That practice was expressly recognized and supported by the chairmen of the different panels as the best 
procedure to adopt allocation schemes. See for example: ICCAT, Report for biennial period, 1996-97, Part 
II (1997), English version (Madrid: ICCAT, 1998), Annex 10, Reports of the Panels 1-4, agenda item 6.b of 
Panel 3, at 162 online: ICCAT <http://www.iccat.int>.  
231
 LOSC, articles 55 and following. 
232 
The effect of the extension of jurisdiction was notorious in the North Atlantic: many fisheries previously 
managed by ICNAF and NEAFC were now within economic exclusive zones of one or more coastal States. 
These stocks were, therefore, no longer in the mandate of the organizations. However, a number of stocks 
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 The new configuration of the oceans naturally impacted the jurisdiction and 
mandate of regional organizations, and the balances between coastal States and distant 
water fishing nations (DWFNs) in the adoption of TAC and allocation, as well as in the 
adoption of other management measures. The different RFMOs adapted differently, 
taking into account their particular realities, as will be described below.  
 
The EEZ in the North West Atlantic 
In January 1977, Canada extended its fisheries jurisdiction out to a distance of 
200 nautical miles from its coast.
233
 At the same time, France and Denmark extended 
their jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles off the costs of Greenland and the islands of St. 
Pierre and Miquelon. U.S.A, in turn, extended its jurisdiction in March 1977, and 
withdrew from ICNAF on December 31, 1976.
234
 These unilateral extensions of fishing 
zones implied that many fisheries previously managed by ICNAF were no longer 
international fisheries. As a consequence, a major revision of both the ICNAF 
Convention and of management practices was necessary. 
It was agreed that the quotas for stocks completely outside national jurisdiction 
(Division 3M Flemish Cap) would be set by the Commission on the recommendation of 
Panel 3. Stocks of common concern to Denmark and Canada in Subarea 1 and Statistical 
Area 0 would be considered by bilateral negotiations between the two countries. For 
shared stocks, or stocks completely inside the Canadian EEZ, Canada sought the 
scientific advice of STACRES and undertook a series of informal intergovernmental 
consultations during the ICNAF meeting. It referred the results of those consultations to a 
joint Panel either for information (in the case of stocks completely inside their fishing 
zone) or for recommendation and adoption by the Commission (in the case of straddling 
stocks). This agreement paved the way for current practices in NAFO: the organization 
manages independently the discrete stocks occurring east of the EEZ limit, and jointly 
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with Canada the stocks that straddle the 200-mile limit. The number of stocks managed 
under the jurisdiction of the newly established NAFO decreased to 10 stocks of common 
interest,
235
 a number that over the years increased to 20 stocks regulated today.
236
 
In parallel to this short term arrangement, the ICNAF members initiated a 
Diplomatic Conference on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries with the aim of preparing a new Convention to address the international 
management of fisheries in the Northwest Atlantic in this new era, and to provide a 
smooth transition to this new regime. The Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation 
in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, done at Ottawa, on 24 October 1978, came into force 
on 1 January 1979, with the ratification by seven signatories.
237
 The new Convention has 
a provision dealing with allocation of catches. Article XI(4) states that  
[p]roposals adopted by the Commission for the allocation of catches in the 
Regulatory Area shall take into account the interests of Commission members 
whose vessels have traditionally fished within that area, and, in the allocation of 
catches from the Grand Bank and Flemish Cap, commission members shall give 
special consideration to the Contracting Party whose coastal communities are 
primarily dependent on fishing for stocks related to these fishing banks and which 
has undertaken extensive efforts to ensure the conservation of such stocks through 
international action, in particular, by providing surveillance and inspection of 
international fisheries on these banks under an international scheme of joint 
enforcement. 
The contracting party referred in the second part of the provision is understood to 
be Canada only.
238
 This provision was recognition of the ICNAF guidelines on allocation. 
Indeed, at least in the first meetings, allocations mostly rolled over from the previous 
ICNAF work and were not discussed explicitly. 
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for 1999 (Dartmouth, NS: NAFO, 2000) 61, at 64. During the reform process of the NAFO Convention, 
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The EEZ in the North East Atlantic 
Following the extension of areas under national jurisdiction in 1977, the member 
States of NEAFC also negotiated a new Convention to adapt to the new political reality. 
The Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries,
239
 
was signed on 18 November 1980, and entered into force on 17 March 1982. This new 
Convention recognizes the competence for the Commission to, inter alia, establish total 
allowable catches and their allocation to contracting parties, and regulate the amount of 
fishing effort and its allocation to contracting parties, in the high seas of the North East 
Atlantic.
240
 It does not include, however, any provision regarding criteria for allocation. 
Despite the new mandate, in practice NEAFC‘s role in establishing conservation 
and management measures suffered. The high seas area (i.e. Regulatory Area) in the 
Convention Area was reduced considerably.
241
 As a consequence, the number of stocks 
that required international management decreased, and excluded most of the 
economically important ones.
242
 In addition, the over-exploited status of the stocks had 
affected their distribution, and they rarely extended to the high seas areas. Consequently, 
former NEAFC stocks were subsequently managed by coastal States and by bilateral or 
multilateral fisheries agreements in the case of transboundary stocks.
243
 In addition, many 
of the original members of NEAFC withdrew from the organization when joining as 
members of the European Union. 
For these reasons, following the implementation of EEZ, NEAFC was considered 
as ―a forum for consultation and exchange of information in the context of a regime 
which would give coastal States very full powers to regulate their own zones as they saw 
fit.‖
244
 Its significance to fisheries managements was lost for many years.
245
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 The high seas areas within the NEAFC Convention Area was reduced to the Reykjanes Ridge, extending 
to the Azores, the Banana hole of the Norwegian Sea, and the Barent Sea Loophole (where quotas are set 
by Norway and Russia). 
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 Sen, supra note 197, at 92. 
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 That was the case, for example, of the North East Arctic cod, which has been managed by the 
Norwegian-Russian fisheries commission from 1977. 
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 D.J. Driscoll and N. McKellar, ―The Changing Regime of North Sea Fisheries‖ in C.M. Mason (ed.) The 
Effective Management of Resources: the International Politics of the North Sea (London: Nichols 
Publishing Co., 1979) 125, at 138. 
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 Gezelius, supra note 129, at 36. According to Sen, following the new Convention and until 1995, 
NEAFC only adopted two conservation and management measures, both of them of technical nature: 
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Currently, NEAFC manages mainly four fish stocks with a high seas 
component.
246
 TACs and allocations were only agreed upon in 1995.
247
 Since then, 
several years agreement has not been possible.
248
 Coastal States have an important role in 
the conservation and management of stocks. Some stocks are, indeed, managed primarily 
by coastal States. In the cases of Norwegian spring spawning herring, mackerel and blue 
whiting, the respective coastal State groups adopt management measures (including TAC 
and allocations) for the whole distribution area of the fish stocks, and propose those 
measures for adoption by NEAFC for areas beyond their jurisdiction.
249
 If agreement by 
the coastal States is not reached, NEAFC in turn does not adopt any management 
measures.
250
 In the case of pelagic redfish, management rests primarily on NEAFC. The 
organization adopts management measures and allocations for the area of distribution of 




The EEZ in ICCAT 
The ICCAT Convention signed in 1966 considers as the area of application all 
waters of the Atlantic Ocean, including the adjacent seas. It adds that nothing in it shall 
be considered as affecting the rights, claims or views of any contracting party in regard to 
the extent of jurisdiction over fisheries under international law. Contrary to the processes 
in NAFO and NEAFC, the unilateral extensions of exclusive economic zones during the 
70‘s and early 80‘s did not trigger a review of the Convention. The practice of the States 
did not make jurisdictional distinctions between States in whose fishing zones the highly 
migratory stock occurs and those considered DWFNs. The allocation keys did not reflect 
                                                                                                                                                                             
minimum mesh size for capelin (1985) and minimum mesh size for blue whiting (1987) (Sen, supra note 
197, at 93). 
246
 The species are: Norwegian Spring Spawning (Atlanto–Scandian) herring, mackerel, blue whiting and 
oceanic pelagic redfish (NEAFC, Performance Review Report, supra note 81, at 11). NEAFC also has 
jurisdiction, and has started management, of Rockall haddock and other deep-seas species of less economic 
importance. 
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 Sen, supra note 197, at 96-98; NEAFC, Performance Review Report, ibid, Appendix II to VII, at 65-70. 
An allocated quota was agreed for Pelagic Redfish fishing year 1996, for Norwegian spring spawning 
herring in 1998, Northeast Atlantic mackerel in 2000. Precautionary unallocated quota was adopted for 
Blue whiting in 1992 (ibid, Appendix II to VII, at 65-70).  
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 NEAFC, Performance Review Report, ibid, at 15, and Appendix II to VII, at 65-70. 
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 Ibid, at 17. 
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 Ibid, at 39. It must be noted, however, that under the NEAFC decision-making process, the consent of 
the coastal member State is required for the measure to have effect in its EEZ. 
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those two groups either. Of course, the coastal States participate in the negotiations, 
concur through their votes in the adoption of a decision, and have the alternative of filing 
an objection to an allocation scheme if so warranted.  
The perception that the adoption of EEZs by coastal State members did not 
demand a revision of ICCAT Convention, or that the allocation decision-making process 
and allocation keys did not require jurisdictional distinctions, has as a plausible 
explanation in an historical interpretation of the LOSC with respect to highly migratory 
stocks. Indeed, the initial interpretation of the LOSC by some States, and particularly the 
USA, was that coastal States had no jurisdictional claim over highly migratory species 
within their EEZs.
252
 This interpretation was officially reversed when the U.S. revised the 
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act in the early 1990s.
253
 However, 
when the first allocation was established in the 1982 meeting between U.S., Canada, and 
Japan, it is to be assumed that there was pressure to adopt an allocation practice that 
respected that early interpretation. And as has been noted, that first allocation set the 
model for the allocations to follow.  
It should be noted that those early practices, that in many respects are maintained 
to this day, have created a certain amount of uncertainty in the legal regime. Indeed, it 
appears to be no ―official‖ interpretation on how the rights of coastal States and the 
jurisdiction of ICCAT interact.
254 
This is, mostly, an un-addressed issue that has 
generated conflict in allocation discussions, as will be seen further below. 
Section 4. Allocation in Global Instruments and Fora: UNFSA and Beyond 
The geographical approach adopted by the LOSC promptly proved to be 
insufficient to address the problems of cooperative management of stocks that occur both 
within and outside areas under national jurisdiction, – i.e. straddling stocks and highly 
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 The Performance Review of ICCAT, in relation to compatibility of measures for areas under national 
jurisdiction and those for the high seas, notes: ―The ICCAT Convention expressly reserves the rights, 
claims or views of its Parties with regard to the ―extent of jurisdiction over fisheries‖ under international 
law. This may imply that it is up to the coastal State to interpret, for example, to what extent the ICCAT 
measures apply within its own Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Thus, the possibility may exist depending 
on the position of a coastal State that this provision of the ICCAT Convention comes in conflict with the 
duties under UNFSA to ensure the compatibility of conservation and management measures throughout the 
migratory range of the tuna species‖ (ICCAT, Performance Review Panel, supra note 81, at 17).  
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migratory stocks - or exclusively in the high seas – i.e. discrete stocks. The LOSC did not 
significantly alter the legal framework for high seas fishing. In particular, the LOSC did 
not address the conflict of interests produced by ever scarcer resources and increasing 
demand, and thus, competition.  
The problem was particularly acute with respect to straddling stocks and highly 
migratory stocks. Coastal States, in their newly acquired EEZs, felt that the still 
unregulated areas of the high seas undermined their sovereign rights. The tension was, at 
that time, particularly a tension between coastal States and DWFNs.  
The issue was discussed in different international fora, not only addressing 
fisheries but also addressing sustainable development. The issue of straddling stocks and 
highly migratory stocks was, indeed, the most controversial issue discussed in Chapter 17 
of the oceans during the 1992 UN Conference on Environment Development (UNCED or 
1992 Rio Conference); the only issue outstanding after Preparatory Conference III and 
Preparatory Conference IV; and one that at the end could not be tackled directly.  All that 
could be achieved was to convene an international conference to discuss the issue. 
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21
255
 includes the following action:  
17.50. States should convene, as soon as possible, an intergovernmental 
conference under United Nations auspices, taking into account relevant activities 
at the sub-regional, regional and global levels, with a view to promoting effective 
implementation of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea on straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. The 
conference, drawing, inter alia, on scientific and technical studies by FAO, should 
identify and assess existing problems related to the conservation and management 
of such fish stocks, and consider means of improving cooperation on fisheries 
among States, and formulate appropriate recommendations. The work and the 
results of the conference should be fully consistent with the provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in particular the rights and 
obligations of coastal States and States fishing on the high seas. 
The mandate of Agenda 21 explicitly prescribed that the work and the results of 
the Conference should be fully consistent with the LOSC. This was the origin of the 
negotiation that adopted the UNFSA in December 1995. 
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The conference was prepared by other meetings. In particular, a Meeting of the 
Group of Technical Experts on High-Seas Fisheries, held at United Nations Headquarters 
from 22 to 26 July 1991; and an FAO consultation on high seas fishing held in September 
1992. 
Both preparatory conferences seem to conclude, or even just assume, that limiting 
fishing effort or catches, and allocating the total allowable effort or catch among the 
participating member States, constitute fisheries management best practices.
256
 Both 
recognized, as well, the difficulties of achieving allocation agreements.
257
 Both 
conference reports also emphasized the challenges of new entrants and participation in 
regional fisheries management organizations, and highlighted the special challenges that 
participation in high seas fisheries poses for developing countries. 
The UNFSA Conference, however, did not address allocation of fishing 
opportunities directly. Neither the document ―A Guide to the issues before the 
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 prepared by the Chairman (A/CONF/164/10), 24 June 1993, and 
presented in the first substantive session, nor the subsequent texts presented during the 
second, third and fourth substantive session,
259
 addressed the issue of distribution of 
fishing effort or catches.
260
 This was despite the fact that since the very first document 
presented to the Conference, TACs were mentioned as a necessary conservation and 
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management measure, and allocation of fishing opportunities (quotas or other measures 
relating of the regulation of fishing effort) were included as a matter of responsibility for 
RFMO or regional fisheries management arrangements.
261
 It seemed that the delegates 
had a common interest in not raising that topic, probably because a discussion on 




The fact that the UNFSA did not address directly or explicitly the issue of 
allocation, does not mean that it did not include several provisions that have an allocation 
implications. UNFSA could not avoid the conflict of interests that were at the basis of the 
Conference itself. The issues with allocation implications addressed are: the compatibility 
of measures adopted for areas under national jurisdiction and those adopted for the high 
seas; participation in regional fisheries management organizations; fishing opportunities 
for new members; and the special requirements of developing States.
263
 These provisions 
will be analyzed in more detail in the next chapter. 
The provisions on those topics provide some guidance on distributional aspects. It 
is widely agreed, however, that they fall short in providing a complete legal framework 
that addresses the main question on how to balance the different rights, interests and 
aspirations over high seas fish stocks.
264
 So, the search for a legal framework for 
allocation decisions continues. 
There seems to be widespread agreement that the development of a more refined 
framework for allocation decisions must be undertaken region by region and stock by 
stock; and as a consequence that this is a task for the various RMFOs. That opinion was 
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expressed already in the FAO Report of the Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing 
held prior to the UNFSA Conferences.
265
 It has been thereafter reinforced in the most 
important development and fisheries fora. The World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg in 2002 addressed the issue in the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation,
266
 Chapter IV, paragraph 31, which includes the following as an action 
required to achieve sustainable fisheries: 
(e) Encourage relevant regional fisheries management organizations and 
arrangements to give due consideration to the rights, duties and interests of 
coastal States and the special requirements of developing States when addressing 
the issue of the allocation of share of fishery resources for straddling stocks and 
highly migratory fish stocks, mindful of the provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Agreement for the Implementation of 
the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, on the high seas and within exclusive 
economic zones. 
The issue was, as usual, not easy to settle. It was one of the outstanding issues after the 




 The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation was considered at the subsequent 2005 
St. John‘s Conference on the Governance of High Seas Fisheries and the United Nations 
Fish Agreement, Moving from Words to Action. The Ministerial Declaration adopted in a 
closed meeting by 19 of the attending Ministers of Fisheries
268
 gathered in St. John‘s 
during the Conference reaffirms the commitment to the implementation of the relevant 
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parts of Agenda 21 and Johannesburg Plan of Implementation.
269
 Furthermore, the 
Ministers committed to work with RFMO/As to implement a decision making process 
that  
(...) uses criteria for allocations which properly reflect the interests and needs of 
coastal States and developing States, including small island developing States, in 




Shortly after this meeting, in July 2005 the United Nations Open-ended Informal 
Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea made another, albeit rather 
neutral, reference to allocation criteria as well. Its report simply welcomed and urged 




Four months afterwards, in November 2005, the Sixtieth Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 60/31 on Sustainable fisheries,
272
 which 
in the section on subregional and regional cooperation included a paragraph urging 
RFMO/As to ―ensure that their decision-making processes (…) develop criteria for 
allocation which reflects, where appropriate, the relevant provisions of the 
Agreement‖.
273
 It is compromise wording, since the criteria are only required to reflect 
―where appropriate‖ the ―relevant‖ provisions of the Agreement. As mentioned above, 
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and will be analyzed further in the next chapter, the Agreement does not give much 
guidance on what interests the criteria should (primarily) reflect. The resolution on 
sustainable fisheries adopted the following year maintained and expanded the reference, 
urging regional fisheries management organizations to  
(...) improve transparency and to ensure that their decision-making processes are 
fair and transparent (…) address participatory rights, including through, inter alia, 
the development of transparent criteria for allocating fishing opportunities which 
reflects, where appropriate, the relevant provisions of the Agreement, taking due 




This language has been maintained in subsequent resolutions. 
Another recent instance where the allocation of fishing opportunities has been 
debated in global fora is the work developed by the Informal Meeting of the States 
Parties to the UNFSA to agree on elements for assessing the adequacy and effectiveness 
of the Agreement, in preparation of the Review Conference.
275
 One of the elements 
agreed upon was ―participatory rights – extent to which RFMOs have agreed, as 




                                                          
274
 Resolution 61/105 adopted by the U.N. General Assembly during its Sixty First Session, on Sustainable 
Fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments, 
A/RES/60/31, 6 March 2007, paragraph 72, online: United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Division for 
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea <www.un.org/Depts/los>. 
275
 The UNGA requested the Secretary-General to consult with the states parties to the UNFSA, once it 
enters into force, for, inter alia: considering the regional, subregional and global implementation of the 
Agreement; making any appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly on the scope and content 
of the annual report of the Secretary-General relating to the Agreement; and preparing for the review 
conference to be convened by the Secretary-General pursuant to article 36 of the Agreement (Resolution 
56/13 on the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, A/RES/56/13, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
during its Fifty-sixth Session, 13 December 2001, online: DOALOS <www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm>, 
para.6). Acting on this decision, the State parties to UNFSA have held nine rounds of Informal 
Consultations. The fourth and fifth informal consultations (2005 and 2006) where mostly devoted to 
prepare the 2006 Review Conference of UNFSA. 
276
 UN Review Conference on the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, New York, 22 to 26 May 2006, 




The Review Conference of UNFSA provided yet another opportunity for the issue 
to be raised in international fora. During the Conference it was recognized by the 
delegates that, while ―articles 10(b) and 11 of [UNFSA] provided the framework for 
participatory rights‖, and although ―some regional fisheries management organizations 
have undertaken efforts to address participatory rights and allocation issues‖, ―further 
work is needed to develop more detailed criteria for participatory rights, bearing in mind 
the importance of addressing social and economic interests in a manner consistent with 
conservation objectives.‖
277
 The Conference agreed to recommend that States, 
individually and collectively, through regional fisheries management organizations, 
―address participatory rights through, inter alia, the development of transparent criteria 
for allocating fishing opportunities, taking due account, inter alia, of the status of the 
relevant stocks and the interests of all those with a real interest in the fishery‖.
278
  
The discussions on allocation issues were not easy during the Review Conference 
either. An observer to the Conference noted that ―a few non-parties felt that key issues 
such as trade measures and participatory rights were being sidelined in the drafting, 
suggesting that the process was being led by a restricted group of countries‖.
279  
 
The negotiation history of these non-binding instruments of international law 
deserves two observations. First, the negotiating parties are reluctant to address the topic 
of participatory rights. It is often one of the most difficult issues to reach agreement on, 
and one that always requires extensive negotiations and careful drafting. In particular, 
special care has been given to ensure a neutral language in the recognition of the interests 
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that need to be taken into account in the allocation processes, in particular, if the 
document is discussed in a fisheries forum.
280
 It seems that many States don‘t have an 
interest in opening such discussion, at least in the global fora.  
The second observation is that negotiating States have explicitly avoided the word 
―equitable‖ while describing the qualities that the allocation criteria should possess. 
Instead, adjectives such as ―transparent‖ and ―according to international law‖ have been 
preferred. This will be addressed in more detail in chapter 5. 
Since the predominant view is that allocation criteria and mechanisms have to be 
developed by the RFMOs, the next section will address how that has been done at the 
regional level to date. However, it should be mentioned that certain voices have 
advocated that at least some role should be played by global fora. During the negotiation 
process of UNFSA, some statements were made in that direction, albeit in a very limited 
and indirect way.
281
 In recent years, however, the idea has been explicitly proposed as a 
means to facilitate the negotiation process of allocation in RFMOs. Michael Lodge and 
Satja Nandan suggest that FAO could support the efforts of RFMOs to develop and apply 
equitable allocation criteria by elaborating guidelines on the implementation of articles 
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10 and 11 of UNFSA,
282
 and recommends action by FAO and RFMOs to develop 
equitable allocation criteria.
283
 Lodge, indeed, has stated broadly that  
[t]here are strong arguments in favour of a global approach to (…) the allocation 
on an equitable basis of shares of harvests and fleet capacity. International 
fisheries are no longer the exclusive preserve of a few technologically advanced 
States. If we are to achieve long-term sustainable management of international 
fisheries, the key challenge for the future will be to establish a globalized regime 
in which all nations have the incentive to cooperate.
284
 
Section 5. Developments in Regional Allocation Frameworks  
As described in the previous section, there is a perceived need for RFMOs to 
develop criteria for allocation ―according to international law‖. The need to develop 
allocation criteria was triggered not only at the global level, but also within RFMOs. In 
particular, there was an increasing dissatisfaction with traditional allocation practices 
which based allocation mainly on the criterion of historical catches. This criterion, it was 
argued, did not consider adequately the different rights, interests and aspirations that were 
recognized in the global legal framework. 
This dissatisfaction with the status quo triggered difficult processes of revision of 
existing allocation criteria in two organizations: NAFO and ICCAT. It also led to new 





The Revision of the Allocation Framework in NAFO 
Allocations in NAFO were roll-over year after year, tracing their origins back to 
the ICNAF era, albeit accommodations were made for the EC to become a member. 
Other ―new members‖, however, were dissatisfied with allocation scheme. In 1997, US 
proposed the establishment of a working group to address the problem of allocation of 
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fishing opportunities to contracting parties.
286
 The proposal was supported by the 
meeting, and it was agreed that it would meet before March 1998.
287
 
The Working Group on Allocation of Fishing Rights to Contracting Parties met 
three times on March 4 to 6 1998, April 13 to 15 1999, and March 28 to 30 2000. The 
working group promptly agreed that rules should be written regarding how NAFO would 
deal with future new members in terms of allocation. After the second meeting, the group 
submitted a draft resolution on this topic that was adopted by the General Council in its 
21
st
 Annual Meeting on September 1999.
288
 
Agreement on guidelines on allocation of fishing opportunities to contracting 
parties, however, proved a much harder task. There was a profound conflict between the 
position of the member States that sought a revision of the allocation agreements (mainly, 
US and Korea) and those who did not want to affect the status quo (EU, Canada, etc.). 
The different views of the member States proved insurmountable. At the September 2000 
meeting, the Fisheries Commission decided that the working group would not meet in 
2001. It was noted by a delegate that ―there is a lack of political will among contracting 
parties to move the issue forward‖.
289
  
In 2002 the Fisheries Commission reopened the issue in the agenda by providing 
terms of reference to the working group, which included the need to ―develop options 
whose terms are explicit and predictable for allocation to Contracting Parties from current 
fisheries with NAFO TACs, fisheries previously not subject to NAFO TACs, new 
fisheries, closed fisheries being reopened, and fisheries for which fishing rights are or 
will be allocated in terms other than quotas (e.g. effort limits).‖ Pursuant to this 
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agreement, the working group reconvened its work on March 26 to 27, 2003. During this 
- their last - meeting, the group adopted document Working Paper 03/3 Draft Guidelines 
for future allocation of fishing opportunities not currently allocated. However, agreement 
could not be reached on two aspects of the document. One was the very fundamental 
issue of the scope of the guidelines. While USA insisted on making it applicable to all 
NAFO stocks, most delegations rejected that possibility and maintained that these criteria 
would be applicable only to allocation decisions for NAFO fish stocks not yet under a 
national quota regime. The other disagreement related to the mention of UNFSA, which 
was rejected by Latvia and Lithuania.  
The working group agreed to submit the guidelines as an annex to the report of 
the Fisheries Commission, but since consensus could not be reached on some aspects of 
its substance, not to make specific recommendation on adoption of guidelines to the 
Commission. The Fisheries Commission, in turn, simply adopted the Report of the 
working group. With this, the work on allocation criteria was concluded. 
There have been three opportunities for the application of the draft guidelines to 
the allocation of previously unregulated fisheries: thorny skate in division 3LNO, white 
hake in division 3NO and redfish in Division 3O. In none of these cases were the draft 
guidelines mentioned. The respective TACs were allocated ―based on standard allocation 
criteria‖, which were identified as coastal State status, percent biomass inside and outside 
Canada‘s 200 mile EEZ, coastal community dependence, contribution to science and 
enforcement, and catch history.
290
 No further details on how these criteria were applied to 
each stock were included in the reports. 
USA made a further attempt to advance a reform on the allocation criteria during 
the NAFO reform process. During the 27
th
 meeting of the General Council, NAFO 
adopted the decision to undertake a revision of the NAFO Convention.
291
 For this 
purpose, it established an ad hoc Working Group on NAFO Reform to review and, where 
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appropriate, develop recommendations to modify and/or complete the provisions of the 
NAFO Convention. The ad-hoc working group met in Montreal, 25-28 April 2006, and in 
Lunneburg, 12-17 September 2006. Additionally, a technical editing working group met 
in Brussels, 22 and 23 May 2007.  
During this process, the USA expressed its concern that ―inequities remain in the 
draft revised NAFO Convention text relative to both the NAFO dues assessment 
procedure and the NAFO allocation practice.‖
292
 To address these inequities, the USA 
submitted proposals to modify article VI paragraph 7 of the Convention,
293
 as well as the 
provisions on contribution to the budget.
294
 The proposed amendment to article VI aimed 
at recognizing explicitly that ―proposals for the allocation of fishing opportunities shall 
be applied in a fair and equitable manner with the goal of ensuring opportunities for all 
qualifying Contracting Parties‖.
295
 It also included, among the criteria for allocation of 
fishing opportunities, ―the contribution of the Contracting Parties to the Commission and 
to the conservation and management of the stock, including the provision of accurate data 
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and their contribution to the conduct of scientific research in the convention area.‖
296
 
None of these proposals was included among the amendments to the NAFO Convention 
officially adopted at the General Assembly 29
th
 Annual Meeting held in Lisbon, Portugal, 
between the 24 and the 28 of September, 2007. The revision of allocation criteria again 
failed in NAFO. 
 
The Revision of the Allocation Framework in ICCAT 
Perhaps the most significant developments with respect to allocation practices 
have taken place in ICCAT. The trigger, in this case, has been the powerful combination 
of coastal States being developing States. They emphasized the lack of recognition of 
both their sovereign rights in their exclusive economic zones, and their urgent needs and 
development aspirations. Their dissatisfaction led to an ―allocation crisis‖ and this, in 
turn, led to ―the search for a new allocation scheme within ICCAT‖.
297
  
The trigger for this process was the difficult negotiation on a sharing agreement 
for South Atlantic swordfish. ―First warning of the need for a TAC for South Atlantic 
swordfish were sounded in 1996, but agreement could not be reached on allocations at 
that meeting, largely as a result of the insistence by Brazil that the new criteria listed in 
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement replaced past performance as the basis for developing a 
sharing agreement.‖
298
 An inter-sessional meeting of Panel 4 was hosted in Brazil in 
1997. Negotiations again proved difficult, and agreement could be reached only on a 
closed session by heads of delegations.
299
 Despite this agreement, developing States 
remained unsatisfied. Some parties argued they were not present in the meeting; some 
that the allocation scheme was unfair. As a consequence of the unsatisfactory results, in 
1998 Brazil, on behalf of several developing countries, succeeded in the initiative of 
establishing a working group to analyze the allocation criteria generally, and not with 
respect to a particular stock. The working group on allocation criteria met four times 
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between 1998 and 2001. In 2001, they finished their work with the adoption of the non-
binding Resolution 2001-15 on Allocation criteria for fishing possibilities.
300
  
As in the case of NAFO, a major discussion concerned the scope of application of 
the criteria. While some States (in particular developed DWFNs) wanted to limit the 
scope of application of the criteria to the stocks not currently allocated, others (mostly 
developing coastal States) expected the criteria to be applicable to all stocks, when 
allocated by ICCAT. Contrary to NAFO, the latter interpretation prevailed.
301
 The 
developed States succeeded in balancing the broader scope of application of the criteria 
by adding a paragraph stating that the allocation criteria should be applied to all stocks in 
a gradual manner, over a period of time to be determined by the relevant panels, in order 




The guidelines were received with great hope by the developing States, which 
qualify this as a breakthrough moment in the life of ICCAT. It was considered that the 
criteria adopted were in line with current international law, and in particular the LOSC 
and other relevant international fisheries agreements. The fact that it respected the rights 
and interests of coastal States in their exclusive economic zone was highlighted by many 
contracting parties. Indeed, some coastal States that were, at the time, observers to 
ICCAT decided to join the organization mainly because the new criteria ensured the 
recognition of the right to develop a fishery in their fishing zones.
303
 
The practical implementation of the criteria proved those hopes to be excessively 
optimistic. The same year that the criteria were adopted, the Eastern and Mediterranean 
bluefin tuna and the Southern swordfish negotiations failed over the allocation issue. 
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Some States estimated that the new criteria were not applied; others that they were 
misunderstood. For the first time, ICCAT failed to even roll over the previous 
management measures, and thus they were left without a TAC or sharing arrangement.
304
 
In the case of East bluefin tuna and Southern swordfish, agreement was finally reached in 
2002. In the case of bigeye tuna, agreement was reached in 2004. These agreements have 
been attributed to ―a slow acceptance of the merits (and perhaps inevitability?) of 
opposing arguments, and a resultant gradual compromise.‖
305
 It is probably also true that 
agreement was possible because the TAC was consistently set above the scientifically 
recommended level, in order to accommodate new aspirations without reducing the share 
of traditional fishing States. In any event, the allocation issue in ICCAT has not been 
completely settled: dissatisfaction with current allocation agreements by contracting 




Allocation Criteria in Other RFMOs 
The developments within NAFO and ICCAT are marked to a great extent to the 
need to supplement the provisions of the Conventions which established these 
organizations. RFMO Conventions adopted after UNFSA had the advantage of these 
previous experiences and the inspiration of this global agreement. For this reason, they 
generally recognized TAC and allocation of national quotas as important conservation 
and management measures; and furthermore, they explicitly consider a list of criteria 
guiding allocation decisions. That has been the case with WCFPC, SEAFO, CCSBT,
307
 
and the recently signed SPRFMO Convention text (not yet in force).
308
  
The criteria of the RFMO Conventions apply to allocation of fishing opportunities 
to both contracting parties and new participants. In general, they follow closely the 
provisions of UNFSA and in particular article 11 on new entrants (including the case of 
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SEAFO that has jurisdiction over straddling and discrete stocks).
309
 Some organizations 
have included certain modifications or added criteria that reflect the specific 
characteristics of the regions or stocks involved.
310
 
In addition to the provisions of their Convention texts, some organizations have 
developed additional guidelines for allocation of fishing opportunities. That is the case of 
CCSBT. Two other organizations – WCPFC and IOTC - have at least started a process to 
develop detailed allocation criteria.  
CCSBT adopted, in 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for allocation 
of fishing opportunities among the three original contracting parties.
311
 The MoU was not 
applied until 2010. In addition, the CCSBT is discussing the adoption of a Strategic Plan 
that includes, among other actions, the implementation of existing decisions that impact 
upon member allocations and the development of options for the long-term allocation 




WCFPC, in turn, agreed during its second meeting to initiate a process to develop 
a framework for the implementation of the allocation provisions in article 10(3) of the 
Convention. For this purpose, it tasked the Executive Secretary with producing a 
discussion paper on the issue of allocation.
313
 However, the work was later suspended.
314
 
Finally, the IOTC, during its last session in March 2010, adopted Resolution 
10/01 for the conservation and management of tropical tuna stocks in the IOTC area of 
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 According to this resolution, the Commission ―shall adopt an allocation 
quota system or any other relevant measure for the yellowfin and bigeye tunas at its 
plenary session in 2012.‖
316
 For this purpose, it was agreed that a technical committee 
should be held prior to the Commission Plenary session in 2011 to discuss allocation 
criteria for the management of the tuna resources of the Indian Ocean and recommend an 
allocation quota system or any other relevant measures.
317
 
Section 6. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter reviewed the evolution of the allocation of TAC in RFMOs from its 
first implementation at the international level to the current legal framework and 
practices. In this section, some aspects of this evolution will be highlighted.  
A first important observation is that TAC and allocation has become an important, 
even fundamental, conservation and management measure. The LOSC recognizes TAC 
explicitly as a management measure to be adopted in the high seas. UNFSA not only 
considers the determination of a TAC, but also its allocation among participating sates, as 
a matter of responsibility for RFMOs. Most RFMOs, including pre-UNFSA RFMOs with 
amended Convention texts, also identify the management measure explicitly in their 
mandates and functions.  
TAC and allocation were recommended as best (available) management tool 
considering two aspects of fisheries management: biological and economic 
considerations. TACs were necessary to limit an increasing fishing mortality that 
threatens to overexploit fisheries; allocation of national quotas was necessary to eliminate 
competition (Olympic race) that results in economic waste in a scenario of 
interdependence.  
The early studies made it clear, however, that allocation of national quotas did not 
in itself produce economic efficiency. It just provided the appropriate incentives for 
States to pursue economic efficiency in their national fishing policies. Therefore, the 
achievement of economic efficiency was dependent upon the national implementation of 
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the quotas by the participating States. The determination of the national policies was, 
however, a matter of State sovereignty and outside the scope of international 
management. Thus, the establishment of national quotas protected and actually reinforced 
State sovereignty, creating ―boxes‖ of exclusive jurisdiction in an otherwise common 
resource. Thus, the role of international fisheries management was reduced to ―dividing 
the pie.‖ National fisheries policies for the exploitation and use of fisheries resources 
remained under the veil of State sovereignty, without even a relationship at the level of 
communication with the international regime.  
As a consequence of the emphasis on biology and economics of the fisheries 
management paradigm, social objectives other than conservation and efficiency, and 
distributional consequences of the quota system – i.e. equity considerations - were not at 
the center of the discussion leading to the recognition of TACs and allocation as best 
available management practices. The Report of a FAO Study Group on Economic 
Aspects of Fisheries Management clearly stated 
These remarks apply, however, only to the efficiency effects of regulatory actions. 
These actions may also have distributions effects (…) [I]t must be acknowledge, 
without reservations, that economic analysis as such can provide no basis for 
distribution decisions of this type. It can only clarify the alternatives, and thus 
improve the essentially political decision-making that must be involved.
318
  
The economist John Crutchfield, one of the main proponents of a national quota 
system for international fisheries, provides a quote that summarizes the lack of attention 
to equity concerns. In one of the early conferences held to discuss the quota system, and 
while addressing the issue of new entrants, he asked ―but who is to define equity, and 
who is to establish criteria for eligibility?‖
319
 The question posed by Crutchfield is at the 
heart of the search for a regulatory framework for TAC and allocations. 
It is necessary to point out that some distributional aspects were included in the 
work of some RFMOs in the early implementation of TAC and allocation. In particular, 
ICNAF and, to a lesser extent, NEAFC, engaged in analysis to determine appropriate 
frameworks for the allocation of quotas. Those frameworks considered the ―special 
needs‖ or ―special circumstances‖ of coastal States, coastal communities, the case of 
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fishing fleets with less diversion possibilities, and new entrants. Nevertheless, it was the 
criteria of historical catches which had preeminence in these theoretical frameworks for 
allocation, and which has also had preeminence in the practical implementation of 
management measures. Allocations followed, and still follow, mainly the criterion of 
historical catches.  
Another aspect of the process that needs to be highlighted relates to the allocation 
practices after the establishment of EEZs. This aspect is particularly important because it 
is an unresolved conflict between coastal States and DWFNs. The consequences of the 
extension of fisheries jurisdiction for allocation issues were dealt with mostly by 
individual organizations in a way that better suited their particular reality and power 
distribution. There was, therefore, no generally-held view on how coastal State and 
DWFNs should address, either procedurally or substantially, the distribution of fishing 
opportunities for straddling and highly migratory stocks. 
Another important observation relates to the procedure for the adoption of TACs 
and allocations. In every case in ICNAF, NEAFC and ICCAT, discussions for allocation 
took place in closed meetings, with no records of deliberations, and often a limited 
number of participants. Indeed, this was considered the ―most effective way‖ to move 
forward the allocation agenda. Allocation negotiations relegated transparency to the 
perceived benefits of political compromise. 
The distributional implications of allocation have remained mostly unaddressed 
and even understated. After some progress was made by including some provisions with 
allocation implications in UNFSA, the global fora has limited itself to recommending to 
RFMOs the development of ―transparent‖ allocation criteria ―in accordance with 
international law.‖ While referring to this perceived need, references to equity have been 
consistently deleted from the international documents. 
RFMOs have made some progress in the development of a framework for 
allocation. In particular, ICCAT has developed non-binding guidelines, and most post-
UNFSA RFMOs include allocation criteria in their Convention texts. However, and as 
the next chapter will attempt to demonstrate, progress has been insufficient. Crutchfield‘s 
question remains without a clear answer; an answer is, however, badly needed. It seems 
apparent that the international community and the RFMOs are still in search of a 
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Chapter 3. TAC and Allocation: Legal Analysis  
 
The previous chapter has analyzed the evolution of the TAC since its inception in 
the early 1970s to this day. It has been mentioned that the global legal framework, and in 
particular the LOSC and UNFSA, provide some insights on allocation issues but fail to 
solve the allocation problem. It has been also explained that the development of an 
allocation framework is widely considered to be the responsibility of RFMOs, and that, 
although RFMOs have made some progress, frameworks are still incomplete.  
This chapter describes and analyzes the substantive framework in more detail. 
Procedural aspects will be dealt with in chapter 6. The first section of this chapter will 
address general aspects of the global legal framework. The second section will address a 
more detailed analysis of the legal provisions in relation to some of the main conflicts of 
rights, interests and aspirations in high seas fisheries: the coastal State – DWFN conflict; 
the new entrant problem; and the special needs of developing States. The third section 
will analyze the additions that have been made to this framework by regional instruments. 
Finally, the fourth section will identify the main types of allocation agreements that have 
been adopted in the practice of RFMOs.  
Section 1. Global Framework for Allocation: Some General Aspects 
The analysis of the legal framework for allocation of fishing opportunities 
considers global and regional instruments, which in turn can be binding or non-binding. 
The binding legal framework is established, at the global level, in the LOSC and UNFSA. 
Non-binding instruments addressing allocation of fishing opportunities in high seas 
fisheries do not provide much help. As described in the previous chapter, resolutions, 
recommendations and declarations at the global fora call for the development of 
transparent criteria for allocation, but do not elaborate on how to achieve this task. Only 
one instrument can be considered to provide some substantive guidance to the process: 
the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. This instrument encourages RFMOs to give 
―due consideration‖ to the rights, duties and interests of coastal States and the special 
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requirements of developing States when addressing the issue of the allocation of 
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.
320
 
At the regional level, the framework for allocation is contained in RFMO 
Convention texts, as well as in binding and non-binding documents of general application 
– decision, guidelines, and recommendations. In some cases, elements of an allocation 
framework can be found in specific recommendations adopted for particular stocks.  
Regional frameworks for allocation should be consistent with international law, 
particularly LOSC and UNFSA. In assessing this consistency, however, two 
considerations should be kept in mind. The first of these considerations relates to the 
ratification status of LOSC and UNFSA. Not all States have ratified those international 
treaties. In the case of the LOSC, this consideration is not so important because it has 
been widely ratified and many of its provisions are considered customary international 
law.
321
 That is, however, not the case with UNFSA. A table with the status of ratification 
for both LOSC and UNFSA by States participating in one or more RFMOs is provided in 
the Appendix.  
It should be mentioned, however, that in recent years, the ratification and 
accession rate of UNFSA has increased considerably.
322
 In addition, the general 
acceptance of its main provisions has been expressed in several UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) resolutions adopted without a vote or by consensus, as well as in other 
international declarations and resolutions.
323
 Furthermore, some of the obligations 
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It is worth noting that the UNGA adopts every year a resolution entitled ―Sustainable fisheries, including 
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Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments.‖ The very title of the UNGA resolutions 
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64/72, Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related 
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in 2001, and 57/143adopted in 2002. In 2003, the GA started adopting two resolutions on oceans issues. 
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included in UNFSA (and in particular those that ratify and give more precise content to 
the obligations of the LOSC) may be considered part of customary international law.
324
 
Furthermore, the practice of States in the RFMOs, including both parties and non-parties 
to UNFSA, follow closely the provisions and guidelines of this international agreement. 
Based on these considerations, it can be argued that the main corpus of UNFSA has been 
accepted by States as governing their relations with respect to high seas fishing 
cooperation.
325
 Nevertheless, the membership of UNFSA has to be kept in mind while 
analyzing the global legal framework in particular situations.  
A further aspect of UNFSA that needs to be taken into account while assessing 
consistency of regional frameworks with international law is its scope. UNFSA governs 
the high seas conservation and management of two particular types of stocks - straddling 
stocks and highly migratory stocks. There are, however, other high seas stocks that do not 
fall into those categories: discrete stocks. It has been recently suggested that most of the 
principles of UNFSA can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to discrete stocks.
326
 This 
proposal has been generally accepted and no objection has been raised. However, 
international management of discrete stocks is very recent and still scarce.
327
 Indeed, only 
                                                                                                                                                                             
One is entitled Oceans and the Law of the Sea, the second as indicated before. That practice has been 
maintained to present day. All resolutions have been adopted by consensus, or without a vote. It is worth 
mentioning that each of these resolutions calls upon States and fishing entities to ratify or accede to 
UNFSA, or to take measures to implement the agreement.   
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 Maguire et al. note that ―on the high seas, management of deep-water fisheries has lagged behind the 
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few discrete stocks have been managed internationally.
328
 Due to the lack of State 
practice, it is probably early to allow an application of those principles to discrete stocks 
based on customary international law. 
The third aspect that needs to be taken into account, while assessing the 
consistency between international (global) and regional frameworks, is that the 
provisions of the LOSC and UNFSA are general in character. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, they are the result of difficult compromises. As a consequence, they 
often lack clarity, precision and operational details. Different interpretations are often 
supported by the same texts. This aspect of the framework will be addressed in more 
detail in the next section. 
The LOSC addresses the high seas in Part VII, articles 86 and following. It 
addresses in particular the conservation of living resources in Part VII Section 2, articles 
116 and following. In addition, articles 63 and 64 contain some regulation for straddling 
stocks and highly migratory stocks. These provisions set the fundamental pillars on 
which high seas fisheries law is founded. Those pillars are: the freedom of the high seas, 
including a qualified freedom to fish,
329
 the primary jurisdiction of the flag State over the 
vessels flying their flags in the high seas,
330
 the obligation to conserve the natural 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to 90, several RFMOs have adopted a moratoria on deep-sea fishing activities in new fishing grounds, 
usually joined by requirements to develop appropriate conservation and management measures before 
expanding fishing activities (see, for example: SPRFMO, Interim Management Measures adopted at the 3
rd
 
meeting of the International Consultations on the proposed South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management 
Organization, held in Reñaca, Chile, on May 4 2007, online: SPRFMO 
<http://www.southpacificrfmo.org>; NAFO, Conservation and Enforcement Measures 2010, supra note 
236, Chapter I bis). Other RFMOs have closed specific areas (NEAFC, Recommendation on the protection 
of Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems from significant adverse impacts in the NEAFC regulatory area, online: 
NEAFC <http://www.neafc.org>). This can be considered as a preliminary measure for active management.  
328
 The most important international agreement for management of discrete stocks is probably the 
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Conservation and Management of Orange roughy on the South Tasman Rise, signed for New Zealand on 
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Mar. & Coast. L. 119. NEAFC has adopted specific management measures that go beyond moratoria and 
closed areas for Orange roughy and other deep sea species in 2010 (Recommendation IX: 2010 on 
Management Measures for Orange roughy in 2010 & 2011, and Recommendation VI: 2010 on 
Conservation and Management Measures for deep-sea species in the NEAFC Regulatory Area 2010 to 
2012, both online: NEAFC <http://www.neafc.org>). 
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 LOSC, article 87, and in particular paragraph 1 subparagraph (e). It is worth noting that the freedom to 
fish is subject to the conditions set in section 2 of Part VII. Furthermore, paragraph 2 of article 87 states: 
―These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for ―the interests of other States in their 
exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with 
respect to activities in the Area.‖  
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 LOSC, article 92. 
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resources of the ocean,
331
 the obligation to cooperate with other States in that 
conservation,
332
 and the obligation not to discriminate against any States in the adoption 
of conservation measures.
333




The multinational character of fisheries in the high seas makes the cooperation 
obligation pivotal for fisheries management. In relation to high seas fish stocks, in 
general, the obligation to cooperate is included in article 118: ―States whose nationals 
exploit identical living resources, or different living resources in the same area, shall 
enter into negotiations with a view to taking the measures necessary for the conservation 
of the living resources concerned.‖ With respect to straddling and highly migratory 
stocks in particular, the LOSC call upon ―coastal State and the States fishing for such 
stocks in the adjacent area shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or 
regional organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of 
these stocks in the adjacent area‖.
335 
In the case of highly migratory stocks, the objective 
of that cooperation is not only conservation of the fish stocks, but also ―promoting the 
objective of optimum utilization of such species throughout the region, both within and 
beyond the exclusive economic zone‖.
336 
 UNFSA, in turn, establishes as an objective of 
its provisions ―the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks 
and highly migratory fish stocks.‖
337
  
The obligation to cooperate is best achieved, or at least is thought to be best 
achieved, through RFMOs. They are considered the ―institutionalization‖ of the 
obligation to cooperate. LOSC promotes their establishment by stating that States ―shall, 
as appropriate, cooperate to establish subregional or regional fisheries organizations to 
this end.‖
338
 UNFSA, in turn, not only promotes their establishment
339
 but also calls for 
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strengthening existing organizations in order to improve their effectiveness in 
establishing and implementing appropriate conservation and management measures.
340
  
The obligation to cooperate for the conservation of high seas stocks has as a goal 
the establishment of conservation and management measures. Thus, these conservation 
and management measures have to be established by agreement of participating States, 
either directly or through the decision-making mechanism of an RFMO. This aspect 
needs to be highlighted because it has important consequences, in particular, for 
allocation of fishing opportunities: particular solutions are subject to a negotiation 
process among participating States using appropriate decision-making frameworks.
341
 
TACs are recognized explicitly as a conservation and management measure for 
high seas fisheries, and indeed, as a fundamental measure in fisheries management, in the 
LOSC. The chapeau of article 119, on conservation and management of the living 
resources of the high seas, reads: ―in determining the allowable catch and establishing 
other conservation measures for the living resources in the high seas (…)‖.
342
 UNFSA, on 
the contrary, does not refer explicitly to TACs, but they are understood to be one of the 
measures that can be adopted to achieve the objective of long-term conservation and 
sustainable use of highly migratory and straddling stocks.
343
 
The issue of allocation of fishing opportunities, on the contrary, is not addressed, 
at least not explicitly, in the LOSC. No provision of the LOSC refers to allocation or 
sharing agreements regarding quotas, effort, or participation, in the high seas, or for 
resources that straddle or migrate between areas under national jurisdiction and the high 
seas.
344
 However, it should be noted that in its preparatory meeting for UNFSA 
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 The only reference to sharing agreements is included in article 62 of the LOSC, addressing the 
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allocation ―issue‖ during the LOSC was resolved through the establishment of an extended area of 
jurisdiction for the conservation and exploitation of resources (EEZ). LOSC adopted a jurisdictional and 
spatial approach to the allocation of natural resources. This new distribution of ocean‘s wealth was believed 
to solve the cooperative problems faced by the international community. As a consequence, the high seas‘ 
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Conference, a group of technical experts on high-seas fisheries interpreted article 119 as 
providing some guidance in this respect. 
Article 119 calls upon States, in determining the TAC ―or other conservation 
measures‖, to 
(a) take measures which are designed, on the best scientific evidence available to the 
States concerned, to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels 
which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant 
environmental and economic factors, including the special requirements of 
developing States, and taking into account fishing patterns, the interdependence of 
stocks and any generally recommended international minimum standards, whether 
subregional, regional or global; 
(b) take into consideration the effects on species associated with or dependent upon 
harvested species with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such 
associated or dependent species above levels at which their reproduction may 
become seriously threatened. 
It further adds, in paragraph 3, that States concerned shall ensure that 
conservation measures and their implementation do not discriminate in form or in fact 
against the fishermen of any State. 
The group of experts considered that the provision of article 119 may be 
interpreted as applicable to allocation decisions, since they ―might be regarded‖ as a 
conservation measure within the meaning of this provision.
345
 According to this 
interpretation, allocation decisions should be qualified by the factors listed in this 
provision, from which they cite in particular: environmental and economic factors, the 
special requirements of developing States, and fishing patterns.
346
  As an additional factor 
to be taken into account, not listed in article 119, the group included the enhancement 
efforts undertaken by a State.
347
  
UNFSA does not address allocation of fishing opportunities directly either. 
However, the Conference could not avoid addressing distributional conflicts. The 
negotiation was, in itself, the result of increasing conflicts of interests in the exploitation 
of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. The predominant conflict was the one 
between coastal States and DWFN. However, the interests and aspirations of developing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
regulation was not addressed in great detail, and the LOSC limited itself to repeating the main legal 
provisions of customary international law. 
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States were also present in the discussion. This was a consequence of both the general 
developments in international law, particularly in the field of sustainable development, 
and the particular genesis of the negotiation process, i.e. the 1992 Rio Conference.  It has 
been noted that the UNFSA Conference was influenced by the recent debates in UNCED, 
although this influence was resisted by some States.
348
  
As a result of these unavoidable conflicts, UNFSA contains several provisions 
with allocation consequences. These provisions address the conflict between conservation 
and utilization (i.e. intergenerational equity as discussed in chapter 4). They also address 
the main conflict between coastal States and DWFNs (in article 7); the issue of new 
entrants to the fishery (in article 11); and the special situation of developing States 
(arguably, in articles 24 and 25, and article 11). These different provisions will be 
addressed in more detail below. However, a few remarks in relation to the general 
approach taken by UNFSA are useful.  
A first aspect of the framework that is important to highlight is that UNFSA does 
not have an overarching provision or principle regarding allocation, but rather addresses 
different conflicts of interests in different provisions. In other words, it provides separate 
guidance on compatibility of measures within and outside EEZ, on new participants, and 
on developing States, but does not address how a decision shall be made where all those 
interests co-exist at the same time and in relation to the same stock. These provisions 
have been considered as an ―encapsulation‖ of the distributional conflicts by UNFSA;
349
 
an encapsulation that represents a failure to address the distributional problem in its 
integrity. 
In addressing a particular distributional problem, the different provisions of 
UNFSA with allocation implications require States to take into account a series of 
elements, criteria, factors or facts. They are reproduced in table 1. 
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Table 1. Provisions with allocation implications in UNFSA 
Article Criteria 








(a) take into account the conservation and management measures adopted and applied in 
accordance with article 61 of the Convention in respect of the same stocks by coastal 
States within areas under national jurisdiction and ensure that measures established in 
respect of such stocks for the high seas do not undermine the effectiveness of such 
measures; 
(b) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied for the high seas 
in accordance with the Convention in respect of the same stocks by relevant coastal States 
and States fishing on the high seas; 
(c) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied in accordance 
with the Convention in respect of the same stocks by a subregional or regional fisheries 
management organization or arrangement; 
(d) take into account the biological unity and other biological characteristics of the stocks 
and the relationships between the distribution of the stocks, the fisheries and the 
geographical particularities of the region concerned, including the extent to which the 
stocks occur and are fished in areas under national jurisdiction; 
(e) take into account the respective dependence of the coastal States and the States fishing 
on the high seas on the stocks concerned; and 
(f) ensure that such measures do not result in harmful impact on the living marine 
resources as a whole. 






(a) the status of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and the existing 
level of fishing effort in the fishery; 
(b) the respective interests, fishing patterns and fishing practices of new and existing 
members or participants; 
(c) the respective contributions of new and existing members or participants to 
conservation and management of the stocks, to the collection and provision of accurate 
data and to the conduct of scientific research on the stocks; 
(d) the needs of coastal fishing communities which are dependent mainly on fishing for the 
stocks; 
(e) the needs of coastal States whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent on the 
exploitation of living marine resources; and 
(f) the interests of developing States from the subregion or region in whose areas of 
national jurisdiction the stocks also occur. 







a) the vulnerability of developing States which are dependent on the exploitation of living 
marine resources, including for meeting the nutritional requirements of their populations or 
parts thereof; 
(b) the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by, subsistence, 
small-scale and artisanal fishers and women fishworkers, as well as indigenous people in 
developing States, particularly small island developing States; and 
(c) the need to ensure that such measures do not result in transferring, directly or 
indirectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing States 
  
This approach deserves four general observations. The first one is that all articles 
require States to ―take into account‖ the factors included in the respective provisions. As 
mentioned by Molenaar with respect to article 11,
 
―even though the chapeau uses the 
word ‗shall‘, which thereby establishes a legal obligation, this is considerably softened by 
86 
 
the qualification ‗take into account‘.‖
 350 
Indeed , the obligation to take into account may 
be satisfied by simply noting the factor, but not giving it any effect in the resultant 
distribution.  
What is said in respect to article 11 applies as well to article 7 and 24. However, it 
should be noted that article 7 requires that more weight than a simple ―consideration‖ be 
given to two particular factors. This weight is implicit in the fact that States are called 
upon not only to consider, but also to ensure a specific result. Articles 7(2), 
subparagraphs a) and f) state: 
In determining compatible conservation and management measures, States shall: 
(a) take into account the conservation and management measures adopted and 
applied in accordance with article 61 of the Convention in respect of the same 
stocks by coastal States within areas under national jurisdiction and ensure that 
measures established in respect of such stocks for the high seas do not undermine 
the effectiveness of such measures; 
(f) ensure that such measures do not result in harmful impact on the living marine 
resources as a whole. (emphasis added) 
The second observation relates to the character of the lists included in articles 7, 
11 and 24.  The elements, criteria, factors or facts are included in either closed or non-
exhaustive lists. Article 7 (which addresses the conflict between coastal States and 
DWFNs) is a closed list, while article 11 (which addresses the fishing opportunities of 
new entrants) and article 24 (which addresses the special requirements of developing 
States) are non-exhaustive lists, as the phrases ―inter alia‖ or ―in particular‖ acknowledge. 
In the two latter cases, therefore, States have latitude not only to ―take into account‖ a 
factor but decide that it should not have an impact on the distributive result, but also to 
consider other elements in their distributional decisions. 
Another aspect that is worth noting is that the criteria in each of the lists constitute 
a description of the interests that are involved in the respective conflict. However, the 
provisions do not determine the weight that has to be given to each factor, do not 
prioritize them, and do not give one or more of them any preference in the distributional 
decision.  
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The fourth observation relates to the nature of the criteria or factors included. The 
criteria are qualitative and general in nature. None of them can be applied to a 
distributional issue without further refinement of its precise content. Even the most 
objective criteria included in the lists – historical catches – leaves important elements to 
be resolved by the negotiating parties (e.g. what is the reference period? the catches made 
by a vessel flying the flag of a DWFN in the EEZ of a coastal State shall be considered 
catches of the DWFN or the coastal State? Which statistics are to be used?) This lack of 
specificity and operational details or parameters allows them to be interpreted 
subjectively with different emphasis, strength and even meaning. 
From this general description, it can be concluded that the approach of the current 
global legal framework to the distributional conflict is to address specific conflicts of 
interests in separate provisions, rather than providing a unitary or harmonized framework. 
As a consequence, it does not contain a ―fundamental norm‖ that acts as a benchmark for 
allocation.
351
 The different conflicts are addressed through the obligation to take into 
consideration closed or open lists of qualitative criteria encompassing a broad range of 
interests without establishing preferences, order, priorities or weight.  
These circumstances give the RFMOs (and their member States) almost absolute 
discretion in determining allocations. Despite the fact that they are included in a binding 
document, the provisions regarding allocation have very little normative value. It can be 
argued that LOSC and UNFSA do little more than acknowledge the competing interests 
in an allocation process.
352
 There is no guidance on how to solve those conflicts of 
interest. 
Section 2. The Conflicts of Interests and Allocation Criteria 
The previous section described the general shortcomings of the legal frameworks 
for allocation as developed in global instruments and RFMOs frameworks. This section 
undertakes an in-depth analysis on how that legal framework addresses particular 
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conflicts of rights and interests in international fisheries, with an emphasis on allocation 
criteria. Identifying the main conflicts of rights and interests in the sharing of fish stocks 
with a high seas component is not a difficult task, after having analyzed the history and 
evolution of TACs and allocations as conservation and management measures. Indeed, 
they were clearly exposed in the early studies for allocations undertaken in the 1960s. 
The subsequent events only confirm the accuracy of these foresights. 
In those early studies, it was asserted that coastal States should be given some 
kind of preference due to their geographical proximity to the fishing grounds and the fact 
that a coastal fishing industry is less movable than a distant water fishing fleet.
353
 The 
conflict of interest between coastal States and DWFNs remained despite the extension of 
fishing jurisdiction. The distributional conflict that would be created by the accession of 
new participants to the fisheries was also recognized and highlighted as one extremely 
important question that needed to be faced in the design of a system of allocation of 
national quotas.
354
 The especial situation of developing States was also acknowledged.
355
 
All those conflicts remain as valid today as in the 1960s. They will be the focus of this 
section. 
Another important conflict is the one between providing fishing opportunities for 
all interested parties, and the need to limit catches for the conservation of the target stock, 
and its associated and dependent species. This particular conflict will be dealt in the next 
chapter. 
There are still other technical conflicts related to the interactions between 
different types of fleet (i.e. a target fishery and a by-catch fishery, or fleets using different 
fishing gears). In the current practice, it is left mostly to individual countries to address 
the fleet conflicts within their national quotas. Exceptions to this general rule exist in 
relation to quotas set for by-catch in a particular target fishery.
356
 For this reason, despite 
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the impact they may have in allocation decisions, these issues will not be analyzed further 
in this thesis.  
 
Coastal State Interests vs. DWFN Interests 
The distribution of fishing opportunities between coastal States, for the portion of 
the stock that occurs in their EEZs, and DWFNs is a problem limited to straddling and 
highly migratory stocks. It is, nevertheless, the most sensitive allocation issue. This 
derives from the fact that straddling and highly migratory stocks account for a significant 
proportion of the resources caught in the high seas; and from the jurisdictional and 
substantive challenges of this distribution. Indeed, allocation is often framed as a conflict 
between coastal States and DWFNs. It is important to note, however, that although such a 
conflict is prominent in practice and discourse, allocation discussions exceed that frame.  
The core of the high seas – EEZs distribution conflict lies in the reconciliation of 
two different regimes: coastal States have an exclusive right for exploration, exploitation 
and conservation of the living resources of their EEZs. DWFNs, in turn, have a ―right to 
fish in the high seas‖, a right that is nevertheless not exclusive but shared with other 
States. This reconciliation has two inter-linked aspects: jurisdictional and substantive. 
The jurisdictional aspect relates to the decision-making process for conservation and 
management measures, and in particular for the TAC, for stocks that occur in areas under 
different jurisdictional regime. The substantive aspect relates to the consideration given 
to coastal State rights in the distribution of fishing opportunities.
357
 This latter aspect is 
the focus of this section. 
The EEZ – high seas conflict was paramount in the UNFSA negotiation process, 
and a very difficult problem to address. Both coastal States and DWFNs had an interest in 
ensuring that the rights carefully negotiated during the LOS Conference did not suffer 
any erosion. For that purpose, it was made clear already in the calling to the conference 
that the results of the conference had to be consistent with the LOSC provisions.
358
 This 
was, indeed, reflected in the text of UNFSA, in particular in article 4: 
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Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of 
States under the Convention. This Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in 
the context of and in a manner consistent with the Convention.
359
 
The simple recognition of the respective regimes of the EEZ and the high seas, 
however, did little to balance the rights and interests at stake in cases of competition and 
conflict. The solution of UNFSA to this problem rested on certain basic principles. One 
of them is the principle of biological unit: conservation and management measures 
adopted for a stock should be consistent over its range of distribution. This principle was 
accepted by both coastal States and DWFNs from the outset.  
As a consequence of the principle of biological unity, it was also accepted that 
conservation and management measures adopted in both areas needed to be compatible 
and coherent. A harder problem was to find the mechanism through which to achieve 
compatible and coherent measures. The final solution is set out in Article 7.  
Article 7 begins with an overall safeguard of respective interests: the sovereign 
rights of coastal States for the conservation and exploitation of resources in their EEZ, 
and the right to fish in the high seas. Article 7(1) reads:  
Compatibility of conservation and management measures 
1. Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal States for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the living marine resources 
within areas under national jurisdiction as provided for in the Convention, and the 
right of all States for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas in 
accordance with the Convention: 
(a) with respect to straddling fish stocks, the relevant coastal States and the States 
whose nationals fish for such stocks in the adjacent high seas area shall seek, 
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 In previous proposals, some States wanted to increase the influence of coastal States in the management 
of those stocks, while other States attempted to ―introduce internationally adopted measures in the high 
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Agreement. To this end, Part VII applies mutatis mutandis in respect of areas under national jurisdiction.‖ 
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either directly or through the appropriate mechanisms for cooperation provided 
for in Part III, to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these 
stocks in the adjacent high seas area; 
(b) with respect to highly migratory fish stocks, the relevant coastal States and 
other States whose nationals fish for such stocks in the region shall cooperate, 
either directly or through the appropriate mechanisms for cooperation provided 
for in Part III, with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective 
of optimum utilization of such stocks throughout the region, both within and 
beyond the areas under national jurisdiction. 
This provision must be read in conjunction with articles 3 and 4. They provide 
safeguards that conservation and management measures are to be adopted, for each area, 
under their respective jurisdictional authority. However, these authorities have to 
cooperate so that the conservation and management measures are adopted on the basis of 
similar standards, so that the management strategy of the whole distribution remains 
stable and coherent (or, in UNFSA terms, so as to ensure ―conservation and management 
of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in their entirety‖).
360
  Article 
7(2) reads: 
(2) Conservation and management measures established for the high seas and 
those adopted for areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to 
ensure conservation and management of the straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks in their entirety. To this end, coastal States and States 
fishing on the high seas have a duty to cooperate for the purpose of achieving 
compatible measures in respect of such stocks (…). 
In discharging this obligation to cooperate so as to achieve compatible 
management measures, they have to take into account some elements, which are listed in 
paragraph 2 of article 7: 
2. (…) In determining compatible conservation and management measures, States 
shall: 
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(a) take into account the conservation and management measures adopted and 
applied in accordance with article 61 of the Convention in respect of the same 
stocks by coastal States within areas under national jurisdiction and ensure that 
measures established in respect of such stocks for the high seas do not undermine 
the effectiveness of such measures; 
(b) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied for the 
high seas in accordance with the Convention in respect of the same stocks by 
relevant coastal States and States fishing on the high seas; 
(c) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied in 
accordance with the Convention in respect of the same stocks by a subregional or 
regional fisheries management organization or arrangement; 
(d) take into account the biological unity and other biological characteristics of 
the stocks and the relationships between the distribution of the stocks, the 
fisheries and the geographical particularities of the region concerned, including 
the extent to which the stocks occur and are fished in areas under national 
jurisdiction; 
(e) take into account the respective dependence of the coastal States and the States 
fishing on the high seas on the stocks concerned; and  
(f) ensure that such measures do not result in harmful impact on the living marine 
resources as a whole. 
The criteria included in the closed list of article 7 include aspects related to stock 
management, biological unit and geographical distribution, fishing practices, dependence, 
and conservation. They shall be taken into account in the establishment of any 
conservation and management measures, and not only in the case of allocation decisions. 
As a consequence, some factors may play a limited role in allocations.
361
  
The biological criteria relate in particular to the relationship between the 
distribution of the stock, the fisheries and the geographical particularities of the region 
concerned. This criterion is known as ―zonal attachment‖. The factor of geographical 
distribution is particularly important, since it implies establishing which proportion of the 
fish stock is present in each jurisdictional area, providing an objective criterion for 
distribution of fishing opportunities. However, it should be noted that the criterion is less 
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objective than might be expected. Firstly, it requires a considerable level of scientific 
knowledge, which is not always available. In addition, fish stocks do not have static 
patterns of distribution, and are influenced by both the amount of fishing and 
environmental factors. Furthermore, fish stocks distribute in different ocean areas at 
different stage of their life cycle. In cases where a relevant stages of the cycle (i.e. 
nursing) occurs in a specific jurisdictional area (e.g. EEZ), claims that the stock has a 
particular attachment to that area, and thus that that area is entitled to a more significant 
share, are probably going to be presented in the negotiation of a cooperative regime.
362
 
As a consequence, the decision on a model to quantify stock distribution in different 
areas is often subject to a negotiation process itself, a process that it is scientific in nature 
but strongly influenced by political considerations.
363
 
It is also worth mentioning that the criteria of geographical distribution or zonal 
attachment for highly migratory stocks has been resisted in even rejected by some States, 
on the basis that the ―the changing distribution of tuna biomass and the fact that due to 




It is also worth mentioning that the letter of article 7 addressing the relationship 
between the biological distribution of the stock, the fisheries, and other geographical 
particularities, includes as one element the ―the extent to which the stocks (…) are fished 
in areas under national jurisdiction‖. According to this, then, not only the presence of the 
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 Meeting of 
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stock is relevant for this criterion, but also the existence and extent of fishing activity. 
Both may not coincide, and often they collide. However, by mentioning both elements in 
the same provision and as elements of the same criterion, UNFSA leaves the 
distributional problems open. As a consequence of these difficulties, different 
interpretations of this one criterion (―zonal attachment‖) may and actually have occurred. 
An example thereof is the dispute that faced NEAFC contracting parties in relation to the 
Norwegian spring spawning herring (or Atlanto-Scandian herring). Although member 
States agreed that zonal attachment should be the criterion for distribution, they had 
different understandings on how to determine that zonal attachment. Some member States 
proposed to establish it in terms of biomass per time; others argued that it should be 
established in terms of catch only.
365
  
In relation to the existence and extent of fishing activities, there is another 
provision that may create more interpretation problems: article 62 of LOSC. According to 
paragraph 2 of this provision,  
[t]he coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources of 
the exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity 
to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other 
arrangements and pursuant to the terms, conditions, laws and regulations referred 
to in paragraph 4, give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch, 
having particular regard to the provisions of articles 69 and 70, especially in 
relation to the developing States mentioned therein. 
The interactions between this provision and article 7 of UNFSA need to be 
assessed. Does this provision apply to cases where the resources occur only within the 
EEZ of a coastal State? Does the provision have any allocation consequence in relation to 
article 7? Or does it regulate, not allocation of fishing opportunities for straddling and 
highly migratory stocks, but access agreements to the EEZ? Those questions remain not 
only unanswered but even unaddressed.
366
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 The question would be, then, if in application of the criteria included in article 7, it is even possible that 
a coastal State will be allocated more fishing opportunities than it is capable of using? If a criterion of zonal 
attachment understood as biological distribution is applied, that may be the case. But if the criterion is not 
given sufficient weight, or if it is counterbalanced by existing fishing patterns or dependency, it may be 
argued that the fishing opportunities should be allocated to other States and not the coastal State. Other 
States still require a permission to fish in the coastal State‘s EEZ, but that would not be to fish the ―surplus‖ 
of the coastal State‘s quota.  
95 
 
A further criterion that article 7 considers for establishing compatibility of 
measures is the dependency of both coastal States and States fishing in the high seas. It 
does not elaborate further on what shall be considered dependency, or how to assess it. It 
has been proposed that ―[s]ome indication for the interpretation of the term ‗dependence‘ 
can be found in articles 11 and 24‖ of UNFSA.
367 
In particular, articles 11(1) 
subparagraphs (d) and (e), and article 24(2) subparagraphs (a) and (b) are cited. 
According to this interpretation, the dependence of the coastal Sates and DWFNs can be 
established by reference to the importance of the stocks to the State concerned in relation 
to its national economy; and the dependence of specific groups on the stocks concerned. 
In the case of developing States, an additional relevant consideration is meeting the 
nutritional requirements of their populations or parts thereof. 
The description of the different criteria that needs to be considered in the cases 
where coastal States‘ and DWFNs‘ aspirations cannot be simultaneously satisfied, 
demonstrates that the provision of article 7 gives little guidance on how to solve the 
allocation problem. Each party is able to find, in the same provision and sometimes in the 
same criterion, the arguments that would support their contradictory positions.  
 
Existing Participants vs. New Entrants  
A second important source of conflict is the one between existing members and 
new (or late) entrants. The LOSC establishes, as a pillar of high seas regime, the principle 
of freedom to fish in the high seas. The freedom is, however, qualified by the obligations 
to directly conserve high seas stocks, to cooperate with other States in their conservation 
and, as appropriate, cooperate to establish subregional or regional fisheries organizations 
to this end. The heart of the problem is to determine if the duty to cooperate implies a 
duty to abstain from fishing, if the fishing stock is already fully exploited. Phrasing the 
question in the reverse, the problem is to determine if RFMOs have an obligation to 
accommodate and provide access to new (or late) entrants. 
UNFSA reinforces the duty of cooperation by establishing, in article 8.4, that 
―only those States which are members of [a regional] organization or participants in [a 
regional] arrangement, or which agree to apply the conservation and management 
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measures established by such organization or arrangement, shall have access to the 
fishery resources to which those measures apply.‖ It adds that a State which is not a 
member of the organization or participant in an arrangement, and which does not 
otherwise agree to apply the conservation and management measures established by such 
organization or arrangement, is not discharged from the obligation to cooperate.
368
 
Paragraph 3 adds that ―such State shall not authorize vessels flying its flag to engage in 
fishing operations for the straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks which are 
subject to the conservation and management measures established by such organization 
or arrangement‖. Therefore, participation in the work of an RFMO is a crucial aspect of 
allocation. In the words of Juda, ―[p]articipation in the management scheme thus has 
been made the price of fishery access; free and unlimited access at will is ended, as 
access now is tied to and limited by the conditions imposed by collective action.‖
369
 
But at the same time, article 8(4) of UNFSA establishes that States with a real 
interest in the fishery have the right and the duty to cooperate with other States by 
becoming members of an organization or participants of an agreement; and the 
organization or agreement could not legally preclude their participation.
370
 What that real 
interest is has not been defined in the agreement, and its scope has been subject to 
interpretation. It is generally recognized that the relevant coastal States (i.e. coastal States 
whose maritime zones are included in, or adjacent to, the RFMO) and the States fishing 
for the stock have a real interest in the fishery. ―Their real interest is implicit in their duty 
to participate‖
371
, recognized in articles 8.4 and 8.5 of UNFSA. According to Orrego, 
these are the only States with a real interest.
372
 Molenaar considers that there is no well-
founded argument for interpreting or applying the concept of ―real interest‖ as a bar to 
participation in RFMOs per se.
373
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The difference of interpretation may not be as substantive if one considers not 
only the participation in the cooperative regime, but also the allocation of fishing 
opportunities, i.e., access to the stocks, for new entrants. Article 11 of UNFSA on 
participatory rights of new entrants contains a non-exhaustive list of criteria that shall be 
taken into account while determining the nature and extent of participatory rights of new 
members of a RFMO, or new participants to an arrangement.
374
 These criteria include: 
(a) the status of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and the 
existing level of fishing effort in the fishery; 
(b) the respective interests, fishing patterns and fishing practices of new and 
existing members or participants; 
(c) the respective contributions of new and existing members or participants to 
conservation and management of the stocks, to the collection and provision of 
accurate data and to the conduct of scientific research on the stocks; 
(d) the needs of coastal fishing communities which are dependent mainly on 
fishing for the stocks; 
(e) the needs of coastal States whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent 
on the exploitation of living marine resources; and 
(f) the interests of developing States from the subregion or region in whose areas 
of national jurisdiction the stocks also occur. 
Orrego considers that states not having a real interest in the stock can only 
participate in the organization as new members, and as such be allocated fishing 
opportunities only ―to the extent possible‖.
375
 Molenaar, although having a broader 
interpretation of the concept of real interest and thus of participatory rights in the regime, 
also leaves open the possibility for restricting access to the stocks to new participants in 
case it is necessary for conservation.
376
 In both cases, the authors seem to give priority to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
interest‖:  flag States that fished in the regulatory area previously and want to resume fishing; flag States 
without a catch history that want to fish in the future; and States with no intention to fish that nevertheless 
want to participate in the RFMO/A (Molenaar, ibid, at 495-496). 
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the first criterion listed in article 11.
377
 Other authors, based on the same article, conclude 
that new entrants must be offered a just and reasonable share of the TAC.
378
 However, 
they do not elaborate on the concept of ―just and reasonable‖ share. 
It should be noted at this point that framing the problem of new entrants as a 
conservation problem is misleading. It is true that the stock can support only a certain 
amount of fishing effort and catches and thus, when that point is reached, no additional 
fishing effort or catches shall be accepted. But that does not imply, necessarily, the 
exclusion of new entrants to a fully exploited stock. The same protection can be achieved 
by re-allocating fishing opportunities within accepted biological limits. In simple terms, 
the exclusion of new entrants to a fully exploited fishery protects the stock (from 
additional fishing effort) but also the existing fishing industry (from reducing its 
participation). 
Whether the interpretation of Orrego or Molenaar is followed, the determination 
of the share of new entrants (if any) is to be established following the criteria of UNFSA 
article 11. It is worth mentioning that the list of criteria is not closed, so other criteria 
may be considered as well by the member States of an RFMO. The criteria listed in 
article 11 can be classified in four main categories: biological (limits of the fishery), 
historical catches (fishing patterns, practices and catches), contribution (to the 
conservation, research and data submission), and need. The criterion of need, in turn, 
considers the dependence of coastal communities and of coastal States, as well as the 
interests of developing coastal States. It is possible to interpret that the interests of 
developing coastal States shall be assessed against the criteria established in article 24 of 
UNFSA, as will be explained below. 
 
Developed vs. Developing States 
According to article 119 of the LOSC, in adopting measures to maintain or restore 
populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable 
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yield, States shall take into account environmental and economic factors, including the 
special requirements of developing States. UNFSA, in turn, devotes a special part to the 
recognition of the special requirements of developing States in relation to conservation 
and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and 
development of fisheries for such stocks.
379
 In particular, States are required to take into 
consideration:  
a) the vulnerability of developing States which are dependent on the exploitation 
of living marine resources, including for meeting the nutritional requirements of 
their populations or parts thereof;  
(b) the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by, 
subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers and women fishworkers, as well as 
indigenous people in developing States, particularly small island developing 
States; and 
(c) the need to ensure that such measures do not result in transferring, directly or 




It is unclear, however, to what extent these provisions shall influence either the 
recognition of developing coastal States rights in the establishment of compatible 
measures for the EEZ and high seas, or of developing States in the allocation of fishing 
opportunities in the high seas. Some authors have concluded, on the basis of article 25(2), 
that UNFSA imposes on members of RFMOs an obligation to cooperate that takes the 
form ―of financial assistance, human resources development, technical assistance, 
transfer of technology through joint venture arrangements, and advisory and consultative 
services‖,
381
 but that ―[n]othing in [UNFSA] gives developing States a prima facie right 
to an allocation of high seas fishing opportunities.‖
382
 Other authors, on the contrary, 
consider that reading articles 25 and 11 together, they ―could be taken to mean that there 
is a certain preferential right in this respect.‖
383
 Still, other authors argue, on the basis of 
the nature of the special requirements listed in article 24(2), that the provisions of Part 
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 Orrego Vicuña, supra note 126, at 235. It must be noted, however, that Orrego has a limited 
interpretation of the concept of real interest and of participatory rights of new entrants. Thus, it may be 
argued that this ―preference‖ applies only to developing States insofar they are coastal States or are fishing 
for the stock, i.e., insofar as they have a ―real interest‖.  
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VII of UNFSA were drafted to target the requirements of developing States insofar as 
they are coastal States.
384
 
Article 25 considers, as one form of cooperation, the enhancement of the ability 
of developing States, in particular the least-developed among them and small island 
developing States, to conserve and manage straddling fish stocks and highly migratory 
fish stocks and to develop their own fisheries for such stocks. Presumably, ―their own 
fisheries‖ refers to the possibility of developing a fishery within their EEZs. Whether this 
implies a certain preference for the allocation of fishing opportunities depends on the 
weight assigned to the needs of (developing) coastal States in relation to other criteria 
listed in article 7.  
Article 25 also imposes the obligation to assist developing States to enable them 
to participate in high seas fisheries, including facilitating access to such fisheries subject 
to articles 5 and 11. The fact that an explicit reference is made to article 5 (on general 
principles for conservation and management of straddling stocks and highly migratory 
stocks) suggests that any access shall be subject to the state of exploitation of the stock. 
Article 11, in turn, considers in particular the needs of developing States only insofar as 
they are coastal States. Thus, the special recognition of developing States in high seas 
fisheries appears to be, at least, limited.  
 
A Summary of Allocation Criteria  
The three main conflicts of interest for high seas fisheries allocations are 
addressed separately in UNFSA. However, and as has been noted before, the conflicts are 
often substantially and procedurally intertwined in the process of establishing a total 
allowable catch and its allocation. What is attempted here is to summarize the main 
factors to provide an integrated list of considerations that need to be taken into account in 
the allocation process, drawing from each of the relevant provisions of UNFSA. 
The summary of criteria does not eliminate the shortcomings noted for the legal 
framework.  It does not assign weights, preferences, or priorities; nor does it determine 
the content with any more objectivity. Furthermore, it should be noted that in cases where 
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preferences or priorities are given to a particular criterion, or set of criteria, a steps-
approach may be preferable. The purpose of this summary is simply to provide a simpler 
framework for further analysis.  
In the allocation of fishing opportunities of straddling and highly migratory 
stocks, five categories of criteria need to be taken into account: biological considerations 
(which in turn include aspects of status of the stock and its distribution), management 
considerations, historical catches, socio-economic factors (need), and contribution. The 
criteria vary slightly for discrete stocks, in that the criteria for compatibility of measures 
in two areas under distinctive jurisdiction is not necessary. Thus, the concept of zonal 
attachment is not applicable.  
The framework includes some elements that give each of these factors or criteria 
some precision in its content. These elements have been extracted from different UNFSA 
provisions. 
The summary of criteria is the following: 
a) Biological considerations 
 Status of the sotck: 
 the exploitation status of the stock, and  
 the harmful impact on the living marine resources as a whole 
 
 Distribution of the stock:  
 the biological unit and other biological characteristics of the stocks  
 the relationships between the distribution of the stocks, the fisheries and the 
geographical particularities of the region concerned 
 
b) Management considerations 
 Existing regulations in the EEZ for the same stock 
 Existing regulations in the high seas area for the same stock 
 Existing regulations in other high seas areas for the same stock 
 
c) Historical entitlement 
 The fishing patterns and practices  
 The extent to which the stocks occur and are fished in areas under national 
jurisdiction 
 
d) Socio-economic factors 
 Dependence of coastal States, including:   
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 needs of coastal fishing communities which are dependent mainly on fishing 
for the stocks 
 the coastal States whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent on the 
exploitation of living marine resources  
 the particular interests of developing coastal States 
 Dependence of States fishing on the high seas on the stocks concerned  
 Needs and dependence of developing States, including:  
 vulnerability of developing States which are dependent on the exploitation of 
living marine resources 
 vulnerability of developing State to meet the nutritional requirements of their 
populations or parts thereof;  
 the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by, 
subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers and women fishworkers;  
 the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by, 
indigenous people in developing States, particularly small island developing 
States;  
 the need to ensure that such measures do not result in transferring, directly or 




 contribution to conservation and management of the stocks 
 contribution to the collection and provision of accurate data  
 contribution to the conduct of scientific research on the stocks 
Section 3. Regional Frameworks for Allocation 
The evolution of the legal framework for allocation addressed in chapter 2 
highlighted the general recognition of the role of RFMOs in developing a transparent 
framework for allocation decisions. RFMOs, in the practical implementation of 
allocations in particular cases, have indeed had the opportunity to develop the allocation 
framework further. Different RFMOs have done it, at least to some extent, through 
allocation provisions in the Convention texts, or allocation guidelines adopted within the 
Commission. These mechanisms will be analyzed in turn. 
 
Allocation Provisions in RFMOs Conventions 
Just as in the case of UNFSA, RFMOs Conventions have provisions potentially 
affecting allocation processes. In particular, the rules for membership, the rules of 
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compatibility of management measures, of allocation of fishing opportunities, and of 
special requirements of developing States shall be taken into account.  
SEAFO, WCPFC, CCSBT, and the recently signed SPRFMO Convention, 
include explicit provisions on allocation of fishing opportunities in their constitutional 
texts.
385
 In all cases, the provisions follow UNFSA provisions very closely, in particular 
article 11. As such, it has been commented that RFMOs regard Article 11 as a minimum 
list of criteria to decide on allocation of fishing opportunities.
386
 A noticeable difference, 
however, is that the provisions on allocation of fishing opportunities, when included in 
the Convention texts, guide the allocation between member States and not only 
allocations of new members. Despite the fact that they are provisions addressing the 
allocation problem directly, they should be read in connection with other provisions with 
potential allocation implications. 
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Table 2. Allocation criteria in RFMO Conventions 
CCSBT WCPFC SEAFO SPRFMO 
In deciding upon allocations among 
the Parties under paragraph 3 above 
the Commission shall consider: 
In developing criteria for allocation 
of the total allowable catch or the 
total level of fishing effort the 





In determining the nature and extent 
of participatory rights in fishing 
opportunities, the Commission shall 
take into account, inter alia: 
 
When taking decisions regarding 
participation in fishing for any fishery 
resource, including the allocation of a 
total allowable catch or total allowable 
fishing effort, the Commission shall take 
into account the status of the fishery 
resource and the existing level of fishing 
effort for that resource and the following 
criteria to the extent relevant: 
(a) relevant scientific evidence; 
 
(a) the status of the stocks and the 
existing level of fishing effort in the 
fishery; 
 
(a) the state of fishery resources 
including other living marine 
resources and existing levels of 
fishing effort, taking into account 
the advice and recommendations of 
the Scientific Committee; 
(a) historic catch and past and present 
fishing patterns and practices in the 
Convention Area (or the relevant range of 
distribution, with the consent of the 
coastal State)  
(b) the need for orderly and 
sustainable development of southern 
bluefin tuna fisheries; 
 
(b) the respective interests, past and 
present fishing patterns and fishing 
practices of participants in the 
fishery and the extent of the catch 
being utilized for domestic 
consumption; 
(b) respective interests, past and 
present fishing patterns, including 
catches, and practices in the 
Convention Area; 
 
(b) compliance with the conservation and 
management measures under this 
Convention; 
 
(c) the interests of Parties through 
whose exclusive economic or 
fishery zones southern bluefin tuna 
migrates; 
(c) the historic catch in an area; 
 




(c) demonstrated capacity and 
willingness to exercise effective flag 
State control over fishing vessels; 
(d) the interests of Parties whose 
vessels engage in fishing for 
southern bluefin tuna including 
those which have historically 
engaged in such fishing and those 
which have southern bluefin tuna 
fisheries under development; 
d) the needs of small island 
developing States, and territories 
and possessions, in the Convention 
Area whose economies, food 
supplies and livelihoods are 
overwhelmingly dependent on the 
exploitation of marine living 
resources; 
(d) the interests of developing States 
in whose areas of national 
jurisdiction the stocks also occur;  
 
(d) contribution to the conservation and 
management of fishery resources, 
including the provision of accurate data 
and effective monitoring, control, 








CCSBT WCPFC SEAFO SPRFMO 
(e) the contribution of each Party to 
conservation and enhancement of, 
and scientific research on, southern 
bluefin tuna; 
 
(e) the respective contributions of 
participants to conservation and 
management of the stocks, 
including the provision by them of 
accurate data and their contribution 
to the conduct of scientific research 
in the Convention Area; 
(e) contributions to conservation 
and management of fishery 
resources in the Convention Area, 
including the provision of 
information, the conduct of research 
and steps taken to establish 
cooperative mechanisms for 
effective monitoring, control, 
surveillance and enforcement; 
(e) the fisheries development aspirations 
and interests of developing States in 
particular small island developing States 
and of territories and possessions in the 
region; 
 
f) any other factors which the 
Commission deems appropriate. 
(f) the record of  compliance by the 
participants with conservation and 
management measures; 
 
(f) contributions to new or 
exploratory fisheries, taking account 
of the principles set out in article 6.6 
of the 1995 Agreement; 
 
(f) the interests of coastal States, and in 
particular developing coastal States and 
territories and possessions, in a fishery 
resource that straddles areas of national 
jurisdiction of such States, territories and 
possessions and the Convention Area; 
 
 (g) the needs of coastal communities 
which are dependent mainly on 
fishing for the stocks; 
 
(g) the needs of coastal fishing 
communities which are dependent 
mainly on fishing for the stocks in 
the South East Atlantic; and  
 
(g) the needs of coastal States and of 
territories and possessions whose 
economies are dependent mainly on the 
exploitation of and fishing for a fishery 
resource that straddles areas of national 
jurisdiction of such States, territories and 
possessions and the Convention Area; 
 (h) the special circumstances of a 
State which is surrounded by the 
exclusive economic zones of other 
States and has a limited exclusive 
economic zone of its own; 
(h) the needs of coastal States 
whose economies are 
overwhelmingly dependent on the 
exploitation of fishery resources. 
(h) the extent to which a member of the 
Commission is utilising the catch for 
domestic consumption and the 
importance of the catch to its food 
security; 
 (i) the geographical situation of a 
small island developing State which 
is made up of non-contiguous 
groups of islands having a distinct 
economic and cultural identity of 
their own but which are separated 
by areas of high seas;  
 (i) contribution to the responsible 
development of new or exploratory 









CCSBT WCPFC SEAFO SPRFMO 
 (j) the fishing interests and 
aspirations of coastal States, 
particularly small island developing 
States, and territories and 
possessions, in whose areas of 
national jurisdiction the stocks also 
occur.  
 (j) contribution to the conduct of 
scientific research with respect to 
fishery resources and the public 






Some organizations do not have criteria in their Conventional texts, but have 
developed non-binding allocation guidelines. Others have supplemented the conventional 
provisions with such guidelines. They refer either to allocation of fishing opportunities to 
new entrants only, or to the allocation of fishing opportunities among contracting parties 
(including new entrants). 
NAFO and NEAFC have adopted non-binding guidelines with respect to 
allocation of fishing opportunities for new entrants. On 17 September 1999, the General 
Council of NAFO adopted Resolution 1/99 to guide the expectations of future new 
members with regard to fishing opportunities in the NAFO Regulatory Area.
387
 In turn, 
NEAFC member States agreed on Guidelines for the expectation of future new 
contracting parties with regard to fishing opportunities in the NEAFC Regulatory Area at 
their 22nd Annual Meeting in November 2003.
388
 Both of these documents, similar in 
structure and wording, basically warn new entrants that fish stocks at the moment are 
fully exploited and that fishing possibilities are restricted to the share of the quota 
apportioned to the category ―others‖ or to new fisheries not currently allocated.
389
 
NAFO also has developed some allocation guidelines applicable to contracting 
parties, but due to lack of consensus on some of its fundamental components (and 
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particularly, its scope of application), they were never officially adopted.
390
 ICCAT, in 
turn, completed in 2001 the process of adopting a non-binding resolution on guidelines 
for the allocation of fishing opportunities applicable to both contracting parties and new 
members.  
Both NAFO and ICCAT introduce a novel aspect in the allocation guidelines. 
They distinguish two different set of criteria: qualifying criteria, and allocation criteria. 
The qualifying criteria are a set of conditions that a State has to fulfill in order to be 
eligible for an allocation.  
Table 3. Qualifying criteria in ICCAT and NAFO guidelines 
NAFO ICCAT 
Be a member of the Fisheries Commission, who: 
− may exercise the right to vote; 
− collects and provides accurate data for the relevant 
stocks; 
− contributes to scientific research on NAFO stocks; 
− exercises effectively jurisdiction over the vessels 
flying its flag operating in the Convention Area; and 
− ensures compliance with the proposals adopted in 
accordance with Article XI of the Convention and 
notably the NAFO Conservation and Enforcement 
Measures; and 
 
Have an interest in the allocation of fishing 
opportunities of the relevant stocks in one or more 
of the following ways: 
− be a coastal State for relevant straddling stocks; 
− have vessels that have traditionally fished the 
relevant stocks in accordance with NAFO rules, 
where applicable; 
− have undertaken extensive efforts to ensure the 
conservation of such stocks in particular by 
providing surveillance and inspection of 
international fisheries under the international 
scheme of joint enforcement; 
− have undertaken significant contribution to 
research and data collection for the relevant stocks; 
− have economies that are overwhelmingly 
dependent on fisheries; or 
− have coastal communities that are dependent on 
fishing for the stocks regulated by NAFO. 
1. Be a Contracting or Cooperating Non-
Contracting Party, Entity or Fishing Entity. 
 
2. Have the ability to apply the conservation and 
management measures of ICCAT, to collect and to 
provide accurate data for the relevant resources and, 
taking into account their respective capacities, to 
conduct scientific research on those resources 
 
                                                          
390
 NAFO, Draft Guidelines for future allocation of fishing opportunities for the stocks not currently 
allocated (Allocation W.G. Working Paper 03/3-Rev. 3) in Annex 11 of Report of the Working Group on 
Allocation of Fishing Rights to the Contracting Parties of NAFO, 26-27 March 2003, Miami, Florida, USA 




The qualifying criteria differ in several respects. First, NAFO requires the 
participants to be members of the organization and more specifically, the Fisheries 
Commission; while ICCAT foresees the possibility of allocating fishing opportunities to 
non-members, if they are granted the status of cooperating non-member. ICCAT also 
foresees explicitly the possibility of allocating fishing opportunities to fishing entities, 
which is of considerable importance to account for fishing powers like EU and Chinese 
Taipei. ICCAT requires, in addition to membership or cooperating non-member status, 
the ability to comply with conservation measures and provide scientific data. The ability 
to conduct of scientific resource is also considered, but qualified by the respective 
capacity of the participant. NAFO, in turn, considers those elements but also adds a set of 
other elements that relate not to its capacity but to an established interest in the fishery.  
With respect to the second type of criteria, the allocation criteria, the approach of 
NAFO and ICCAT also differ significantly. Both documents list several criteria that need 
to be taken into account in the allocation process. However, NAFO draft guidelines 
contain a very limited list of allocation criteria. ICCAT, in turn, has over 15 criteria that 
need to be taken into account in the allocation process, which have been classified under 
four main categories. 




• historical fishing in accordance with NAFO 
rules during a representative reference period; 
  
A. Criteria Relating to Past/Present Fishing Activity 
of Qualifying Participants 
4. Historical catches of qualifying participants. 
5. The interests, fishing patterns and fishing practices 
of qualifying participants 
 B. Criteria Relating the Status of the Stock(s) to he 
Allocated and the Fisheries 
6. Status of the stock(s) to be allocated in relation to 
maximum sustainable yield, or in the absence of 
maximum sustainable yield an agreed biological 
reference point, and the existing level of fishing effort 
in the fishery taking into account the contributions to 
conservation made by qualifying participants 
necessary to conserve, manage, restore or rebuild fish 
stocks in accordance with the objective of the 
Convention. 
7. The distribution and biological characteristics of the 
stock(s), including the occurrence of the stock(s) in 
areas under national jurisdiction and on the high seas. 
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• needs of coastal communities which are 
dependent on fishing for the stock concerned; 
and/or 
 
C. Criteria Relating to the Status of the Qualifying 
Participants 
8. The interests of artisanal, subsistence and small-
scale coastal fishers. 
9. The needs of the coastal fishing communities which 
are dependent mainly on fishing for the stocks. 
10. The needs of the coastal States of the region whose 
economies are overwhelmingly dependent on the 
exploitation of living marine resources, including 
those regulated by ICCAT. 
11. The socio-economic contribution of the fisheries 
for stocks regulated by ICCAT to the developing 
States, especially small island developing States and 
developing territories1 from, the region. 
12. The respective dependence on the stock(s) of the 
coastal States, and of the other States that fish species 
regulated by ICCAT. 
13. The economic and/or social importance of the 
fishery for qualifying participants whose fishing 
vessels have habitually participated in the fishery in 
the Convention Area. 
14. The contribution of the fisheries for the stocks 
regulated by ICCAT to the national food 
security/needs, domestic consumption, income 
resulting from exports, and employment of qualifying 
participants. 
15. The right of qualified participants to engage in 
fishing on the high seas for the stocks to be allocated. 
• contribution to the NAFO Conservation and 
Enforcement Measures  
 
• contribution to research and data collection on 
the stock concerned; 
 
D. Criteria Relating to Compliance/Data 
Submission/Scientific Research by Qualifying 
Participants 
16. The record of compliance or cooperation by 
qualifying participants with ICCAT‘s conservation and 
management measures, including for large-scale tuna 
fishing vessels, except for those cases where the 
compliance sanctions established by relevant ICCAT 
recommendations have already been applied. 
17. The exercise of responsibilities concerning the 
vessels under the jurisdiction of qualifying 
participants. 
18. The contribution of qualifying participants to 
conservation and management of the stocks, to the 
collection and provision of accurate data required by 
ICCAT and, taking into account their respective 








In addition, both NAFO and ICCAT include some rules under the title of 
―allocation considerations‖ or ―conditions for the application of allocation criteria‖. 
Again, NAFO‘s considerations are rather simple;
392
 while ICCAT lists 9 conditions 
which include important principles that States are to follow in the allocation process. 
Among them, the resolution explicitly states that the allocation criteria should be applied 
on a stock-by-stock basis in a fair and equitable manner with the goal of ensuring 
opportunities for all qualifying participants; and that they should be applied in a gradual 
manner in order to address the economic needs of all parties concerned, including the 




What Do Regional Instruments Add to the Legal Framework for Allocation? 
After describing the efforts of different RFMOs to address the allocation problem, 
it is worth considering what these instruments add to the substantive allocation 
framework of the organization. In general, it is easy to conclude that they add very little. 
As has been pointed out, they follow UNFSA, and in particular article 11, very closely. 
This implies that they share their main characteristics and prescriptive shortcomings. 
In the case of RFMO Conventions, they also follow the practice of UNFSA of 
addressing different conflicts of interests in different provisions. There is, mostly, no 
―fundamental norm‖ that acts as a benchmark for allocation. 
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contributions to conservation made by qualifying participants necessary to conserve, manage, restore or 
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The criteria themselves are included, in general, in open lists (using the 
expression ―inter alia‖ or explicitly recognizing that the Commission may take other 
elements into considerations). The guidelines impose only an obligation to take into 
account the criteria listed, without any guidance on the weight, priority or preference that 
each element should be afforded. The specific weights to be accorded to the various 
factors are considered to be an issue that needs to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
394
 
In addition, the criteria are qualitative and lacking operational details. 
 This general assessment deserves some qualification. Some of the RFMO criteria 
add some elements to the substantive framework. These elements relate to participation 
and access to fisheries, and to general guiding principles. These two aspects will be 
analyzed in turn. 
Some regional criteria provide some guidance on access to the fisheries, mainly in 
two ways. Firstly, the NAFO and NEAFC guidelines basically put a moratorium on new 
entrants to the fisheries. It can be argued that these guidelines balance the different 
interests by prioritizing conservation and existing fishing patterns. More interesting, from 
the perspective of a legal framework is the contribution made by NAFO and ICCAT 
guidelines on qualifying criteria. These qualifying criteria, as has been noted, define a 
series of States‘ qualities and conducts that need to be fulfilled to be eligible for 
allocation. In so doing, NAFO and ICCAT are not necessarily addressing the 
interpretations problem surrounding the concept of ―real interest‖, which refers to 
participation in the RFMO rather than allocation of quota. But certainly, since 
participation in the RFMO is usually motivated by the expectation of quota, by defining 
qualities and conducts that are required to be eligible for allocation they are addressing 
the more critical aspect deriving from participation.  
In addition to the guidance on access and effective participation in fisheries, ICCAT 
makes an important contribution to the allocation framework by providing a series of 
―conditions‖ that should be followed in the consideration of the different criteria. These 
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conditions qualify as general principles guiding the allocation process, including a 
fundamental norm (equity) and subsidiary principles. These are: 
 The allocation criteria should be applied in a fair and equitable manner with the 
goal of ensuring opportunities for all qualifying participants. 
 The allocation criteria should be applied to all stocks in a gradual manner, over a 
period of time to be determined by the relevant Panels, in order to address the 
economic needs of all parties concerned, including the need to minimize 
economic dislocation. 
 The allocation criteria should be applied consistent with international instruments 
 The allocation criteria should be applied in a manner that encourages efforts to 
prevent and eliminate over-fishing and excess fishing capacity and ensures that 
levels of fishing effort are commensurate with the ICCAT objective of achieving 
and maintaining MSY. 
 The allocation criteria should be applied so as not to legitimize illegal, 
unregulated and unreported catches and shall promote the prevention, deterrence 
and elimination of illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, particularly fishing 
by flag of convenience vessels. 
 The allocation criteria should be applied in a manner that encourages cooperating 
Non-Contracting parties, Entities and Fishing Entities to become Contracting 
Parties, where they are eligible to do so. 
 The allocation criteria should be applied to encourage cooperation between the 
developing States of the region and other fishing States for the sustainable use of 
the stocks managed by ICCAT.  
Section 4. Allocation in Practice  
The sections above have described the global and regional theoretical frameworks 
for allocation of fishing opportunities, and their shortcomings. This section provides a 
practical overview of implementation of allocation decisions. For this purposes, the 
section provides a general description of the usual kind of allocation agreements adopted 
by RFMOs, followed by some practical examples of each kind. Afterwards, some general 
observations are made on the relationship between the theoretical framework (allocation 





Allocation Agreements Adopted by RFMOs 
The allocation agreements adopted by RFMOs can be implicit or explicit. It is 
implicit (also called de facto
395
), if the adopted conservation measure contains a general 
rule on limiting catches or effort to a certain reference period. The specific limit for each 
country is not contained in the conservation measure, but it can be inferred from the 
statistical data. The agreement is explicit, in turn, when the conservation measure assigns 
a specific catch or effort limit to individual States.  
An explicit agreement in practice can adopt a variety of modalities in relation to 
its unit, its duration, and its scope. A catch allocation agreement may assign specific 
catch quantities (expressed in tonnes) to individual States, or it may be expressed as 
percentage participation on the TAC. There have been agreements that combine those 
two methods. An effort allocation agreement may assign a number of authorized vessels 
(usually joined by technical characteristics of the vessels), a limitation on a certain 
technical indicator of effort (i.e., GRT), or a limitation on days or hours for engaging in 
fishing activities.   
Catch allocation agreements are usually one-year agreements, but they can also be 
multi-year or long-term agreements. If this is the case, they may include pre-agreed 
reduction or increase of national quotas as the result of reductions or increases in the 
TAC. 
The agreement can also involve all members of the RFMOs, or only a subset of 
the member States (usually the main States fishing for the respective stock). In the latter 
case, it may be understood that the participants that do not have an allocated quota cannot 
participate in the fishery. In this case, the agreement is equivalent to assigning them a 
quota zero. It may also be understood that they are allowed to fish without a quantitative 
restriction. Or it may be agreed that States without a national quota participate in a 
common quota duly established. Differential norms establishing catch or effort limits are 
especially common in RFMOs with a significant participation of developing States. 
The next paragraphs provide a sample of allocation agreements. They were 
chosen as examples that demonstrate the variety of agreements that have been design in 
different RFMOs and for different stocks. They first example, WCPFC limitation on 
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effort and catches for swordfish, illustrates the common first step in an allocation process: 
freezing catches or effort. It also illustrates one particular form of differentiated 
treatment. The second example, the CCSBT MoU, illustrates a percentage and long-term 
allocation agreement that includes provisions in case of variations in the TAC. The third 
example, the ICCAT agreement on Western Atlantic bluefin tuna, illustrates a 
combination of numeric and percentage agreement, with also provides for pre-agreed 
modifications in case of TAC variations. Finally, the NAFO quota table illustrates the 
simplest design of allocation agreement: a table of national quotas. 
 
a) WCPFC Limitations on Effort and Catches for the Swordfish Fisheries 
WCFPC first adopted a conservation measure for swordfish by Conservation and 
Management Measure 2006-03, which was later replaced by Conservation and 
Management Measures 2008-05 and 2009-03. The current measure establishes a limit 
effort and catch in the following terms:  
Commission Members, Cooperating Non-Members and participating Territories 
(CCMs) shall exercise restraint through limiting the number of their fishing 
vessels for swordfish in the Convention Area south of 20°S, to the number in any 
one year between the period 2000-2005 (listed in Annex 1).  
In addition to vessel limits established under paragraph 1, CCMs shall exercise 
restraint through limiting the amount of swordfish caught by fishing vessels 
flagged to them in the Convention Area south of 20°S to the amount caught in any 
one year during the period 2000-2006. 
The agreement results in an implicit limit of catches determined, for each State, by the 
higher levels of effort and catches registered in the 2000-2005 and 2000-2006 period, 
respectively. As a consequence, the TAFE and TAC are also implicitly determined by the 
sum of those individual (higher) levels of effort and catches.  
This conservation and management measure, however, has an exception. Paragraph 5 
reads: 
Paragraphs 1 to 4 and paragraph 9 shall not prejudice the legitimate rights and 
obligations under international law of small island developing State and participating 
Territory CCMs, in the Convention Area who may wish to pursue a responsible level 




The exception is an answer to the exclusive rights of coastal States in the area in 
which waters under national jurisdiction the swordfish also migrates.  
 
b) CCSBT and the MoU 
In their first meeting, the member States of the CCSBT Japan, Australia and New 
Zealand agreed upon distribution rules to be applied to the Southern bluefin tuna. They 
agreed, firstly, to distribute the TAC with the following TAC and national quotas: 
Japan 6065 tonnes  
Australia 5265 tonnes 
New Zealand 420 tonnes 
According to the understanding, as the global quota is increased, the Australian 
relative participation  should move to equality with Japan's national allocation (Australia 
moving up and Japan moving down) and New Zealand's allocation should increase to 
either 1,000 tonnes or 6% of the global quota, whichever is greater. The adjustments 
would occur over a series of 4 steps, each of them involving a variety of conditions that 
required country's to achieve certain catch levels by qualifying fleets before moving to 
the next step.  The primary adjustments were to commence once the global quota reached 
12,750 tonnes. However, the agreement also included an initial 30 tones increase to New 
Zealand as soon as the global quota increased.
396
 
The Memorandum of Understanding was not applied until 2010. During the 
period 1994-2009, CCSBT allocations were marked by the scientific dispute between 
Australia and New Zealand, on one side, and Japan, on the other, on the real status of the 
stock; and the allocation of fishing opportunities for new participants in the fishery. 
During the 2009 Meeting held in October, the member States (including now Japan, 
Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, and the fishing entity of 
Taiwan as member of the extended Commission) agreed to apply the Memorandum of 
Understanding without taking into account the steps initially considered. However, the 
national quotas were affected by a reduction in the TAC (applied after the terms of the 
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Memorandum of Understanding was provided by Robert Kennedy, Executive Secretary of CCSBT, in 




Memorandum of Understanding) and by a temporal reduction of the Japanese quota due 
to underreporting prior to 2006. 
 
c) ICCAT and Percentage Agreements 
The first ICCAT allocation agreements were expressed in tonnes. An example thereof is 
the West Atlantic bluefin tuna. The agreement in 1982 considered the distribution of the 
West Atlantic stock among the three main fishing States in the following quantities: 
Canada 250 tonnes 
Japan 305 tonnes  
USA 605 tonnes 
As the quota was increased or reduced, the participation of each member State 
increased or reduced in the same proportion. In 1994, the proportional participation of 
each State changed, to leave Japan with a lower comparative participation (from to ca. 
26% to 13%), and Canada and USA with quotas that respected their participation in 1991. 
In addition, the participation of each State was dependent upon the evolution of the TAC. 
The greater the TAC, the bigger the percentage that Japan would have in the TAC, 
recovering its ca. 26% when the TAC is above 2,660 tonnes. In addition, a few other 
countries claimed and were granted some participation in the fishery, which were 
expressed in tonnes. The current recommendation considers two steps for the allocation 
of TAC, which are summarized in the following table:  
 
Table 5. ICCAT, allocation of national quotas of Western Atlantic bluefin 
tuna  





USA bycatch 25 







Second step: Distribution of the reminder among main fishing States: 
State If the reminder of the TAC is 
< 2,413 t 2,413 t > 2,413 t – 2,660 t > 2,660 t 
Canada 23.75% 573 573 21,54% 
Japan 18.77% 453 453 + increase 
between 2,413 t & 
2,660 t 
26,32% 
USA 57.48% 1,387 t 1,387 52,14% 
 
 
d) NAFO and Allocation Tables 
The allocation agreements of NAFO are reflected in a table that expressed the national 
quota, expressed in tonnes, for a particular year and TAC. No provisions are made as to 
pre-agreed allocation agreement in cases of changing circumstances, including changes in 
TAC, distribution of the stock, or changes in the participants. In the case of NAFO, 
changes in participants, and particularly the acceptance of new entrants, is an excluded, 
or at least very difficult, possibility in light of the Resolution to guide expectations of 
new entrants adopted in 1999. 
Usually, allocation agreements of this kind reflect an implicit distribution of each 
stock that is respected in future allocations. In other words, although the table is 
expressed in metric tonnes, it implicitly recognizes a percentage of participation that is 
usually respected in future allocations over increased or reduced TACs. Clear examples 
thereof are the fisheries for cod in division 3M and redfish in division 3LN. During the 
2009 Meeting, the Fisheries Commission agreed to re-open these fisheries in 2010, after 
more than 10 years of moratorium. TAC and allocations were adopted. The allocation 
scheme respected the proportional participation of the States fishing for redfish and cod 
in the respective statistical area in the year before the moratorium, as reflected in the last 
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Table 6. Table NAFO Quota Table 2010,
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 3L 3M 3% 
3M 
3NO 3LN 3% 
3LN 
3M 3O SA2 +  
1F + 
3K 
3LNO 3M 3LNO 3L 3NO 3NO 3NO 
Canada - 44 0.80 0 1,491 42.60 500 6,000 385 0 0 16,575  0 1,765 0 





- 1,229 22.35 - - - 69 - 9,627 - - -     
European 
Union 
- 3,136 57.03 0 638 18.23 7,813 7,000 9,627 
2,503 




- - - - - - 69 - 385 - - 340  -   
Iceland - - - - - - - - 9,627 - - -  -   
Japan - - - - - - 400 150 385 - - -  -  0 
Korea - - - - - - 69 100 385 - - -  -   
Norway - 509 9.25 - - - - - 9,627 - - -  -  0 
Russian 
Federation 
- 356 6.47 0 1,007 28.77 9,137 6,500 9,627 - 0 -  0 353 0 
Ukraine - - - - - - - 150 385 - - -  -   
USA - - - - - - 69 - 385 - - -  -   
Others - 22 0.40 0 21 0.60 124 100 - 0 0 85  0 353  
TOTAL * 5,500 100 * 3,500 100 10,000 20,000 12,516 * * 17,000 * * 6,000  * 
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Allocation Criteria: Any Influence for Allocation Decisions? 
The influence and usefulness of the allocation criteria and guidelines for the allocation 
negotiations and the final decisions is hard to assess for several reasons. Firstly, most 
RFMOS that have allocation criteria in their Conventions, or have developed allocation 







 and the CCSBT manage most of the stocks under their jurisdiction 
with TACs and allocations.
402
 Another pre-UNFSA organization (IATTC) has 
traditionally adopted national limits on fishing effort. Only recently, it adopted a 
conservation measure for bigeye tuna that includes a limit of fishing effort or limit of 
catches and, for some participating States, a national quota.
403
 CCAMLR has not adopted 
nationally allocated TACs. The use of the conservation and management measure has 
been proposed, but rejected by the contracting parties.
404
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 NAFO currently manages 20 stocks. For 2010, seven are under moratorium, but are expected to be 
managed with TAC and national allocations when they recover to sustain a commercial fishery (cod in 
divisions 3L and 3NO, American plaice in divisions 3LNO and 3M, witch in divisions 3L and 3NO, and 
capelin in Division 3NO). Eleven are managed through TAC and national allocations (cod in division 3M, 
redfish in divisions 3LN, 3M, 3O, subareas 2+3 and division 1F+3K, yellowtail in division 3LNO, white 
hake in division 3NO, skates in division 3LNO, Greenland halibut in division 3LMNO, squids in subarea 
3+4, and shrimp in division 3L(NO). One stock is managed through limits on fishing efforts and its national 
allocation (shrimp in division 3M). 
400
 NEAFC currently manages 8 stocks. Two pelagic stocks are managed under a TAC and allocation 
primarily agreed upon by the relevant coastal States (blue whiting and Norwegian spring spawning or 
Atlanto-Scandian herring). With respect to another pelagic stock, mackerel, agreement could not be 
reached and is currently not under TAC regulation. The pelagic redfish in the Irminger Sea is managed 
through national quotas that, according to NEAFC recommendation, cannot be increased. The pelagic 
redfish in the ICES subareas I and II is managed through an unallocated TAC. Orange roughy has also been 
put under fishing effort and catch restrictions. Other demersal species, such as Rochall haddock, are 
managed through closed areas. 
401
 ICCAT manages 6 stocks with a TAC and national allocations (Northwestern bluefin tuna and 
Northeastern and Mediterranean bluefin tuna, Northern albacore, Northern and Southern swordfish, and 
bigeye tuna). One stock is managed with a TAC and an incomplete system of allocation that allows the 
main fishing States to catch a certain amount of the TAC in Olympic fishery (Southern albacore). Other 
important commercial and non-commercial stocks have not been put into a TAC regime or any other form 
of restricting fishing mortality (yellowfin tuna, skipjack tuna, blue and white marlin, small tunas and 
sharks).  
402
 It must be remembered that in some cases, agreements have failed, have faced objections by one or more 
contracting party, or are not comply with by contracting parties or non-contracting parties. 
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 See: IATTC, Resolution C-09-01 on a multiannual program for the conservation of tuna in the Eastern 
Pacific Ocean in 2009-2001, adopted at the IATTC 80
th
 meeting held in La Jolla, California (USA), 8-12 
June 2009, online: IATTC <http://www.iaatc.org>. 
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 CCAMLR, Report of the eleventh meeting of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources, Hobart, Australia, 26 October - 6 November, 1992, online: <http://www.ccamlr.org>, 




Recent RFMOs have not (yet) engaged in allocation of national quotas. In some 
cases, they have not adopted conservation and management measures limiting fishing 
effort or catches. That is the case of SEAFO, a new organization that has only adopted 
few conservation measures to this day. Others RFMOs have adopted only measures to 
limit fishing effort or catches to existing levels, or to the levels at a certain reference 




. That is also the case of the non-




Table 7 illustrates different levels of recognition of TAC and allocations in the 
RFMOs texts, and different levels of development of allocation criteria and guidelines. It 
illustrates clearly that most of the allocation practices take place in RFMOs that have a 
weaker regulatory framework for allocations. It is difficult to assess, in that circumstance, 
how the allocation criteria help the allocation negotiation process. 
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IATTC       
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ICCAT       
CCAMLR       
IOTC       
CCSBT       
WCPFC       
SEAFO       
SPRFMO       
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 See, for example: IOTC, Resolution 07/05 on Limitation of fishing capacity of IOTC Contracting 
Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties in terms of number of longline vessels targeting swordfish 
and albacore, superseded by IOTC Resolution 09/02 on the Implementation of a limitation of fishing 
capacity of Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties, both online: IOTC 
<http://www.iotc.org>. 
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 See, for example: WCPFC, Conservation and Management Measure 2006-03 for Swordfish, online: 
WCPFC <http://www.wcpfc.int>, and text above. 
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 See: SPRFMO, Interim Management Measures, supra note 327, and SPRFMO, Revised Interim 
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 meeting of the International Consultations on the Proposed 
South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization, held in Auckland, New Zealand, on 14 




A second reason why that assessment is difficult is that the deliberations on 
allocation and the different proposals and their justifications are usually not made public. 
The criteria, considerations, principles, goals or objectives that were taken into 
consideration in adopting a particular allocation agreement, and the weight given to each 
criterion, are not stated in the respective documents. Only in a few cases, the criteria and 
their relative weight can be found in the records of the negotiation process.
408
 More often, 
the discussions take place in small closed meetings, in bilateral negotiations outside the 
formal RFMOs Commission forum, or are simply not made public. 
A preliminary assessment of the adequacy of the legal framework can be drawn 
from the performance reviews undertaken by some RFMOs: ICCAT, CCSBT, NEAFC, 
IOTC and CCAMLR.
409
 These performance reviews show different assessment of this 
subject in different RFMOs. In ICCAT, the performance review committee noted a 
growing dissatisfaction on allocation issues, attributed to a) the weak powers of the 
commission according to article VIII of the Convention to recommend quota allocations; 
b) the non-binding character of the criteria; b) the ambiguous formulation of the 
criteria.
410
 In addition, transparency problems were raised by some member States. In 
relation to ICCAT allocation practices, Butterworth and Penney point out that the ICCAT 
criteria have served as little more than a ―shopping list‖
411
 from which each State seeks 
the equity arguments that suit their national interest.  
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 A good example thereof is the report of the failed negotiation on allocation of quotas for shrimp in 
division 3M (managed through fishing effort allocation) and a re-negotiation of the allocation of quotas for 
shrimp in division 3L. The report includes the debate and specific proposals tabled by different 
participating States, which included the factors to be taken into account (mostly historical catches in 
different periods between 1993 and 2007) and the weight to be assigned to each factor (NAFO, Report of 
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extent to which NEAFC is determining participatory rights of new members in accordance with Article 11 
of UNFSA. 
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 ICCAT, ibid.  
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In the case of the CCSBT, the review committee noted that the allocation process 
was unsatisfactory until 2006, and now satisfactory and with no need to improve. 
However, the CCSBT has just recently implemented the Memorandum of Understanding 
on allocation of fishing opportunities of 1994. In addition, Japan has a considerable, but 
temporary, reduction of its TAC due to over-catches prior to 2006. In addition, some 
cooperating non-contracting parties have expressed dissatisfaction with their 
allocations.
412
 Thus, it seems apparent that allocation is not settled, and is probably going 
to become more intense in the future.  
In the case of NEAFC, the panel noted the secondary role that NEAFC mostly 
plays in allocation of fishing opportunities in the NEAFC area, and concludes that its 
highest priority should be to encourage consistency and certainty into this process across 
all fisheries in the Convention Area. Thus, it ―urged the organization to make every effort 
to resolve outstanding allocation issues‖, paving ―the way for a change in NEAFC‘s 
approach to management, moving away from management driven, bi annual (sic), ad hoc 
negotiations amongst Coastal States, towards management systems driven by transparent 
objectives and implementation processes.‖
413
  
CCAMLR‘s case is different in that the organization has not adopted national 
quotas as management measure. As a consequence, the allocation of fishing opportunities 
was not included in the terms of reference approved for the review. The panel, 
nevertheless, expressed concerned about the lack of effort and catch control and 
incentives for overinvestment and overcapacity of the existing competitive catch 
management model, in particular in light of increasing interest in krill and finfish 
fisheries in the Convention Area.
414
 For this reason, it recommends to the Commission 
the establishment of a small group of experts to explore and report on the advantages and 
disadvantages (including cost and feasibility) of approaches and actions to prevent or 
eliminate excess fishing capacity, including a ―system of annual tradable units of quota 
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with a very clear understanding that they bestow no ongoing rights and will be 
reallocated for each successive fishing period.‖
415
 
The different performance reviews demonstrate that the global and regional 
regulatory framework for allocation of TACs, based in allocation criteria and non-binding 
guidelines, is an insufficient basis for the resolution of the conflicts of interests inherent 
to this conservation and management measure. The search for an adequate framework, 
thus, continues.  
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Chapter 4. Allocating to Future Generations: Intergenerational Equity 
in International Fisheries Law 
 
The fact that a resource is scarce, as is often the case with fisheries, implies that 
there is a need to make choices for their utilization: not all demands can be satisfied. One 
of those choices relates to the inter-temporal utilization of the resource: what proportion 
of the resource should be allocated to current use or consumption, and what proportion 
should be saved to be used in future periods. This is, as well, an allocation decision.  
This allocation decision raises questions of equity between generations: the 
decisions made today affect the possibilities, options and even livelihood of generations 
not yet born.
416
 It is possible to conceive a model where present generations do not 
consume anything, saving all the resources for the future (preservationist model), or a 
model where present generations consume all what they want today, ignoring the needs 
of future generations (opulent model).
417
 Between these two extremes, there is space for 
trade-offs between the needs and preferences of present and future generations. The 
theory of intergenerational equity addresses the fairness of those trades-offs. 
This chapter analyzes the linkages between TAC and allocation and 
intergenerational equity. For this purpose, the first section provides a general overview of 
the theory of intergenerational equity and its critiques, and the extent to which the theory 
has been accepted in international environmental law. The second section addresses 
intergenerational equity in international fisheries law in particular. The third section 
presents the theoretical and practical relationships between intergenerational equity and 
TAC and allocation, which are then illustrated through several case studies in section 
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 The unsustainable use of natural and cultural resources raises, according to Brown Weiss, three kinds of 
equity problems: a) depletion of resources, which narrows the range of available natural resources for 
future generations; b) degradation of environmental quality, which imposes serious health effects and 
welfare costs on future generations, causes less flexibility in using their natural resources, and leads to 
depletion of plant and animal life; and c) discriminatory access and use (Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to 
Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity (Dobbs Ferry, 
NY; Transnational Publishers, Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University, 1989), at 6-15). 
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 According to Brown Weiss, the opulent model is based either on the uncertainty of the existence of 
future generations, or in the belief that maximizing the wealth today is the best way to maximize wealth for 
future generations. In this latter case, Brown Weiss argue that the model overlooks the long-term and 
irreversible degradations of the planet that may be generated, and the moral obligation to conserve the earth 





four. Finally, the fifth section addresses some proposals to further the needs of future 
generations in the international fisheries regime. 
Section 1. Intergenerational Equity and its Recognition in International 
Environmental Law 
The theory of intergenerational equity addresses the allocation of natural 
resources, their benefits and the burdens of their conservation, at an inter-temporal scale, 
i.e., between present and future generations.
418
 Its most comprehensive formulation has 
been presented by Edith Brown Weiss in the book In Fairness to Future Generations.
419
 
In this work, Brown Weiss postulates that  
[w]e, as species, hold the natural and cultural environment of our planet in 
common both with other members of the present generation and with other 
generations, past and future. At any given time, each generation is both a 




The theory of intergenerational equity is based on a partnership among all 
generations,
421
 a partnership that has the purpose of sustaining the welfare and well-being 
of all generations.
422
 This includes: to sustain the life-support system of the planet; to 
sustain the ecological processes, environmental conditions and cultural resources 
necessary for the survival of the human species; and to sustain a healthy and decent 
human environment.
423
 Thus, every generation has the obligation to pass the planet on in 
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 Lawrence B. Solum identifies three meanings of generations: a demographic cohort generation; a lineal 
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To fulfill these purposes, Brown Weiss derives three basic principles of 
intergenerational equity: a) the principle of conservation of options; b) the principle of 
conservation of quality; and c) the principle of conservation of access.
425
 According to 
the principle of conservation of options, each generation should be required to conserve 
the diversity of the natural and cultural resource base, so that it does not unduly restrict 
the options available to future generations.
426
 According to the principle of conservation 
of quality, each generation should be required to maintain the quality of the planet so that 
it is passed on in no worse condition than the present generation received it.
427
 According 
to the principle of conservation of access, each generation should provide its members 
with equitable right of access to the legacy from past generations and should conserve 
this access for future generations.
428
 
These three principles are the basis of certain planetary obligations and a set of 
planetary rights that each generation holds, as a class. Planetary obligations are: a) the 
duty to take positive steps to conserve resources; b) the duty to ensure equitable access to 
use and benefits of these resources; c) the duty to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts on 
the resources or on environmental quality; d) the duty to minimize disasters and provide 
emergency assistance; and e) the duty to bear the costs of damage to these resources or 
the environmental quality.
429
 The planetary rights of each generation are the obverse of 
the planetary obligations. They are identified as: a) the right to receive the planet in no 
worse condition than that of the previous generations; b) the right to inherit comparable 
diversity in the natural and cultural resources base; and c) the right to have equitable 
access to the use and benefits of the legacy.
430
 
The duty to conserve resources applies to both renewable and nonrenewable 
natural resources, as well as cultural resources. In the case of renewable resources (such 
as fish stocks), the essence of the duty is to develop and use them on a sustainable basis – 
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i.e., they can be used and developed for the benefit of the present generation in any 
manner consistent with their renewal and hence availability for future generations.
431
  
The comprehensive theory of intergenerational equity exposed by Brown Weiss 
has been subject to certain critiques. A first critique relates to the human rights model 
adopted to preserve the global environment – a rights-based approach.
432
 This model 
presents two flaws, according to the critics. The first one is that future generations, 
persons not yet born, cannot be holders of rights.
433
 Furthermore, it has been argued that 
future generations cannot have rights because any action to protect the environment will 
inevitably affect the composition of the next generations – creating the paradoxical result 
that protecting the environment for future generations will harm individuals who, because 
of those actions, will never come into existence.
434
 Weiss, in turn, argues that the 
planetary rights are generational rights possessed by groups in relation to other 




Another part of this critique relates to the uncertainty of future generation‘s 
preferences. Present generations ―cannot know the numbers and kinds of generations that 
will exist, their values, interests or technologies, and that as a consequence decision-
making becomes less reliable the further it is extended into the future.‖
436
 Some argue 
some kind of ―intertemporal imperialism‖ – by anticipating the needs of future 
generations, the current generation is actually imposing its values on the future and 
restricting rather than promoting future generations‘ liberty.
437
 Redgwell responds to this 
critique arguing that this is a matter of degree. ―Certain assumptions can be made; and the 
model is not a static one. Later generations may alter assumptions about the preferences 
of future generations as human society evolves and changes.‖
438
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A second critique is the anthropocentrism of the right-based approach. D‘Amato, 
among other authors, contends that there is a duty to living creatures in the environment 
per se, not as a consequence of an obligation owned to future generations of humans. In 
other words, this position maintains that wildlife has an intrinsic value independent from 
its utility to future generations of human being.
439
 
Perhaps the most relevant critique from a legal perspective relates to the nature of 
the proposed planetary obligations. The theory of intergenerational equity is argued to 
exert binding force only on the moral plane, with the necessity for positive law to 
translate planetary duties into normative obligations. Brown Weiss acknowledges that 
―the translation of the expressed concern for future generations into normative 




The idea that current generations have some duties and responsibilities in the 
exploitation of natural resources towards the future generations was recognized as early 
as 1893.
441
 Today, the notion that humans have a responsibility for the future is widely 
considered incontrovertible.
442
 There is a general consensus regarding the need to take 
the interests of future generations into account.
443
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However, the notion that the theory of intergenerational equity may have 
normative status in international law has been viewed with more skepticism. Lowe has 
stated that ―the principle of inter-generational equity is, in normative terms, a 
chimera.‖
444
 Boyle, in turn, categorized the doctrine as ―misplaced utopianism,‖
445
 
rejecting the possibility of international law extending to future generations as wildly 
unrealistic.
446
 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, in turn, acknowledge that  
(...) although the idea of moral responsibility to future generations is well 
established in the writings of Rawls and other philosophers, it is less easy to 




Despite this skepticism, notions of intergenerational equity or consideration of the 
needs of future generations have been widely reflected in instruments of international 
law, both binding and non-binding. Early examples can be found already in 1946.
448
 
However, it was the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment that put 
intergenerational equity on the agenda of international environmental law and policy. 
Both the preamble and several principles of the Declaration of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment adopted during the Stockholm Conference 
include explicit references to the need to defend and improve the human environment for 
present and future generations.
449
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Further explicit references to future generations were included in the non-binding 
1982 World Charter of Nature,
450
 and in the 1987 Brundtland Report.
451
 The latter report 
includes the interests of future generations in its definition of sustainable development: 
―the development that meets the needs of present generations without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their needs.‖
452
 Intergenerational equity is a 
fundamental principle of the overarching concept of sustainable development.
453
 Indeed, 
some authors consider that it is the very foundation of this concept.
454
  
The 1992 Rio Declaration encompasses intergenerational equity in principle 3, 
linking it to the right to development: ―the right to development must be fulfilled so as to 
equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future 
generations‖.
455
 The 2002 Johannesburg Declaration reaffirms the commitment to 
sustainable development, with explicit recognition of the interests of our children and the 
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principles 3, 5, and 11. 
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long-term perspectives required by sustainability.
456
 Most of the non-binding instruments 
adopted since include a reference to future generations, either independently or as a 
component of sustainable development.
457
 
References to a notion of intergenerational equity have also been included in the 
preamble section of various Conventions and treaties. Two early examples, roughly 
contemporaneous with the Stockholm Declaration, can be found in the 1973 Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
458
 and the 1972 
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.
459
 
Most of the references can be found, however, in Conventions and agreements signed in 
the 1990s, after the conclusion of the United Nations Rio Conference on Environment 
and Development. The 1992 Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial 
Accidents;
460
 and the 1994 Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries 
Experiencing Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa,
461
 acknowledge in 
their preambles the needs of future generations. The Convention on Biological Diversity 
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(CBD) also recognizes the future generations in its preamble,
462
 and in its definition of 
sustainable use.
463
 Furthermore, the Conference of the Parties of the CBD has recognized 
the ecosystem approach as the primary framework for action under the Convention and 
endorsed the application of the Malawi Principles for Ecosystem Approach.
464
 These 
principles explicitly recognize the inter-temporal dimension of conservation by requiring 
that the objectives for ecosystem management be set for the long term.
465
  
In contrast, few treaties incorporate the interests of future generations in their 
substantive or operational provisions. One of few treaties that do is the United Nations 
Convention on Climate Change,
466
 which contains explicit references to future 
generations both in the preamble
467
 and in the normative section.
468
 However, the 
Convention does not develop the precise content of this responsibility. For this reason, 
Redgwell sees this provision only as a starting point in the process of defining obligations 
of the present generations ―to absorb the costs of reducing the risk of global warming for 
future generations‖ and not a fully fledged normative provision.
469
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into force on 21 March 1994). 
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shall be managed so that the needs of the present generation are met without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs.‖  
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The international jurisprudence has had a few opportunities to address 
intergenerational equity, its status in international law, and its legal implications. The 
most prominent cases were the two Nuclear tests cases,
470
 and the Nuclear Advisory 
Opinion.
471
 In the two Nuclear tests cases, the Court did not address the issue. The 
Advisory Opinion, on the contrary, made several references to generations yet unborn. 
However, it did not rely on a principle of intergenerational equity or an explicit 
recognition of the rights of future generations in rendering its opinion.
472
 The missed 
opportunities to address the principle and its legal status have been criticized and 
lamented both outside
473
 and inside the International Court of Justice.
474
  
Intergenerational equity has had, undoubtedly, ample recognition in international 
law instruments. However, this recognition lies mainly in non-binding instruments or in 
the preambles of treaties. Its practical implications are less than clear. Sands notes that, 
although the interests of future generations were profusely included in the UNCED 
instruments, ―there was little, if any, discussion in the negotiations which indicates what 




For these reasons, most authors believe that ―the principles of intergenerational 
equity ―have not yet achieved the status of binding norms under international law.‖
476
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Nuclear Weapons (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 338, at 349. 
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L. 303, at 342. 
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 Redgwell, supra note 432, at 115. French argues that ―[t]he language so far utilized in international legal 
and policy texts would from the outset, seem to suggest that whatever the legal implications of 




Despite this majority opinion, it should be noted that prominent scholars are of the 
opinion that intergenerational equity is a principle of international law. One of those 
proponents is Judge Weeramantry. In his dissenting opinion in the Request for an 
Examination of the situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment 
of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France), he stated: 
(...) the rights of the future generations have passed the stage when they were 
merely an embryonic right struggling for recognition. They have woven 
themselves into international law through major treaties, through juristic opinion 
and through general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
477
  
One of the sources of the rights of future generations cited by Judge Weeramantry 
is the doctrine of intergenerational equity.
478
  
The fact that intergenerational equity is, generally, not considered a binding norm 
under international law does not mean that it does not have any legal implications. 
Redgwell notes a ―creeping intergenerationalism‖ that is manifested in several ways. 
First, the wide recognition of the interests of future generations in non-binding 
international instruments and pre-ambular texts of international treaties allows a 
conclusion that some general notion of intergenerational equity has likely emerged as a 
guiding principle in international environmental law. This guiding principle performs the 
role of a source of inspiration for the development and adoption of binding rules at both 
national and international levels and as the basis for the development of new international 
customary law.
479
 It can also be considered as a guiding principle in the application of 
substantive norms, including existing treaty obligations, under international law.
480
  
Secondly, it has been noted that there are several substantive principles of 
international law that have an inter-temporal dimension and are, thus, important for the 
doctrine of intergenerational equity. Redgwell cites, as examples of such substantive 
principles, the principle of sustainable development, the common heritage of humankind, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Professor Brown Weiss, that the present generation has a legal relationship with future generations… In 
other words, while the interests of future generations has unquestionable symbolism, and one that 
underpins other concepts such as the principle of sustainable use and the precautionary approach, its own 
normative status is clearly questionable.‖ (Duncan French, International Law and Policy of Sustainable 
Development (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press; New York: Juris, 2005) at 61). 
477





 Redgwell, supra note 432, at 120. 
480




the principle of custodianship or stewardship, the precautionary principle, and the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibility.
481
 In light of the Malawi Principles 
on Ecosystem Approach, this latter principle can be included among them. 
Finally, it must be mentioned that many of the ―planetary obligations‖ are already 
included as principles of international law, and as normative obligations for States. In 
light of its relevance to this thesis, it is worth noting, in particular, the duty to conserve 
resources. While it is arguable whether a general duty to conserve resources exists in 
international law,
482
 many treaties (including fishery treaties) contain an explicit 
obligation to conserve natural resources and give this obligation certain normative 
content. These existing normative obligations may acquire new emphases and focuses if 
interpreted in the light of a duty to protect the environment for the benefit of future 
generations.  
Section 2. Intergenerational Equity in International Fisheries Law  
Following the conclusions of the previous sections, an analysis of whether 
intergenerational equity is reflected in international fisheries law requires determining: 
whether intergenerational equity, or the concern for future generations, is explicitly 
recognized in binding and non-binding instruments; and whether planetary obligations or 
substantive principles with inter-temporal dimensions are included as normative 
obligations. These two aspects will be analyzed in turn. 
 
Intergenerational Equity as Reflected in International Fisheries Instruments 
The explicit recognition of the needs and interests of future generations is 
remarkably absent in international fisheries instruments, both binding and non-binding. 
The first explicit reference to the interests of future generations can be found in the 1992 
Cancun Declaration on Responsible Fisheries, which declares that States should adopt 
effective fisheries planning and management to ensure supply of fish products to feed 
                                                          
481
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dimension of several substantive principles of international law (ibid, at 126). 
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present and future populations.
483
 A few years later, the FAO Code of Conduct
484
 
included the needs of future generations in the definition of the objective of fisheries 
management. Article 6.2 states:  
Fisheries management should promote the maintenance of the quality, diversity 
and availability of fishery resources in sufficient quantities for present and future 
generations in the context of food security, poverty alleviation and sustainable 
development. 
In line with this objective, article 7.1.1 states that 
Conservation and management measures, whether at local, national, subregional 
or regional levels, should be based on the best scientific evidence available and be 
designed to ensure the long-term sustainability of fishery resources at levels 
which promote the objective of their optimum utilization and maintain their 
availability for present and future generations; short-term considerations should 
not compromise these objectives.
485
 
Successive non-binding international instruments on fisheries do not include 
references to the needs of the future generations. However, most of them acknowledge 
and reaffirm the principles of the FAO Code of Conduct, thus implicitly acknowledging 
that conservation measures shall ensure quality, quantity, diversity and availability of 
fishery resources for both present and future generations.
486
 
                                                          
483
 1992 Cancun Declaration on Responsible Fisheries, at para. 1, reads: ―States, with a view to ensuring 
supply of fish products to feed present and future populations, should adopt effective fisheries planning and 
management standards which, within the context of sustainable development, will promote the maintenance 
of the quantity, quality, diversity and economic availability of fisheries resources‖ (FAO, Declaration on 
Responsible Fisheries, adopted by the International Conference on Responsible Fishing held in Cancun, 
Mexico, 6-8 May 1992, Document COFI/93/Inf, online: FAO <http://www.fao.org/documents>).  
484
 FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 25. Further references were made during the preparatory work of the 
Code. For example, the 1995 Rome Consensus on World Fisheries also acknowledges the interests of 
future generations, albeit rather incidentally. The consensus states: ―In the discussion, the Ministerial 
Meeting noted the FAO analysis which indicates that the problems of overfishing in general, and 
overcapacity of industrial fishing fleets in particular, threaten the sustainability of the world's fisheries 
resources for present and future generations‖ (FAO, Rome Consensus on World Fisheries, supra note 75, 
para. 5). 
485
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International Conventions and regional agreements do not explicitly recognize the 
interests of future generations in their normative provisions.
487
 Furthermore, and contrary 
to common practice in international environmental law, global Conventions and most 
regional agreements do not recognize the interests of future generations in the preamble 
of their texts. The only exception thereto is the WCPFC Convention, which in the first 
paragraph of its preamble states that the contracting parties are  
[d]etermined to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use, in 
particular for human food consumption, of highly migratory fish stocks in the 




“Planetary Obligations” in International Fisheries Law  
As in the case of environmental law in general, the fact that intergenerational 
equity as such is not generally mentioned either in binding or non-binding fisheries 
instruments does not preclude the existence of certain obligations or principles with an 
inter-temporal dimension that are components of the theory of intergenerational equity. 
Three are of particular interest in the case of fisheries: the obligation of conservation, the 
precautionary approach, and the ecosystem approach to fisheries. 
It has already been noted that the planetary duty to conserve resources implies, in 
the case of renewable resources, the obligation to exploit them on a sustainable basis,
489
 
i.e. an exploitation consistent with their renewal and hence availability for future 
generations.
490
 It is worth adding that sustainable exploitation is considered necessary for 




                                                                                                                                                                             
Responsible Fisheries‖). The 2005 St. John‘s Ministerial Declaration reiterates the ―commitment to 
responsible fisheries‖ (2005 St. John‘s Ministerial Declaration, supra note 269, at para. 5). 
487
 It should be noted that during the negotiation process of UNFSA, Sweden proposed the inclusion of the 
principle of conservation and management compatible with sustainable use, which was stated as: 
―Conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks should be 
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The duty to conserve and ensure sustainable use of marine living resources in the 
high seas has been considered since the early codifications of international law of the 
high seas. The 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the 
High Seas defined the expression ―conservation of the living resources of the high seas‖ 
as the ―aggregate of the measures rendering possible the optimum sustainable yield from 
those resources so as to secure a maximum supply of food and other marine products.‖
492
 
The 1958 Convention reflected the objective of maximum sustainable yield for fisheries 
management, defined as ―making possible the maximum production of food from the sea 
on a sustained basis year after year.‖
493
 In this early formulation, thus, conservation was 
considered mainly as a means to maintain economic growth. 
The LOSC did not define the concept of conservation, although several provisions 
refer to the conservation of living marine resources. It has been pointed out that the 
LOSC only provides for conservation objectives.
494
 Although this may seem as a step 
backwards in the definition of the obligations of States, some authors consider it 
recognition of the complexity that conservation of living marine resources had reached.
495
 
Furthermore, the qualification of the objectives of conservation by environmental factors 
allows elaboration of the concept of conservation in light of new developments in 
international environmental law.  
Those new developments were readily identifiable after the UNCED conference. 
The ecosystem approach, the precautionary approach, intergenerational equity, and 
sustainable development, are elements that have been introduced in the interpretation of 
the legal obligation to conserve natural resources. This wider and more comprehensive 
concept of conservation is reflected in the definition provided by the World Commission 
on the Environment and Development, which considers conservation as the  
the management of human use of a natural resource or the environment in such a 
manner that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present generations 
while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future 
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generations. It embraces the preservation, maintenance, sustainable utilization, 
restoration, and enhancement of a natural resource or the environment.
496
 
It was consistent with these developments for the Cancun Declaration on 
Responsible Fisheries and the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries to include 
the needs of future generations among the considerations to be taken into account while 
defining the objectives of fisheries planning and management.
497
 
UNFSA, however, did not consider the needs of future generations explicitly. It 
did, nevertheless, strengthen the inter-temporal component of conservation in three ways. 
Firstly, UNFSA defined the objective of the agreement as ―long-term conservation and 
sustainable use‖ of the fisheries stocks. Although the meaning of long-term is not 
defined, its explicit inclusion nevertheless reinforces the need to take into account the 
effects of fishing in the future.  
Secondly, UNFSA considers the precautionary approach as one of the principles 
that need to be observed in the management of fisheries. Article 5 of UNFSA reads:  
In order to conserve and manage straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish 
stocks, coastal States and States fishing on the high seas shall, in giving effect to 
their duty to cooperate in accordance with the Convention: (c) apply the 
precautionary approach in accordance with article 6. 
Article 6, in turn, reiterates that States shall apply the precautionary approach 
widely to conservation, management and exploitation of straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks in order to protect the living marine resources and preserve the 
marine environment, and provides detailed guidance on how the precautionary approach 
should be applied.
498
 In addition, Annex II of UNFSA provides further guidelines for the 
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application of precautionary target and limit reference points in conservation and 
management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.  
It has been recognized that the precautionary principle has a potential role in 
achieving a balance of interest between present and future generations,
499
 or at least a 
direct and positive bearing on the interests of future generations.
500
 A FAO information 
paper prepared for the UNFSA Conference and which served as the basis for the 
discussion on precautionary approach in fisheries management states that the 
precautionary approach seeks to  
(...) promote a more equitable balance between the attention given to the needs of 
present and future generations. Such an approach would address the issue of inter-
generational equity (as required by UNCED) and would tend towards reducing 
the cost of our present decisions for future generations.
501
  
The paper qualifies intergenerational equity as a ―moral obligation placed on current 
generations to exploit the resources and enact conservation measures in such a manner as 
to preserve options for future generations‖ (emphasis added).
502
 Other documents 
presented during the UNFSA Conference also acknowledged that the precautionary 




 The concept of conservation adopted by UNFSA also includes concern for the 
ecosystem. Article 5 calls upon States to  
(d) assess the impacts of fishing, other human activities and environmental factors 
on target stocks and species belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with 
or dependent upon the target stocks; 
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(e) adopt, where necessary, conservation and management measures for species 
belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with or dependent upon the target 
stocks, with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such species above 
levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened.
504
 
Although the UNFSA does not provide more guidance on the implementation of a 
principle of conservation of the ecosystem, this vacuum has been at least partially filled 
by ongoing work by FAO and its member States. During the FAO Technical Consultation 
on Ecosystem-based fisheries Management held in Reykjavik, 16-19 September 2002, the 
parties adopted the Reykjavik Declaration on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine 
Ecosystem,
505
 which endorses the ecosystem approach to fisheries. The Reykjavik 
Declaration also requests FAO to develop technical guidelines for best practices in regard 
with introducing ecosystem considerations to fisheries management. The resulting 
guidelines state that  
(...) the purpose of an ecosystem approach to fisheries is to plan, develop and 
manage fisheries in a manner that addresses the multiplicity of societal needs and 
desires, without jeopardizing the options for future generations to benefit from a 
full range of goods and services provided by marine ecosystems.
 506
  
In line with the Malawi Principles adopted by the Conference of the Parties of the CBD, 
the FAO guidelines explicitly recognize intergenerational equity as one of the principles 
relevant for ecosystem approach to fisheries management.
507
 It specifies that the principle 
requires that future generations be given the same opportunity as the present ones to 
decide on how to use resources.
508
  
It can be concluded that, although the instruments on high seas fisheries 
management seldom make explicit references to intergenerational equity or the needs and 
aspirations of future generations, intergenerational considerations are implicit in three 
obligations of the legal framework: the obligation of States to ensure long-term 
conservation and sustainable use of living marine resources; the obligation of States to 
implement a precautionary approach in the adoption of conservation and management 
measures; and the obligation to implement an ecosystem approach to fisheries.  
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The concept of conservation has evolved through time. This evolution has been 
marked partially by the advances in fisheries science and partially by the influence of the 
developments in international environmental law and international law in the field of 
sustainable development. As a result, the concept of conservation has been broadened and 
enriched. This evolution has emphasized the inter-temporal effects of fisheries 
management, and therefore, reinforced intergenerational considerations in international 
fisheries law. 
This evolution can also be appreciated in regional fisheries agreements, and 
particularly in the reforms of their Convention texts. Early Conventions, such as 1949 
IATTC Agreement, stated as an objective of the agreement and organizations maintaining 
the populations of fishes at a level which will permit maximum sustained catches year 
after year.
509 
NAFO, in turn, established as the objective of the organization the optimum 
utilization, rational management and conservation of the fishery resources in the 
Convention Area. The amendments to these Conventions emphasize the long-term 
objective of conservation efforts. The newly adopted Antigua Convention and the 2007 
Amendment to the NAFO Convention both recognize, as objective of the organizations, 
ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of the fish stocks.
510
 New 
agreements, such as SEAFO, South Pacific RFMO, WCFPC, also follow closely the 
wording of UNFSA in the definition of their objectives. 
Furthermore, recent regional agreements have included in their texts, and as 
substantive provisions, the obligations to adopt the precautionary and ecosystem 
approaches to fisheries management.
511
 Both principles, as has been mentioned above, 
include in their modern formulation the long-term conservation and the requirement to 
take into account the needs of future generations. 
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Section 3. Allocating TAC: Balancing Short and Long Term Needs  
The previous sections analyzed intergenerational equity in international 
environmental law and international fisheries law in particular. They support a conclusion 
that, despite the fact that future generations are seldom explicitly mentioned in global or 
regional instruments, the legal framework includes intergenerational considerations. They 
are included in the duty to conserve and manage fish stocks with the objective of 
achieving sustainable fisheries. Inter-temporal considerations are also essential to the 
precautionary approach and ecosystem approach, widely accepted as guiding principles 
for fisheries management and explicitly included in binding and non-binding global and 
regional fisheries agreements. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyze how RFMOs have been fulfilling 
the obligation to ensure long-term conservation of stocks through, inter alia, the 
application of the precautionary approach or ecosystem approach.
512
 What is of the 
interest to this thesis is how the TAC and allocation and, in particular, the practical 
implementation of TACs and allocations, enables or challenges the consideration of inter-
temporal, or intergenerational, considerations. In other words, the interest of this and the 
following sections is to analyze how TAC and allocation have allowed balancing short 
and long term benefits of the exploitation of living resources. 
 
TAC, Conservation, and Options for Future Generations 
Chapter 2 has analyzed the origins and rationale of the TAC and allocation. It has 
been pointed out that different studies concluded that the conservation of high seas 
fisheries resources required reducing the rate of fishing mortality; that the best 
mechanism available to do so was a quota or TAC; and that this TAC should be allocated 
to States to allow them to improve fishing efficiency and thus the net economic benefit. 
Therefore, the TAC is a fundamental conservation and management measure to ensure 
the long-term conservation and sustainable use of fish stocks. In establishing a TAC 
according to the precautionary and ecosystem approaches, it should be ensured that the 
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options of future generations to benefit from the goods and services or marine ecosystem 
are not jeopardized.  
In the phase of establishing a TAC, the long-term timeframe for conservation (i.e. 
the inter-temporal considerations) depends on decisions made in relation to the 
exploitation rate. This, in turn, depends on the adopted limit and target reference points, 
the accepted probability of reaching those limits, and the recovery time frame. Fishing 
mortality producing maximum sustainable yield has been traditionally considered a target 
reference point. It is, nevertheless, considered a non-precautionary target and its use as a 
limit reference point is currently preferred.
513
  
The same target reference point can be more or less precautionary depending on 
the agreed probabilities of exceeding the limit reference point. For instance, it might be 
agreed that the probabilities of exceeding the limit reference point are 25%, or 50%. This 
decision will therefore alter the exploitation rate, being more or less precautionary and 
thus, compromising more or less the ability of the stock to meet future needs.  
In addition, the timeframe agreed to maintain or rebuild the stock also affects the 
exploitation rate, the level of precaution, and the ability of the stock to meet future needs. 
It should be mentioned that currently, the decision models for fisheries 
management do not consider an objective quantification of the needs of future 
generations. Nevertheless, economists have developed a series of approaches to the 
consideration of future generations‘ interests in policy decision-making. These 
approaches rely on discount rates to objectively assess and balance inter-temporal 
allocation of scarce resources. These approaches have found some echo in fisheries 
management science, with academic research on the use of modified discount rates to 
actively and objectively consider future generations in fisheries management decisions.
514
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Those attempts are, however, in their initial stage and have not been used by any RFMO 
or, to the best of my knowledge, by any national fisheries authority. 
 
Allocation, Conservation, and Options for Future Generations 
The phase of agreeing on an allocation is, in this theoretical framework, an 
independent decision that can be either previous, simultaneous, or subsequent to the TAC 
decision. This decision relates exclusively to the distribution of fishing opportunities 
between participating States in the present time, assuming that conservation (and inter-
temporal or intergenerational) issues have been, or are going to be, considered on their 
own merit.  
Experience shows, however, that both processes are intertwined. During the 
negotiation, States cannot separate the adoption of a global TAC from their share in that 
TAC. The relevance of the national quotas for the States‘ economies, fishing industries, 
and fishing communities, makes the decisions on TAC dependent upon the national 
allocation of that TAC. Considering this economic importance, and in the light of the 
practices for allocation that have evolved in international fisheries law and that have been 
described in previous chapters, a TAC and allocation process generates a rational selfish 
State behavior that is characterized by four effects. These four effects are: the 
announcement effect, the increased TAC, the paper fish effect, and increasing TAC to 
accommodate new entrants. They are analyzed in turn. 
 
a) The Announcement Effect: Postponing Measures and the Race to Fish 
A rational chain of events, facing the announcement of a management regime 
involving TAC and allocation, is for States to postpone the adoption of management 
measures, and in particular the allocation discussion, until their participation in the 
fishery satisfies their fishing aspirations or bargaining position.
515
 In other words, the 
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current allocation system provides incentives to both postponing measures for the 
protection of the stock, and increase fishing effort and fishing capacity in the fishery - a 
―powerful incentive to indulge in a race to fish.‖
516
 Considering the effects of the 
allocation for their industries in the long-term, States have incentives to engage in fishing 




This effect has been widely, and early, recognized: the announcement effect.
518
 It 
dangerous consequences were also warned.
519
 Experience has shown repeatedly that 
States and fishers behave almost inexorably according to this rationale.
520
 These 
experiences have shown that  
States with aspirations to participate in the fishery will avoid allocation 
discussions or will defer joining an organization until their fishing activity has 
increased to a point at which they perceive that the allocation formula will give 
them a fair share. This delay in reaching an allocation decision has resulted in a 




b) Inflated TACs 
If a fishery has followed its ―rational path‖, during the years prior to the adoption 
of an allocation agreement, the participants of the fishery would have increased their 
catches in order to increase their participation in the fishery and their bargaining power 
with the goal of increasing their outcome: the national quota. In some cases, new 
participants will enter the fishery with the same purpose. If all participating States, and 
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some new States, engage in that rational behavior, the catches of the fishery would be at 
very high levels at the moment of any possible agreement. More often, agreement can 
only be reached when the stock already shows signs of overexploitation. 
This unsustainable level of catches acts as the baseline for the fishing aspirations 
of each State, and therefore their bargaining position. Not infrequently, agreement can 
only be reached at this high level of TAC, which accommodates the aspirations of all 
negotiating States.
522
 In other words, the TAC is not set at the level that ensures long-
term conservation of the stock, but rather at the level that satisfies the aspirations of 
participating States and that allows agreement (even though those aspirations are 
unrealistic if considered in relation to the status of the stock).
523
 The short term individual 
benefit overrides the long term conservation objective, with the result that the interest of 
future generations is overridden by the short-sighted interests of current generations. 
 
c) The “Paper Fish” Effect 
The race to fish causes the TAC to be set at high levels, in order to satisfy the 
aspirations of participating States. In many cases, the allocated TAC bears no relation to 
the conservation status and production capacity of the stock. In other words, the 
participating States ―create‖ an inflated TAC for allocation purposes, but in reality the 
fishery does not support those levels of catches. Actual catches are often at much lower 
levels – the fishery is already over-exploited or depleted.  
This generates ―paper quotas‖, i.e., quotas to be found only in paper.
524
 As such, 
they have little impact as effective conservation and management measures. Again, long-
term conservation is postponed in light of short-sighted interests. 
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Despite the fact that the fish population does not sustain high ―nominal quotas‖, 
States have an interest in maintaining them. That is often done even against the clear 
scientific advice to reduce TAC.
525
 The reasons behind that interest may vary. It is often 
the result of a sense of entitlement to the fishery derived from the allocation of a specific 
quota. The quota is the recognition of the share of the fishery that ―belongs‖ to a 
particular State. Thus, even if at the present moment there are no fish available to actually 
engage in fishing activities commensurate to the nominal quota, there is the expectation 
that in the future the State will take full advantage of ―its share‖.  
Another explanation for paper or nominal quotas may be found in a sense of 
stability resulting from the negotiation process for that quota in particular or, more often, 
of the package deal resulting from allocation of different stocks within the same RFMO.  
A further reason for maintaining nominal quotas is to justify the exclusion of new 
entrants on the basis that the fishery is fully exploited and fully allocated, even in 
circumstances where the participating States may not be fishing their allocated quota. 
That could be the case, for example, in the context of the resolutions adopted by NAFO 
and NEAFC to guide the expectations of new members.  
In addition, and as will be analyzed in further detail in chapter 7, there is an 
increasing trend to allowing the negotiation (trade, purchase, or lease) of allocated 
quotas. In light of this possibility, an allocated quota becomes a title with value of its 
own, only indirectly related to the present status of the stock and the States‘ capability or 
interest in the fishery. The valuable asset is the ―paper fish‖ – not the actual fish anymore. 
 
d) Accommodating New Entrants 
The reluctance of States to reduce their allocated shares has yet another 
manifestation in the process of accommodating new entrants. In the alternative of 
reducing their quota to accommodate new entrants or increasing the TAC for this 
purpose, RFMOs usually prefer the latter alternative. In so doing, the RFMOs show a 
―willingness to adopt a high risk management strategy, with the risk borne by the 
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 Analyzing this behaviour from the perspective of intergenerational equity, it 
can be added that the risk is borne by the resource but also by future generations.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
TACs are, in theory, a fundamental management tool to achieve long-term 
conservation and sustainable use of high seas fish stocks. As such, they are one of the 
mechanisms through which intergenerational considerations may be, and ought to be, 
introduced in fisheries management. This purpose is frustrated, however, by the selfish, 
but rational, behavior of participating States in light of the current practices for setting 
TAC and allocation of national quotas. These practices create incentives to disregard 
long-term, and therefore intergenerational, considerations. 
 The next section provides examples that illustrate, now from a practical 
perspective, the effects of the establishment of TAC and allocations in RFMOs.  
Section 4. Postponing Long-term Considerations: Some Examples  
The consequences of TAC and allocation theoretically summarized in the 
previous section have been extensively described in the literature with respect to specific 
stocks. That is the case with blue whiting in the North East Atlantic (NEAFC),
527
 and 
Southern albacore in the Atlantic (ICCAT).
528
 This thesis provides two other examples: 
South Pacific jack mackerel and white hake.  
 
South Pacific Jack Mackerel: a Recent Case of Announcement Effect 
Chilean jack mackerel (Trachurus murphyi) is a schooling pelagic species 
distributed throughout the South Eastern Pacific, both inside EEZs and on the high seas, 
ranging from the Galapagos Islands and south of Ecuador in the north to southern Chile.  
Fishing for jack mackerel in the South Pacific began in 1950s. The only fleets 
fishing for that species were Chile and Peru, both the coastal States. In the 1970s, 
DWNFs began to fish for the species in the South Pacific area: Bulgaria, Cuba, Korea, 
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Japan, Poland and the U.S.S.R. In the 1980s, Ecuador joined the fishery as a coastal 
State; and Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine did too as DWFNs. 
The distant fleet ceased its operations soon thereafter, and from 1993 to 1998, only the 
three coastal States registered catches. In 1999 Japan again resumed operations. Ghana 




In 2005, New Zealand, Chile and Australia announced that the three countries were 
co-sponsoring a multilateral negotiation for the establishment of a fisheries management 
regime for the South Pacific.
530
 The initiative was triggered by cooperative management 
problems with two species: jack mackerel Trachurus murphyi and orange roughy 
Hoplostethus atlanticus. The multilateral negotiation took place between February 2006 




An important component of the negotiation was to establish provisional or interim 
conservation measures for the protection of jack mackerel and bottom fisheries. Such 
measures were discussed already during the second international consultation, but after 
lengthy and difficult negotiations agreement could not be reached. During the third 
meeting held in Reñaca, Chile in May 2007, States participating in the international 
consultations were able to agree upon voluntary interim measures for the protection of 
jack mackerel, for deep sea species (bottom fishing), and for collection and sharing of 
data.  
According to the jack mackerel interim measure adopted in 2007, the States 
participating in the international consultation committed themselves to limiting the total 
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level of gross tonnage (GT) of vessels flying their flag fishing for pelagic stocks in 2008 
and 2009 to the levels of total GT recorded in 2007 in the Area. Coastal States and States 
with a catch history for jack mackerel with no fishing activity in 2007 could enter the 
fishery and exercise voluntary restraint of fishing effort.  
At the November 2009 Meeting, the States prorogued and revised the interim 
measure adopted in May 2007.
532
 The revised measures are applicable from January 1
st
, 
2010, to the date that the Convention enters into force and conservation and management 




 measure limits the 
fishing effort for jack mackerel to the gross tonnage (GT, or GRT when GT is not 
available) of vessels flying their flag to those that have been actively fishing in 2007, 
2008 or 2009 in the Convention Area.
535
 The provisional GT (or GRT) for each country 
has been included in table 1 of the revised interim measure, but the numbers are 
considered provisional until the information of vessels actively fishing in 2009 has been 
submitted.
536
 They further agreed to voluntarily ―restrain catches by vessels flying its flag 
in the Convention Area to the annual level of catches recorded by that participant in 
either 2007, 2008, or 2009‖.
537
  
Since the announcement of the intention to negotiate a Convention to establish an 
RFMO in the South Pacific in 2005, the number of participants in the fisheries, the 
vessels fishing for jack mackerel, and their catch reports, have increased significantly. 
That has occurred even after 2008, the year States agreed to limit their fishing efforts to 
existing levels in accordance with the voluntary interim measure.  
Four States have started fishing operations for jack mackerel since 2005: EU, 
Faroe Islands, Cook Islands, and Belize.
538
 In addition, three States (EU, China and 
Korea) have not respected the interim measure of limiting fishing effort to 2007 levels, 
increasing the GTR operating in the area between 2008 and 2009. These increases were, 
however, recognized in the revised interim measure. Table 8 shows the authorized and 
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active fleet in the area for 2007, according to the information provided by each State to 
the Secretariat of the South Pacific RFMO, and the limits recognized in the revised 
interim measures. 












Australia 5,715  0 0 - 
Belize 76,136 9,814 1 9,814 
Chile 138,364.37+ 
7,855.55GRT 
103,849 135 96,867.24 + 
3,755.81GRT 
China 55,672 55,672 11 74,516 
Cook Island 12,613GRT 12,613 GRT 3 12,613 GRT 
EC 77,209 62,999 8 78,600 
Faroe Island At least 23,415 23,415 3 23,415 
Japan 4,350.62   4,350.62 
Korea 10,473 10,473 3 15,222 
Peru 
High seas 
Occasionally HS  
    
40,000 
25,000 
Russian Federation    23,235 
Vanuatu 31,220GRT 31,220GRT 4 31,220 GRT 
 
More importantly, the catches for jack mackerel have increased considerably 
since 2005. Table 9 shows a detail of the catches during the 2000-2008 period, 
considering the latest catch reports provided to the Interim Secretariat of the SPRFMO. 
The evolution shows an increase from 1,600,000 tonnes in 2000 to ca. 2,000,000 in 2004. 
During the period 2005-2008, the catches have fluctuated between ca. 1,650,000 tonnes 
to 1,950,000 tonnes. However, it should be noted that the catch information of the latter 
period is still incomplete. Peru has not reported its catches, and other countries have 
announced the existence of catches but have not quantified them. It is to be expected, 
then, that catches are well above 2,000,000 tonnes.  
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In particular, it should be noted that some States have increased their reported 
catches considerably in the last few years. Noteworthy is the EC, which started operating 
in the area in 2005, and in 4 years increased its catches from a little above 6,000 tonnes to 
more than 106,000 tonnes. Faroe Island has not reported its catches for 2008, but in 2007 
it reported ca. 40,000 tonnes with just one vessel operating in the area. Vanuatu, in just 6 
years of operation, has caught between 53,000 tonnes and 129,000 tonnes annually. 
China, in 8 years, has increased its catches from 20,000 to 160,000 tonnes, with later 
catches ca. 140,000 tonnes. 
Table 9. Jack mackerel catches in the 2000-2008 period 
  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Chile 
1,234,299 1,649,933 1,518,994 1,421,296 1,451,599 1,430,434 1,366,770 1,565,401 1,415,846 
Ecuador 
7,144 134,011 604 - -       
  
Peru 
296,579 723,733 154,219 217,734 186,931         
China 
x 20,090 76,261 94,690 131,020 143,000 160,000 140,582 143,182 
Ghana  
2,472 1,157 - - -       
  
Korea 
0 - - 2,010 7,438 x 10,474 10,940 12,600 
Russia 
0 - - 7,540 62,300 7,040 0 0 x 
Vanuatu 
      53,959 94,685 77,356 129,535 112,501 100,066 
EC 
          6,179 62,137 123,511 106,655 
Faroe 
Island               38,700 x 
Cook 
Island                 x 
Belize 
                x 
TOTAL 
1,540,494 2,528,924 1,750,078 1,797,229 1,933,973 1,664,009 1,728,916 1,991,635 1,778,349 
 
In the meantime, the interim scientific committee has reported preoccupation on 
the status of the resource. According to the best scientific information available, fishing 
mortality is likely to have exceeded sustainable levels since at least 2002, and continues 
to do so.
540
 Current biomass levels are substantially below levels at the peak of the 
fishery in the 1990s and, as a result of recent poor recruitment, are highly likely to be still 
declining.
541
 Evidence indicates that further declines in stock status are likely unless 
fishing mortality is reduced, particularly if recruitment remains poor. The interim 
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scientific working group concludes that to stop further declines and re-build this jack 





NAFO and White Hake: Paper Quotas at Unrealistic High Levels 
White hake (Urophycis tenuis) is a ground fish distributed along the Southwest 
fringe of the Grand Bank, the edge of the Laurentian channel and southwest coast of 
Newfoundland, in NAFO areas 3NO and 3Ps.  
The directed fishery for this stock began only in 1988, by Canadian vessels.
543
 
Before that, however, there were significant catches of white hake as bycatch of other 
groundfisheries. The catches peaked in 1985 at 8,100 tonnes in Division 3NO.
544
 In 2002, 
the EU (Spain and Portugal) joined the fishery, and so did the Russian Federation one 
year later.
545
 As a result of the participation of new States, and a particular strong 
recruitment of the 1999-year class, the catches reached another peak in the 2003-2004 
period: between 5,300 and 6,700 tonnes, depending on the statistical record.
546
  
In 2005, the fishery was put under an allocated TAC management regime. The 
negotiation process was relatively short. In 2003, the Fisheries Commission requested 
advice to the scientific committee, which was delivered to the 2004 Fisheries 
Commission meeting. The scientific committee recommended that catches should be 
limited to the levels of the two most recent years, which averaged 5,800 tonnes.
547
 
However, instead, in the 2004 meeting, a Canadian proposal for TAC and allocation was 
adopted by the Fisheries Commission.
548
 The TAC was set at 8,500 tonnes for the 3-year 
period between 2005 and 2007. An allocation agreement was proposed by Canada, based 
on ―standard allocation criteria‖ which were identified as coastal State status, percent 
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biomass inside and outside Canada‘s 200 mile EEZ, coastal community dependence and 
contribution to science and enforcement, catch history.
549
 The reports of the meeting do 
not provide further details on the scientific basis or justification for the proposed (and 
adopted) TAC, which was 46% higher than the scientific recommendation. Indeed, the 
TAC was set at levels even higher than the catch peak of 8,100 tonnes reported in 1985. 
Neither did the reports of the meetings specify the application of the allocation criteria 
claimed to be used, their quantification, or their relative weight. The agreed allocation 
was: 
Canada 2,500 tonnes 
EC 5,000 tonnes 
Russia  500 tonnes 
Others 500 tonnes 
Total 8,500 tonnes 
 
Following the adoption of the management measure, EC and Russia have 
discontinued direct fishing for white hake in Division 3NO.
550
 Reported catches in that 
area have fluctuated between 600 and 1,200 tonnes between 2005 and 2008.
551
  
The scientific advice has consistently stated that given the intermittent recruitment 
of this stock, and the change in fisheries between directed and by-catch, it is not possible 
to give advice on an appropriate TAC. However, considering the lower biomass and poor 
recruitment after the 1999 year-class, the Scientific Council has advised that catches of 





 The scientific committee recommended not exceeding the current level 
of catches (ca. 1,100 in 3NO). Nevertheless, the Fisheries Commission maintained the 
TAC and allocation for 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009. 
For 2010, the scientific committee again recommended that the 2006-2008 
average annual catch level of 850 tonnes in Division 3NO not be exceeded.
554
 The 
Fisheries Commission agreed to reduce the TAC to 6,000 tonnes, still seven times higher 
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than the scientific recommendation.
555
 The allocation scheme was maintained without 
discussion.
556
 Thus, Canada was allocated 1,765 tones, EC 3,529 tonnes, Russia and 
―others‖ 353 tonnes each.
557
 
Negotiation appeared to be easy in 2004 and again in 2009. No objections, debate, 
concerns or complaints were reported. This may not be surprising, considering that only a 
few States are interested in the fishery; that the national quotas apportioned to them are 
larger than their historical catches and, therefore, no sacrifice was required for their 
industries; and that the national quotas considerably exceed the real catches (and 
therefore the economic interest) of their fleets. The fact that the status of the stock is 
uncertain and declining, that the Scientific Council cannot determine reference points for 
the stock, and that the TAC has been absolutely inconsistent with scientific advice every 
year since the first conservation and management measure was adopted, appears to be 
irrelevant for the management decisions.  
In this particular case, the status of the stock and the management regime appear 
to follow different paths. TAC and allocation do not act as a conservation and 
management measure to limit fishing mortality at sustainable levels. Allocation has a 
different purpose, although that purpose is unclear. A few hypotheses can be proposed. 
White hake allocation may be playing the role of a bargaining chip within a ―package 
allocation‖ that considers the several stocks managed by NAFO. The allocation may have 
the objective of excluding potential new entrants to the fishery on the basis that the stock 
is fully exploited and fishing opportunities are fully allocated. The allocation may be 
considered as an investment for the future, in particular, considering that the stock is a 
pulse recruiter capable of producing a large year class from a small spawning stock. What 
is clear is that long-term conservation (and therefore intergenerational equity) is not the 
concern of members in adopting the TAC and allocation. 
Section 5. Intergenerational Equity in TACs and Allocation: Ways Forward 
Intergenerational equity, or the concern for future generations, is only explicitly 
stated as an objective of fisheries management in non-binding instruments. International 
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Conventions and regional agreements do not generally contain an explicit reference to 
this notion. Nevertheless, inter-temporal considerations and concern for future 
generations are implicit in the duty of States to conserve high seas living marine 
resources, a duty that has been reinforced by recent developments in international 
environmental law. UNFSA recognizes those developments by acknowledging the long-
term conservation of stocks as the objective of high seas fisheries cooperation, and by 
requiring the implementation of the precautionary approach and ecosystem approach to 
fisheries management. 
TAC and allocation, as conservation and management measures, should therefore be 
instrumental to intergenerational equity. It is particularly in setting the TAC that the 
precautionary and ecosystem approaches should be implemented, thus balancing the 
satisfaction of current needs with the requirement of ensuring options for future 
generations. 
In practice, however, an allocated TAC produces incentives to disregard future needs 
in favor of immediate benefits. The rational selfish behavior of a State is to postpone 
long-term considerations in order to obtain the short-term benefit of an increased national 
quota. Several factors allow this rational, but detrimental, behavior. Among them, are: 
a) The freedom of the high seas and its subsequent lack of quantitative restrictions 
on fishing activities unless there is a specific agreement; 
b) The decision-making process requiring consensus for the adoption of fishing 
restrictions; 
c) The process of adoption of TAC and allocations, concentrated in the same organs 
of the RFMOs; 
d) The lack of explicit criteria for conservation and, therefore, lack of explicit 
consideration of the needs of future generations; 
e) The fact that allocations are based, mostly, on historical catches, and in particular 
historical catches of recent years; 
f) The desired ―stability‖ in allocations, which in practice means roll-over of 
allocation agreements after the first allocation. 
To address the failures of TAC and allocation in achieving long-term conservation of the 
fish stocks would require, therefore, addressing one or more of those factors.  
Most authors addressing this problem in international fisheries law have proposed 




allocations. Lodge et al. explicitly recommend that ―[d]ecisions on total allowable catch 
or total allowable effort are insulated and separate from decisions on allocation.‖
558
 
Willock and Lack, in their review of best practices in RFMOs, also conclude that 
―negotiations over allocations should be transparent and separate from decisions on the 
level of catch or effort.‖
559
 Lodge and Nandan concur in suggesting that ―[i]t is important 
to emphasise that allocation rights, both in the EEZ and on the high seas, are subordinate 
to the obligation to conserve.‖
560
 It is added that, for this purpose, allocations should be 
based on percentage of TACs instead of volume of catch expressed in tonnes.
561
 
Despite the logic of these suggestions, they face an almost insurmountable 
challenge in their practical implementation. Decisions on TAC and allocations are made 
by States, and in particular by the States participating in a specific cooperative 
agreement. Decisions are therefore in the hands of those States, whether they are made in 
the same body of the RFMO or in different bodies, and whether they are made together or 
in different timeframes. As a consequence, they are necessarily related decisions. And it 
is likely unrealistic to think that States will surrender jurisdiction to make decisions on 
any of them.  
The opposite solution, i.e. integrating both inter- and intra-generational aspects of 
the decision, has also been proposed on the basis of the very concept of intergenerational 
equity. Indeed, in Brown Weiss‘ theory of intergenerational equity, equitable access to 
resources (thus intra-generational equity) is a component of intergenerational equity, 
which denotes that they are note separate but inter-linked concepts.
562
 For this reason, 
intergenerational equity has been categorized as an ―integrative‖ doctrine that recognizes 
the legitimacy of multiple claims, and particularly the rights of members of the 
developing world to enjoy equal access to planetary resources.
563
 The integration is 
supported in the fact that the balancing of the needs of present and future generations 
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needs to take appropriate account of the needs of present generations. In the absence of 
such a balance, future generations may benefit at the expense of current ones; or on the 
contrary, their needs maybe overridden by current generation‘s needs and aspirations.  
This integration of intergenerational and intra-generational equity cannot be 
simply interpreted as considering a quota for future generations in the allocation of 
fishing opportunities. Intergenerational allocation and international allocation have a 
different temporal dimension and thus cannot be reduced to a uni-dimensional 
distribution of fish stocks. Instead, the integration between current needs and future needs 
in high seas fisheries could be translated, in practical terms, in an explicit and transparent 
consideration of the trade-offs between present and future generations‘ needs.  
Firstly, precautionary levels of exploitation would have to be defined with an 
explicit reference to how that exploitation rate would protect the stock for the future. 
These requirements already exist in UNFSA. In particular, article 6 on precautionary 
approach and Annex II on Guidelines for the Application of Precautionary Reference 
Points in Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks already establish the obligation to determine target and limit reference points 
for each stock under management. However, with the exception of CCAMLR,
564
 this 
requirement is seldom fulfilled by RFMOs.
565
  
Even when those precautionary reference points exist and the scientific advice is 
based on them, the scientific advice is often not followed by the management 
commissions. This chapter has explained why allocation implications create incentives 
for States to inflate TACs even disregarding scientific advice. As a result of these 
deviations of the scientific advice, the impact of the decision on future generations is not 
made explicit. Further transparency in the trade-offs between present and future 
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generations would required, then, that the TAC finally agreed upon is joined by an 
explicit declaration on how this decision would impact the availability of resources for 
future generations.  
Another strategy suggested to practically implement intergenerational equity in 
environmental regimes is to include requirements to ―monitor and report on the status of 
the trust corpus.‖
566
 The status of the fish stock is regularly monitored by each RFMO, 
and in some cases also by independent reviews. Again, the transparency of these reports 
with respect to intergenerational considerations could be greatly improved if they include 
explicit declaration of the implication of the status for availability of resources for future 
generations. 
In relation to the transparency of the trade-offs between current and future 
generations‘ needs, it is worth mentioning yet another strategy suggested to implement 
intergenerational equity in international environmental law. This strategy is the 
representation of future generations in the decision-making process. In this context, the 
idea of an Ombudsman established at the international, regional, national or local level 
has been proposed.
567
 The Ombudsman could have different functions: ensure that 
international agreements incorporating planetary obligations and rights were properly 
executed (with the capacity to intervene in administrative and judicial proceedings to this 
end); to respond to citizen complaints and to investigate and mediate complaints 
regarding the non-compliance with planetary obligations established in international 
agreements; and to serve as watchdogs alert to impending problems affecting future 
generations.  
The idea faces skepticism. Brown Weiss acknowledges that the role of an 
Ombudsman at the international level would face serious limitations on the basis of 
national sovereignty.
568
 In general, the political will to ―implement and to abide by such 
arrangement‖ has been doubted.
569
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In relation to high seas fisheries, the idea of an Ombudsman actively participating 
in the decision-making process has not been suggested and is, realistically, very unlikely. 
However, another function attributed to the Ombudsman, namely the function of a 
―watchdog‖, in practice has been exercised by the many institutions, academics and 
NGOs that periodically review the performance of RFMOs.
570
 These ―watchdog‖ 
initiatives could either put pressure for RFMOs to integrate intergenerational equity in the 
TAC decision making process, directly undertake that task by analyzing and publishing 
how the TAC decisions of RFMOs impact the availability of resources for future 
generations, and raise awareness of those tradeoffs. 
At this point, it should be noted that the transparency of trade-offs by RFMOS or 
watchdog initiatives are hindered by the limited responses available to address or 
approach cases of weak performances. Beside public shame, they seldom result in a 
practical and timely response that improves long-term conservation of the stocks. The 
same is generally the case with the performance reviews undertaken by RFMOs, although 
its institutional and official character may imply the necessity of a more proactive 
response on the part of the RFMO and their member States. However, NGOs and public 
pressure have proven successful mechanisms to promote change in some cases; its 
potential should not be underestimated. 
The alternative of resorting to international dispute settlement bodies on the basis 
of breaches to the obligation of long-term conservation of living marine resources, the 
obligation to cooperate for the conservation of those resources, or the obligation to 
implement the precautionary or ecosystem approach, has generally not been exercised.
571
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Indeed, it has been widely noted that the current structure of dispute settlement 
procedures is not suitable to address cases where multilateral action and global 
conservation are at stake.
572
 However, as status of resources decline, this may be an 
avenue that some States may pursue seriously in the future. 
Finally, an approach that has been less explored as a means to avoid the persistent 
disregard of long-term conservation in the adoption of TACs and allocation, is the 
necessity to change the allocation criteria or mechanisms in order to remove the 
incentives to engage in a race to fish. Indeed, the race to fish is motivated by two main 
factors: the fact that historical catches, and furthermore, recent catches, are the 
predominant allocation criterion; and the fact that the first allocation establishes the 
participation of each State in the fishery on a permanent, or almost permanent, basis. As 
long as these two features persist, so will the inevitable chain of events (―postponing 
management measures - race to fish – increased catches – inflated TAC – paper quotas‖). 
This particular proposal is further addressed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 5. TAC and Allocation and Intra-generational Equity 
 
This chapter addresses the fundamental question of distribution of fishing 
opportunities among competing States – a question of equity. It attempts to explore the 
normative content of the concept of equity as a legal standard for the allocation of a 
scarce resource. 
The question is posed in the context of an evolution that denotes an ongoing 
struggle to achieve predictable and objective patterns of distribution. That struggle has 
been depicted in chapters 2 and 3. Since predictability and objectivity are predominant 
roles of law, it is therefore implied in this struggle that there is a perceived need to define 
and refine legal principles applicable to the distribution of fishing opportunities. In other 
words, there is a need to identify normative content to equity considerations. 
But the question is also posed in the context of a belief that the distribution – and 
indeed equity - is a political rather than a legal issue. Oda has categorically asserted that 
in the issues of allocation of benefits and burdens of ocean management and 
conservation,  
(...) the concept of equity has a predominant impact, while legal norms play little 
or no role. Equity comprises no objective legal criterion and varies in each 
circumstance. Its evaluation or determination is not a simple matter. Solutions in 
the above categories nonetheless will need to be found; but they will not be found 




In the same line, Molenaar noted that the ―allocation process is to a large extent 
governed by political and negotiating factors, and constrained only by very general rules 
and principles of international law.‖
574
  
The purpose of this chapter is to explore and ultimately challenge those 
assertions. An attempt is made to determine what role can law fulfill in order to provide 
objective and predictable solutions to the distributional problem; to identify those ―very 
general rules and principles of international law‖ applicable to the issue; and to refine, or 
at least suggest ways to refine, their normative content. 
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To address this task, it is necessary to address first the meaning and role of equity 
in international law. Within this wider framework, the concept of intra-generational 
equity in international environmental law and in the field of sustainable development is 
analyzed. This first task proved not to be easy. Equity is a controversial, 
multidimensional, and evolving, concept. Schachter has stated that ―no concept of 
international law resists precise definition more than the notion of equity‖.
575
 
Weeramantry cites a scholar defining equity as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an 
enigma."
576
 This thesis has no ambition for solving the riddle. An introductory section on 
equity is needed, however, to address the main focus of this chapter: equity as a legal 
standard for allocation of resources. That extended introductory analysis provides a 
framework to address whether equity is considered in the international fisheries legal and 
regional framework.  
After these general introductory analyses, the chapter explores, in successive 
sections, three legal principles rooted in equity. The first section addresses the role of 
equity in maritime delimitation. This analysis provides important insights on the 
construction of a normative concept of equity in international law, as interpreted and 
applied by international tribunals.  
The second section analyses the concept of equitable utilization in the law of non-
navigational uses of international watercourses. This field of international law was 
considered relevant because it is with respect to this shared resource that the principle of 
equitable utilization has had most developments at the legal, policy and jurisprudential 
level. In addition, its legal framework offers significant parallelism with the legal 
framework for straddling and highly migratory stocks, analyzed in chapter 3. Water 
shares with straddling and highly migratory stocks the fact that they ―move‖ across 
boundaries.  
The third section addresses the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility, and the extent that it provides a useful standard for allocation of burdens 
and benefits. 
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The purpose of this analysis is to draw on lessons and key concepts on the 
contribution of equity to solving allocation problems. Those lessons and contributions are 
summarized in the last section of this chapter, including an analysis of the particular 
conflicts of interests identified in chapter 3. 
Section 1. Equity in International Law 
Equity is multi-dimensional. It is a philosophical, ethical, political, and legal 
concept. The role of equity, and its relation to law, has long been debated. Some consider 
that equity is not a legal concept, but just an ethical one. Some consider that equity is the 
moral foundation of international law. Others see in equity the objective of international 
law (and thus, more lege ferenda then lex lata). However, currently there seems to be 
agreement in that equity, and equitable principles, is part of substantive and procedural 
legal frameworks.
577
 It is equity as a legal concept that is of interest for this thesis, 
although references to the relationship between equity as a legal concept and ethical, 
political or social concepts of equity are inevitable.  
Even narrowing the meaning of equity to its legal meaning, it is a concept that is 
understood differently and plays different roles in common law and civil law systems, 
and in domestic and international law systems. The aspect relevant for this thesis is the 
legal concept of equity as understood and applied in international law. 
The traditional concept of equity arises from Aristotle‘s Nichomachean Ethics. 
Along with the two forms of particular justice,
578
 Aristotle identifies a procedural notion 
of equity, or the equitable, as corrective justice. Corrective justice implies an 
individualization of the general law to specific cases. Aristotle stated: ―[w]hen the law 
speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal 
statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us and has erred by over-simplicity, to 
correct the omission – to say what the legislator himself would have said had he been 
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present, and would have put into his law if he had known.‖
579
 Equity, or the equitable, 
acts then as a ―correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality.‖
580
   
Janis has stated that ―equity acting as a form of judicial discretion is the oldest 
and most generally accepted role for equity in international law.‖
581
 In this respect, it is 
useful to distinguish equity, as a legal concept, from ex aequo et bono, which the 
Tribunals may apply to the settlement of disputes with the consent of the respective 
States. As stated by Sir Jennings, the difference between these two notions of equity is 
not only the source of discretion (States‘ consent, or law). The content of equity and the 
process of its application are different, as well.  ―[E]quity, as a part of law, should mean 
the application to the case of principles and rules of equity for the proper identification of 
which a legal training is essential. The appreciation and application of equity so 
conceived is essentially juridical.‖
582
  
The issue is, however, not settled. Controversy exists on the extent to which an 
international judge can exercise discretion to complement, or even modify, international 
law and in particular treaty law. In this respect, three types of equity have been identified: 
equity infra legem,
583
 equity prater legem,
584
 and equity contra legem.
585
 While equity 
infra legem is generally accepted (and even recognized as ―the ordinary process a court 
has to go through to arrive at its judgment‖)
586
, the recourse to equity praeter legem and 
contra legem is debated and, in the latter case, mostly rejected. 
A second form of equity that has had recognition in international law is 
autonomous equity
587
, or broadly conceived equity.
588
 In this case, equity does not 
mitigate the unfair effects of the application of the rule of law to a particular situation, but 
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is itself the dominant rule of law. As can be imagined, such a broad concept of equity has 
been resisted as a legal concept – and considered as cases of application of ex aequo et 
bono. 
A key element of both forms of equity is their connection to the factual situation. 
The application of equity requires, then, a legal process of identifying the factors of the 
specific case that have legal relevance, and considering how those factors affect the 
application of the rule of law. Among those relevant factors are the rights, entitlements 
and interests of parties that are in conflict. ―Equity infra legem allows the court to 
determine which interpretation is the most just, having regard to the circumstances and 
balancing the rights and obligations of the parties‖.
589
 Schachter has also identified as one 
of the methods of operation of equity, the balancing of interests of the parties. Thus, 
equity is also understood as an exercise of balancing the rights, interests, needs and other 
considerations that are in conflict in a specific situation. 
Equity is also understood as a legal standard for allocating shared resources; and 
more generally, allocating the benefits, resources, burdens, and costs that derive from a 
common resource. Schachter, for example, mentions equitable standards for the 
allocation of sharing of resources and benefits as one of the five uses of equity in 
international law. Shelton, as well, classifies rules for allocation of scarce resources as 
substantive norm of equity. Franck considers that equity is a mode of introducing justice 
into resource allocation;
590
 and adds that equity lends ―important assistance in this task, 
affording judges a measure of discretion, within a flexible rule-structure, commensurate 




Many authors refer to this notion of equity as synonymous of distributive 
justice.
592
 Distributive justice, or equity, tracks its roots back to Aristotle. He defined 
distributive justice as one form of particular justice that requires that the distribution of 
honor, money, or other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the 
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constitution, according to merit, although not all may agree on the sort of merit that shall 
be relevant for the distribution.
593
 
Equity as distributive justice is understood also with a different emphasis. It is 
understood not as a correction of strict rules of law, nor balancing of competing rights 
and interests, but as a norm correcting existing distribution of wealth. In this 
understanding, the principle of distributive justice and economic equity justifies a transfer 
of resources from developed to developing States, in order to reduce and if possible 
eradicate the gap that exists between a minority of rich nations and a majority of poor 
nations. 
Janis has observed that the concept of equity is understood under two different 
conceptions by western and third world international lawyers, respectively. Western 
laywers, following a traditional conception of equity as corrective equity and therefore as 
judicial discretion, view equity as ―a flexible corrective function in specific cases not 
well-handled by strict universal rules‖
594
 (which he calls discretionary justice). Third 
world international lawyers, in turn, ―see equity notions as emerging from perceived 
economic and political injustices in the global distribution of wealth and power.‖
595
 
These equity notions, thus, would correct those inequalities in the distributions of wealth.  
 This dual meaning of the concept of equity is also noticed by Schachter. He notes 
that ―equity and distributive justice are identified almost entirely with the demands of the 
poor and disadvantaged for a larger share of resources‖.
596
 Indeed, he notes that for 
economists, distributive justice is used ―virtually as a code word for wider income 
distribution and transfer payments to the poor.‖
597
 He acknowledges, however, that the 
idea of equity has a much wider meaning for governments than this narrow interpretation 
of the term.
598
   
In this respect, it is useful to mention a distinction made by the International 
Court of Justice in the field of maritime delimitation. Although equity is considered a 
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 The wider interpretation takes into account the notions of entitlement in actual disputes where strong 
feelings of injustice have been generated (ibid). Its conception of equity based on the concepts of 




principle of international law applicable to maritime boundary disputes (and actually, one 
of the main areas where equity as a legal principle has been recognized and applied), the 
International Court of Justice has explicitly ruled that maritime delimitation is not a 
matter of distributive justice.
599
 The judgment on the North Sea Continental shelf cases
600
 
stated that the task of the tribunal was related to  
delimitation and not the apportionment of the areas concerned or their division 
into converging sectors. […] Delimitation in an equitable manner is one thing, but 




The exclusion of matters of distributive justice from maritime boundary disputes 
has justified the rejection of economic and social factors as relevant criteria in the search 
for an equitable solution. Judge Oda, in his dissenting opinion in the Continental Shelf 
(Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya/Malta) Judgment, states that consideration of socio-economic 
elements involve  
global resource policies, or basic problems of world politics, which not only could 
not be solved by the judicial organ of the world community but stray well beyond 
equity as a norm of law into the realm of social organization.
602
 
Does this imply that the apportionment of shared resources – distributive justice - 
is necessarily a political rather than legal decision? Fuentes, commenting on international 
watercourses law, argues not. She argues that the distinction between delimitation and 
apportionment is rather artificial,
603
 and that the ―real objection to the inclusion of socio-
economic factors does not lie in a per se extra-legal nature of the socio-economic criteria, 
but on how these factors should operate in the process of delimitation so that the decision 
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does not intrude into the political realm.‖
604
 In other words, the inclusion of socio-
economic elements in the application of the rule of equitable utilization ―does not 
necessarily transform what is to be a judicial decision into a political one.‖
605
 The correct 
approach, in this interpretation, is to distinguish between relevant and non-relevant socio-
economic factors.
606
 Thus, and according to this interpretation, establishing just and 
equitable shares of an undivided resource is not, per se, excluded from the application of 
equity as a rule of law.
607
  
In this distinction, it is the latter concept of distributive justice which seems to be 
denied a legal character – while the balancing of rights and interests (even when those 
rights and interests have an economic or social component) is considered a matter of law 
if they are relevant to the dispute, and to the extent to which they are relevant. 
It seems apparent that international lawyers and scholars alike address equity as 
distributional justice under two different notions, or doctrines in the terms of Janis. One is 
a legal notion of equitable principles that allow making case-specific decisions on 
balancing different interests and rights, a function that is intrinsically a legal reasoning 
(what could be called distributional justice in a narrow, technical or legal, sense). The 
other is a socio-political concept of re-distribution of wealth to correct social injustices – 
a concept that is extra-legal in nature (what could be called distributional justice in a 
broader, or political, sense).  
Janis, however, makes a note of caution with respect to the attributed extra-legal 
nature of distributional justice in a broader sense. He acknowledges that this notion does 
not necessarily imply any legal quality, but economic, political or moral aspirations; and 
that it is simple to dismiss them as not having any meaning in international law or that 
they represent, at best, lege ferenda.
608
 However, he notices that this explanation is 
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inadequate for two reasons: first, because it does not take into account the references to 
equity made in subsequent international practice in relation to economic relations; and 
secondly, it does not take into account a doctrine (the ―third world doctrine‖) that 
ascribes a legal quality to the broader concept of distributional justice.
609
 
Both of these arguments are best understood while analyzing the principle of 
intra-generational equity in the field of sustainable development. 
Section 2. International Environmental Law, Sustainable Development, and Intra-
Generational Equity 
Equity is considered to be a key concern, and indeed an important element of 
political division, in environmental law and law of sustainable development.
610
 This 
equity concern arises from the global impacts on the environment that can be created by 
development efforts, and the increased interdependency of countries in the globalized 
world. It arises as well from the interactions between environmental protection and 
development opportunities, subsumed in the concept of sustainable development. It is a 
possibility and a reality that while some communities reap the benefits of development, 
others bear its environmental costs. It is also possible that costs of environmental 
protection are imposed unevenly among and within communities. Those distributional 
problems are equity problems; and they have created sharp divisions among countries. 
Brown Weiss noted that  
[a]t the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 
countries were deeply divided over questions of equity (…) While [countries] 
agreed that environmental protection and economic development were compatible 
through sustainable development, they disagreed about who should pay for it and 
how much.
611
   
The concern of equity in the integration of environmental protection and 
economic and social development has been present since the first conferences addressing 




 Edith Brown Weiss has noted that ―[c]oncerns about equity have become the focus of pointed conflicts 
in the negotiation and implementation of international environmental legal instruments‖ (Edith Brown 
Weiss, ―Environmental Equity: The Imperatives for the Twenty-First Century‖ in Winfried Lang, ed., 
Sustainable Development and International Law (London; Boston: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 








 However, its emphasis – and consequently the political divisions– became 




The 1992 Rio Declaration was adopted ―with the goal of establishing a new and 
equitable global partnership through the creation of new levels of cooperation among 
States, key sectors of societies and peoples.‖
614
 Its third principle states: ―The right to 
development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental 
needs of present and future generations.‖ It adds in principle 5:  
All States and all people shall cooperate in the essential task of eradicating 
poverty as an indispensable requirement for sustainable development, in order to 
decrease the disparities in standards of living and better meet the needs of the 
majority of the people of the world.  
On the basis of this declaration, the International Law Association has included 
equity and eradication of poverty as one of the principles which ―application and, where 
relevant, consolidation and further development […] would be instrumental in pursuing 
the objective of sustainable development in an effective way.‖
615
 The principle of equity 
includes, in this formulation, both inter- and intra-generational equity, which is defined as 
―the right of all peoples within the current generation of fair access to the current 
generation‘s entitlement to the Earth‘s natural resource‖.
616
 In respect to the latter, the 
ILA states: 
The right to development must be implemented so as to meet developmental and 
environmental needs of present and future generations in a sustainable and 
equitable manner. This includes the duty to co-operate for the eradication of 
poverty in accordance with Chapter IX on International Economic and Social Co-
operation of the Charter of the United Nations and the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development as well as the duty to co-operate for global 
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sustainable development and the attainment of equity in the development 
opportunities of developed and developing countries.
617
 
Several references to equity can be also found in the environmental agreements 
that were elaborated in recent years and in particular under the umbrella of UNCED 
conferences. Prominent examples thereof are the Climate Change Convention,
618




It is somehow paradoxal that, despite the deep division by countries on matters of 
equity,
620
 the concept is nevertheless profusely invoked in international instruments. It is 
therefore not a surprise that the actual meaning of those equity references, its legal status, 
and practical consequences are not clear.
621
 Sands notes: 
Little consideration was given, however, to what the concept means or to its 
consequences when applied to a particular set of facts. Indeed, the way it was 
sometimes referred to suggests that some of its main proponents had little 
understanding of its prior use in international law, especially as recently applied 
by the International Court of Justice. At UNCED, the term provided a convenient 
way of introducing flexibility and ambiguity into the rights and obligations which 
were being put in place. Its frequent usage reflects a lack of consensus (as 
opposed to the existence of consensus) in efforts to allocate rights and 
responsibilities for States with differing levels of economic development and 
perspectives on their future needs and priorities.
622
 
The ambiguity can be found not only in legal instruments, but also in the work of 
scholars. Albeit all recognize equity, intra-generational equity, or equitable use as 
components of the broader concept of sustainable development, their understanding of 
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the concept differs. In many respects, this ambiguity reflects the distinction between 
―discretionary justice‖ and ―distributive justice‖ identified by Janis and discussed in the 
previous section. 
Sands, for example, addresses intra-generational equity as a synonym of equitable 
use, which he perceives in terms similar to judicial discretion (albeit applied to 
negotiations): ―a flexible means of leaving the extent of rights and obligations to be 
decided at a subsequent date‖
623
 and with an emphasis on the balancing of relevant 
factors.
624
 References made to allocation of shared freshwater resources, as well as the 
Icelandic Fisheries case, and the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
625
 case reinforce that, in Sands 
approach, intra-generational equity is equivalent to equity as understood and applied by 
international tribunals: as a rule or principle of law. 
Other authors, on the contrary, address intra-generational equity as a concept 
with, mainly, a redistributive objective. This can be clearly seen from the ILA New Delhi 
Declaration, which addresses equity together with eradication of poverty.
626
 Schrijver, 
who follows the principles identified in this declaration in his analysis, notes in respect to 
intra-generational equity that it can refer to: a) more equal development opportunities; or 




Perhaps the clearest exposition of the multiple, and evolving, roles of equity 
within the concept of sustainable development is explained by French. He starts by 
stating that equity has both a legal and political meaning, but then focuses on the political 
meaning of equity. In this respect, French observes that within the concept of sustainable 
development, equity means different things, or more precisely, has become to mean 
different things as the agenda of sustainable development has broadened.
628
 On one side, 
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it means simply that environmental protection must be accompanied by developmental 
aspects. But progressively, the purpose of equity has evolved to consider quality-of-life 
and human development that need to be addressed if sustainable development is to 
become meaningful. ―The role of equity within sustainable development is consequently 
to confront the wider structural issues of injustice and unfairness within the international 
economic and political system that have hindered the South‘s development since the 
1960s.‖
629
 From this role of equity would derive a moral and legal injunction upon the 
North to assist the South with its efforts to develop sustainably.
630
 Not surprisingly, 
French notes that the North does not share this notion of equity, and instead prefers a 




This is the place to discuss, then, the legal status of equity or intra-generational 
equity as a component of sustainable development. Generally, the concept of sustainable 
development has been denied the status of a legal principle or legal norm in international 
law.
632
 The same is true for one of its components: intra-generational equity. It has been 
noted that ―there is little in the way of State practice and opinio juris to suggest that it is 
customary international law‖.
633
 Schrijver, for example, considers that ―intra-generational 
equity can at best be allocated a ‗soft law‘ status.‖
634
 Sands does not address the legal 
status of the principle explicitly. 
However, even understood as a political statement and thus as an objective of 
policy action, rather than as a normative concept, it has legal implications. Two of them 
can be identified: a) the interpretation of legal concepts – including the legal concept of 
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The Brundtland report has defined sustainable development as ―development that 
meets the needs of present generations without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.‖
637
 This definition highlights two key elements of 
the concept of sustainable development: 
a) The idea of limitations to development imposed by the carrying capacity of the 
environment; 
b) The emphasis on ―needs‖, which implies the idea that people in developing countries 
as well as future generations should be able to meet their basic needs.
638
 
Equity, in the concept of sustainable development, puts an emphasis on the social 
and development considerations, along with environmental concerns. Thus, the concept 
of sustainable development sheds a new, and stronger, light into social and economic 
aspects – need – in the decision making process.  
Equity, interpreted in the light of sustainable development, would require that 
emphasis, or at least careful consideration be given to the social and economic aspects in 
this balancing exercise. And as has been already noted in the previous section, this 
emphasis or careful consideration to social and economic aspects and the needs of the 
parties does not necessarily transform a decision based on equity as a legal norm, into a 
decision based on politics.  
There is still another legal implication of the concept of sustainable development 
in the interpretation, inception and development of legal standards. Sustainable 
development emphasizes the material differences between the countries involved. An 
equal treatment of States that are formally equal, but substantially unequal, is by 
definition unjust. Giving emphasis to the material situation of the State, and establishing 
appropriate responses according to these differences, is a matter of equity or justice. And 
this equity concern is precisely the justification of the principle of common but 
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differentiated responsibility. The acknowledgment of different material circumstances 
through the principle of common but differentiated responsibility has had distributive 




Section 3. Equity and Equitable Principles in International Fisheries Instruments 
The previous sections have explained how the concept of equity, and equity as a 
norm for the allocation of scarce resources (i.e. distributional justice), has been 
understood in international law and in international law in the field of sustainable 
development. The current section addresses whether equity, in its narrow or broad 
meaning, have been included as a principle in international fisheries law. 
References to equity in international fisheries law leave one with a mixed feeling. 
On the one hand, the LOSC has as clear objective the achievement of equity. On the other 
hand, references to equity ever since the LOSC have almost disappeared from 
international instruments. 
The LOSC includes several references to equity. The preamble states 
Recognizing the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due 
regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans which 
will facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of 
the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the 
conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation 
of the marine environment, 
Bearing in mind that the achievement of these goals will contribute to the 
realization of a just and equitable international economic order which takes into 
account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole and, in particular, the 
special interests and needs of developing countries, whether coastal or land-
locked, 
 
References to equity are also made in the substantive sections of the treaty, in the 
following context: 
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a) As a fundamental legal norm to resolve conflicts of interests in the EEZ;640 
b) As a standard to regulate access to the fish stock surplus in the EEZ from the 








d) As a legal standard for the distribution of the payments and contributions 
made by coastal States to the International Seabed Authority with respect to 
the exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles;
643
 
e) As a legal standard for the distribution of the benefits of the exploitation of the 
international seabed, common heritage of humankind;
644
 
f) As a guiding principle for the transfer of marine technology for the benefit of 
all States concerned;
645
 and the training of members of the managerial, 
research and technical staff constituted by the Seabed Authority;
646
 and  
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relation to geographically disadvantaged States, see similar provisions in LOSC, article 70. 
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and of articles 61 and 62. 
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According to Janis, the equity provisions of the LOSC ―display a considerable 
and confusing degree of variety.‖
648
 Although in some cases he ascribes a particular 
reference to one of the doctrines of equity he previously identifies,
649
 many equity 
references can be read with different emphasis, according to the reader‘s eyes.  
Most importantly for this thesis, the provisions regulating the high seas, and 
particularly the conservation and use of living marine resources in the high seas, do not 
have any reference to equity or equitable principles. Similarly, UNFSA does not make 
any references to equity in its preamble or in its substantive provisions. This absence is 
more remarkable if it is considered in the context of a LOSC where equity is explicitly 
stated as an objective in many provisions and institutions. 
Is equity, therefore, a principle for high seas fisheries governance regimes? And if 
so, what does equity mean for the high seas fisheries regulatory framework? 
The foundations of the high seas fisheries regime are in the LOSC and thus, the 
general principles of the LOSC shall be considered applicable to it. The preamble of the 
LOSC recognizes the desirability of establishing, through the Convention, a legal order 
that promotes, inter alia, ―equitable and efficient utilization of their resources‖.
650
 It could 
be argued, therefore, that the objectives of the high seas fisheries regime should be in line 
with equity and efficiency. However, this preamble can also be read as to mean that this 
equitable and efficient utilization of the resources is achieved through the carefully 
balanced rights and obligations of States as developed in the LOSC provisions. In other 
words, it can be argued that equity and efficiency were the guiding principles in the 
overall design of the different regimes of the oceans included in the LOSC. That does not 
mean, or at least not necessarily, that equity and efficiency are directly applicable as 
guiding principles in each of the regimes; in particular in the high seas fisheries regime 
where equity is not explicitly mentioned. 
The objectives for high seas fisheries management, as established in articles 63, 
64, and 118 of the LOSC regulating the duty for States to cooperate in the case of high 
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seas fisheries, is the ―conservation‖
651
 and ―optimum utilization‖ of the high seas living 
marine resources.
652
 UNFSA, in turn, states as an objective of the agreement, and thus of 
the cooperation of States, the ―long-term conservation‖ and ―sustainable use‖ of 
straddling and highly migratory stocks. Is equity included, implicitly, in those objectives? 
It has already been mentioned in chapter 4 that the term conservation, which 
originally was centered in maximizing productivity as in the concept of maximum 
sustainable yield, can be interpreted in the light of the principles advanced by 
international environmental law. Following those developments, FAO has defined the 
objective of fisheries management as maintaining the quality, diversity and availability of 
fishery resources in sufficient quantities for present and future generations in the context 
of food security, poverty alleviation and sustainable development.
653
 UNFSA, in turn, 
also reflects those developments in its provisions, and in particular in the broader concept 
of conservation that includes ecosystem considerations and the precautionary approach. 
This broader concept of conservation is also reflected in the objective of the agreement: 
the long-term conservation and sustainable utilization of straddling and highly migratory 
stocks. 
It has been doubted if this objective - to ensure the long-term conservation and 
sustainable use of straddling and highly migratory stocks - can be regarded as a specific 
norm governing the outcome of an allocation process.
654
 Even if it is considered as an 
overarching objective of high seas fisheries management and therefore governing the 
specific management measure of TAC and allocation, it is doubtful that it includes equity 
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as a principle guiding access to fishing opportunities. Long-term conservation, as it has 
been stated in the previous chapter, has an emphasis on the inter-temporal dimension of 
conservation. The term sustainable utilization, in turn, is probably used in the sense of the 
utilization that is compatible with the regeneration of the stock. In other words, the term 
sustainable refers probably to a biological sustainability of the stock (inherent in the 
terms maximum or optimum sustainable yield), rather than to the concept of sustainable 
development (including intra-generational equity).  
The latter interpretation can be supported by reference to the history of the 
concept of sustainable development. Schrijver notes that the concept of sustainability 
acquired its earliest expression in fisheries, and in particular in the concept of maximum 
sustainable yield.
655
  However, he also notes that the substance of the concept of 
sustainable development has been formed by a convergence of international 
developments in the fields of environmental conservation, development and human 
rights.
656
 In the early manifestations of the term sustainable, therefore, the development 
aspect and the related idea of intra-generational equity, were not yet present. 
This interpretation can also be supported by the principles of sustainable 
development recognized by scholars. Sands and Schrijver, for example, identify 




It must be noted, however, that the objective for fisheries management included in 
provision 6.2 of the Code of Conduct makes an explicit reference to sustainable 
development (and not sustainable use). This reference may allow a conclusion that the 
elements of sustainable development – and in particular intra-generational equity – are 
guiding principles for the adoption of conservation and management measures, including 
TAC and allocation. However, the Code of Conduct applies to all fishing activities within 
and beyond EEZs, so its interpretation as a guiding principle for allocation of fishing 
opportunities in the high seas may be questioned. In addition, the non-binding character 
of the code must be taken into account. 
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Other non-binding international instruments do not make references to equity 
either. But more interesting is the fact that, in the drafting of several documents, explicit 
references to equity or equitable allocations were deleted and replaced with reference to 
―transparent‖ allocation criteria consistent with ―existing international law.‖ Several 
examples can be cited in this respect. 
The first example is the Johannesburg Plan of Action. The Plan includes a 
paragraph (nr. 30) which identifies several actions to achieve ―sustainable fisheries‖. One 
of those actions, included in subparagraph e), is to 
encourage relevant regional fisheries management organizations and 
arrangements to give due consideration to the rights, duties and interests of 
coastal States and the special requirements of developing States when addressing 
the issue of the allocation of share of fishery resources for straddling stocks and 
highly migratory fish stocks, mindful of the provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Agreement for the Implementation of 
the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, on the high seas and within exclusive 
economic zones. 
  An earlier proposal included the expression "equitable and" sustainable fisheries 
as a goal for the actions listed in paragraph 30; and subparagraph (e) included a reference 
to "the rights of coastal States‖ in the allocation of highly migratory fish stocks. Both the 
reference to equitable in the chapeau of the paragraph, and the reference to rights of 
coastal States in the high seas, was objected to by several States.
658
 It was argued, for this 
latter point, that the LOSC did not recognize any rights of coastal States in the high seas. 
After lengthy negotiation, the difficulty was settled by a package deal that included: a) 
amending subparagraph (e) to reflect the language of LOSC in article 116 - ―rights, 
duties, and interests of coastal States‖ -  and to add a reference to the special 




Another example is the IPOA IUU. Molenaar observes: 
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It is noteworthy that para. 71 of the Sydney Draft IPOA on IUU Fishing […], 
stipulated that RFMOs ―should address the issue of access to the resource in a 
timely, realistic and equitable manner in order to foster co-operation and enhance 
sustainability in the fishery''. In the October 2000 Draft IPOA on IUU Fishing 
[…], the words ―in a timely, realistic and equitable manner'' have been left out, 
although the sentence now ends with ―in accordance with international law''.
660
 
Another example is offered by the work developed by the Informal Consultation 
of the States parties to the UNFSA to agree on elements for assessing the adequacy and 
effectiveness of the Agreement, in preparation for the 2006 UNFSA Review Conference. 
During the fourth Informal Consultation, its Chairman circulated a working paper with 
possible criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the Agreement.
661
 This working paper 
included, among other, the following element: ―Fishing allocation – extent to which 
RFMOs have allocated fishing opportunities fairly and equitably‖. The Consultation 
discussed the draft assessment criteria during the next informal UNFSA preparatory 
meeting in March 2006, on the basis of a revised Chairman working paper that would 
take into account the suggestions made by the delegates and submitted in the interim.
662
 
The agreed document on ―Elements for assessing the adequacy and effectiveness of the 
Agreement‖ worded the criteria in the following terms: ―participatory rights – extent to 
which RFMOs have agreed, as appropriate, on participatory rights, such as allocation of 
allowable catch or levels of fishing effort.‖
663
  
Not surprisingly, the same debate took place during the Review Conference of 
UNFSA, where participatory rights and allocation of fishing opportunities was explicitly 
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addressed by the Conference. Delegates acknowledged that ―articles 10(b) and 11 of 
[UNFSA] provided the framework for participatory rights‖, as well as the effort 
undertaken by some RFMOs to address participatory rights and allocation issues. 
However, they noted that ―further work is needed to develop more detailed criteria for 
participatory rights, bearing in mind the importance of addressing social and economic 
interests in a manner consistent with conservation objectives.‖
664
 As a consequence, the 
Conference agreed to recommend that States, individually and collectively through 
regional fisheries management organizations,  
(...) address participatory rights through, inter alia, the development of transparent 
criteria for allocating fishing opportunities, taking due account, inter alia, of the 




Once again, the wording of this recommendation was subject to debate and 
negotiation. An earlier draft included the need to develop ―equitable criteria for allocating 
fishing opportunities‖, an expression that was later replaced by ―transparent criteria‖.
666
  
At the regional level, most RFMO Conventions do not make a reference to equity 
as either a goal or objective of the organization, or a goal or objective of the allocation 
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 The only exceptions thereto are SEAFO and IOTC, which have 
explicitly mentioned equitable utilization, equitable benefit or equitable participation in 
the preamble and, in the case of IOTC, in the normative text of their Conventions.
668
 
The lack of references to equity, and furthermore, the explicit attempt to delete 
references to equity in global instruments, may lead to the conclusion that equity was 
intentionally not considered as a fundamental norm in the high seas fisheries regime.
669
 
The opposite interpretation (i.e. to consider equitable use as a fundamental norm 
guiding the allocation process, despite the fact that it has not been considered explicitly in 
LOSC or UNFSA
670
) has been supported with reference to two arguments.
671
 One of 
them is based on the decisions in the Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of 
Germany v. Iceland) and Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland) 
cases,
672 
where the ICJ explicitly held that the States involved were ―under mutual 
obligations to undertake negotiations in good faith for the equitable solution of their 
differences concerning their respective fishery rights'',
673
 and that ―in order to reach an 
equitable solution of the present dispute it is necessary that the preferential fishing rights 
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of Iceland, as a State specially dependent on coastal fisheries, be reconciled with the 
traditional fishing rights of the Applicant.‖
674
 The ―significance of equity in multilateral 
fisheries management in general, and of allocation in particular, is also apparent in many 
other paragraphs of the Judgment.‖
675
  
A second argument arises from several regional practices that, paradoxically, 
recognized equity explicitly as a guiding norm for allocation of fishing opportunities. 
Beside the two regional agreements already mentioned above, the cases of ICCAT and 
NAFO are worth considering. ICCAT criteria for allocation of fishing opportunities states 
explicitly that ―the allocation criteria should be applied in a fair and equitable manner 
(…)‖.
676
 The work undertaken by NAFO to develop guidelines for allocation was also 
built upon a general support for the view that allocation criteria ―should reflect the 
principle of equity‖.
677
 These examples demonstrate that States assign a role to equity in 
the allocation processes.  
Scholars, on the other hand, provide wide support for the application of equity to 
high seas governance, in general, or high seas fisheries management, in particular. It has 
been noted that Molenaar supports the application of equity to high seas fisheries 
allocation conflicts. Rayfuse and Warner also identify intra-generational equity as one of 
the ―modern norms of international law‖ which conditions the exercise of the freedom of 
the high seas.
678
 Freestone, in turn, identifies sustainable and equitable use as one 




 This opinion has been reflected 
in the IUCN ten modern principles for high seas governance.
680
  
In this very obscure and contradictory description, it is hard to assess whether 
States consider equity as a fundamental principle for high seas fisheries management and 
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of allocation of fishing opportunities in particular. An explanation of these contradictory 
records may be found, however, by focusing on the different meanings of equity in 
international law provided in the previous sections.  
Indeed, the expression of ―equitable criteria for allocation‖ has been replaced by 
―transparent criteria for allocation according to international law‖ in those cases where, 
because of the context of the document and their global scope, equitable may have been 
understood as distributive justice in its re-distributive meaning. On the contrary, a 
technical concept of equity as balancing the different rights and interests according to the 
relevant circumstances of the particular case, does not create such an objection.  
In addition, scholars that consider equity as a principle to be applied to high seas 
governance or allocation of fishing opportunities consider equity in this technical sense: 
as an act of balancing the rights, interests and relevant factors of the particular case. That 
is demonstrated, for example, by the fact that the principle has been sustained in the 
references to equity made by the ICJ in the Fisheries Case. It is also demonstrated by the 
fact that scholars make a reference to equitable use or equitable utilization, which is 
widely recognized as a principle of international law. In addition, IUCN defines explicitly 




There are other legal arguments that support a role for equity in its legal meaning. 
One of them is the provision of articles 87(2) and 116(b) of the LOSC. According to 
article 87(2), the freedoms of the high seas shall be exercised by all States with due 
regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas. 
According to article 116(b), the States have the right to fish in the high seas, but a right 
that is qualified by the rights, duties and interests of coastal States with respect to, among 
others, straddling and highly migratory stocks. The provisions of ―due regard‖ and 
―subject to‖ imply an act of accommodation and balancing of the rights and interests of 
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the States (both fishing in the high seas and coastal States), which is the essence of equity 
in its legal meaning.  
The same conclusion arises from the provisions of UNFSA, in articles 7, 11 and 
24. All these provisions identify a series of ―relevant factors‖ that need to be taken into 
account in decisions on compatibility of measures within and outside EEZ, and allocation 
of fishing opportunities to new members. The consideration of all relevant factors of the 
particular case is also an element of the essence of the traditional legal notion of equity. 
For these reasons, whether explicitly stated as an objective of the allocation 
process of the RFMO or not, it can be concluded that at least prima facie, a technical or 
legal meaning of equity can be considered as a guiding principle in the allocation 
processes.  
However, this raises the question of what that implies for allocation processes. 
What is the normative content of equity in international law? How does it constrain the 
discretion of States?  
To address these questions, the following three sections will analyze the 
implementation of three equitable principles. The first is equitable delimitation in 
maritime boundary delimitation; the second is the law of non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses; and the third is the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility. At the end of this analysis, lessons for high seas fisheries are drawn. 
Section 4. The Principle of Equitable Delimitation in Maritime  Boundary 
Delimitation  
It has been already noted that there is one significant difference between equitable 
delimitation and allocation of shared resources. The ICJ has explicitly stated that the task 
of the tribunal was related to  
(...) delimitation and not the apportionment of the areas concerned or their 
division into converging sectors. […] Delimitation in an equitable manner is one 
thing, but not the same thing as awarding a just and equitable share of a 
previously undelimited area […].
682
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Delimitation is also intrinsically linked to geographic characteristics, where 
allocation of straddling or migrating fishing resources does not have a clear, and 
permanent, geographical connection. As a consequence, delimitation of a boundary has a 
permanent character while allocation of fishing opportunities is subject to changes due to 
changes in circumstances.  
Despite those differences, the analysis of equitable delimitation is useful in the 
search for a legal principle with normative content. On the one hand, it has already been 
noted that at least some authors do not see dramatic differences between the act of 
delimitation and the act of apportionment.
683
 In addition, the method for arriving at such a 
delimitation has some similarities with an allocation process. In particular, as it is the 
case in equitable use, ―the delimitation is to be effected in accordance with equitable 
principles and taking account of all relevant circumstances, so as to arrive at an equitable 
result‖.
684
 Thus, it has been suggested that maritime delimitation law can provide some 
assistance in addressing the problem of allocation of fishing opportunities.
685
 Most 
importantly, the jurisprudence on the concept of equity in the context of maritime 
boundaries delimitation provides valuable insights into the question of normative content 
of equitable principles – and thus as equity as law. 
 
Equity with a Normative Content 
The concept of equity has played an essential role in the field of maritime 
boundary delimitation, both in the cases of delimitation of continental shelf and EEZs. 
Indeed, the LOSC provides very limited guidance on how the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries is to be effected. According to its provisions, it has to be made ―by agreement, 
on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
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International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.‖
686
 It has been the 
dispute settlement bodies which, through a series of judgments that have been considered 
as ―case law‖,
687
 have enriched the normative content of equity as a norm of law. It 
should be mentioned that this process has not been linear or uncontroversial.
688
 
Nevertheless, its general evolution and the scholar commentaries it has generated provide 
valuable insights on equity as a substantive legal standard.  
A starting point in this evolution is the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
(Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. 
Netherlands).
689
 In its judgment, the ICJ denied the equidistance rule the status of a rule 
of law,
690
 and instead declared that the delimitation of continental shelves was to be done: 
a) by agreement of the parties, and b) on the basis of equitable principles, and taking 
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account of all the relevant circumstances.
691
 In 1982, and in the light of the new text of 
the LOSC recently adopted, albeit not yet in force, the ICJ reiterated this notion in the 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) by stating that  
[c]learly, each continental shelf case in dispute should be considered and judged 
on its own merits, having regard to its peculiar circumstances; therefore, no 
attempt should be made here to overconceptualize the application of the principles 
and rules relating to the continental shelf.
692
  
The same judgment ruled that ―there was only one truly normative rule of 
maritime delimitation, namely that the result must be equitable.‖
693
  
In this construction of equity, ―a principle was equitable only if it led to an 
equitable result, which depended entirely upon the facts of the particular case.‖
694
 In the 
same line, the methods used for delimitation were only techniques which the tribunal was 
free to use or discard.
695
 While emphasizing the result of the delimitation process, the 
Court diminished the role of equity principles. In subsequent judgments, it abandoned the 
terminology of ―equitable principles‖ for ―equitable criteria‖,
696
 which in fact ―were 
analyzed as relevant circumstances.‖
697
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This notion of equity which emphasizes the result and is highly dependent upon 
the particular circumstances of the individual case, has been termed by Kolb as the theory 
of the unicum, and by Jennings as the doctrine of the equitable result. The role of equity, 
in this reasoning, is an autonomous equity acting ―at first hand‖.
698
 The notion of 
corrective equity was abandoned in favor of this autonomous equity because, as has been 
pointed out, it ―is not valid in the field of continental shelf delimitation by reason simply 




This notion of autonomous equity was severely criticized by judges, practitioners, 
and scholars alike. It was qualified as ―unstructured discretion‖, an exercise of ex aequo 
et bono, distributive justice, and incompatible with the very concept of law.
700
 Judge 
Gros, in his dissenting opinion in the Gulf of Maine case, stated: 
Controlled equity as a procedure for applying the law would contribute to the 
proper functioning of international justice; equity left, without any element of 
control, to the wisdom of the judge reminds us that equity was once measured by 
‗the Canchellor‘s foot‘; I doubt that international justice can long survive an 
equity measured by the judge‘s eye. When equity is simply a reflection of the 
judge‘s perception, the courts which judge in this way part company from those 
which apply the law.
701
  
Sir Jennings, in turn, stated that  
[t]he doctrine of the ‗equitable result‘ (…), leads straight into pure judicial 
discretion and a decision based upon nothing more than the court‘s subjective 




 States parties to disputes, in turn, have claimed that 
(...) an excessive individualization of the rule of law, which changes from one 
case to another, would be incompatible with the very concept of law. Every legal 
rule presupposes a minimum of generality. A rule which is elaborated on a case 
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by case basis rests on the discretionary power of the judge, on conciliation, on 
distributive justice – in brief, on ex aequo et bono.
703
 
This line of jurisprudence was reversed in the 1985 judgment on the Continental 
Shelf (Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya v. Malta).
704
 In this judgment, the Court ruled:  
Thus the justice of which equity is an emanation, is not abstract justice but justice 
according to the rule of law; which is to say that its application should display 
consistency and a degree of predictability; even though it looks with particularity 
to the peculiar circumstances of an instant case, it also looks beyond it to 
principles of more general application. This is precisely why the courts have, from 
the beginning, elaborated equitable principles as being, at the same time, means to 
an equitable result in a particular case, yet also having a more general validity and 
hence expressible in general terms; for, as the Court has also said, "the legal 
concept of equity is a general principle directly applicable as law (I.C.J. Reports 




Thus, as Kolb notes, the ICJ judgment asserts that there are principles that are 
equitable in themselves and could thus be used as direction-finders for the purpose of 
achieving an equitable result.
706
 These principles once again took on the character of 
legal norms, albeit highly open and flexible ones.
707
  
The equitable principles that act as direction-finders to achieve an equitable result 
have been identified by the ICJ as the following: 
a) the principle that there is to be no question of refashioning geography, or 
compensating for the inequalities of nature;  
b) the related principle of non-encroachment by one party on the natural 
prolongation of the other, which is no more than the negative expression of 
the positive rule that the coastal State enjoys sovereign rights over the 
continental shelf off its coasts to the full extent authorized by international law 
in the relevant circumstances;  
c) the principle of respect due to all such relevant circumstances;  
d) the principle that although all States are equal before the law and are entitled 
to equal treatment, ―equity does not necessarily imply equality […], nor does 
it seek to make equal what nature has made unequal; and 
                                                          
703
 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya v. Malta), Counter-memorial submitted by the Republic of 
Malta (26 October 1983) [1983] I.C.J. Pleadings (vol. 1) 58, para. 111, as cited in Nelson, supra note 692, 
at 841. 
704
 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya v. Malta), supra note 684. 
705
 Ibid, para. 45 at 39. 
706
 Kolb, supra note 587, at xxiii. 
707




e)  the principle that there can be no question of distributive justice.
708
 
In addition, the ICJ qualified the relevant circumstances that can be taken into 
account in the application of a legal concept of equity, by stating that  
[f]or a court, although there is assuredly no closed list of considerations, it is 
evident that only those that are pertinent to the institution of the continental shelf 
as it has developed within the law, and to the application of equitable principles to 
its delimitation, will qualify for inclusion.
709
 
In the process of identifying equitable principles and the relevant circumstances 
that need to be taken into account to achieve an equitable result, the ICJ moved away 




As noted by Weil, the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya v. Malta) case 
did not attempt to ―integrate principles of equity into the law has not been extended to 
methods of delimitations,‖
711
 a situation that he certainly criticizes considering that 
method permits putting equity into practice.
712
 This situation appears to be changing, 
since recent judgments have relied upon the use of equidistance to draw a provisional 




Weil, analyzing the normativity content of the concept of equity as applied in 
maritime delimitation law, states that when law of maritime delimitation contains no rule 
of law other than the ―fundamental norm‖ (or what Kolb called autonomous equity), its 
level of normativity is at its lowest. A little higher on the scale of normative density is the 
approach which includes the definition of equitable principles within the legal 
framework. And at the highest level of all, the legal field is broadened to include, in 
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As a summary, a normative concept of equity requires the definition of equitable 
principles, relevant circumstances, and equitable methods to achieve at an equitable 
result. Van Dijk, using a different terminology, arrives at the same conclusion: a 
normative content of equity requires the definition of some substantive and procedural 
criteria by which the equity standard can be objectified.
715
  
Sir Jennings, similarly, identifies three normative elements of an apparatus of 
decision according to equity: the legal rule to be applied, the appreciation of the 
particular facts, and the application of known equitable criteria relevant to those facts. He 
acknowledges that in the final stage of the decision there must be an area of judicial 
discretion.
716
 However, he highlights that ―this equitable procedure is now looking very 
different from the decision ex aequo et bono‖.
717
 A normative, or controlled, equity 
―possesses or acquires certain coherence and predictability‖
718
 which are, indeed, 
characteristic of the rule of law. 
 
The Relevant Circumstances 
It has been noted already that the application of equity in maritime delimitation 
requires to take into consideration all relevant circumstances, and that although there is 
no closed list of such circumstances, only those that are pertinent to the legal institution 
are to be considered legally relevant to that effect. Several authors, on the basis of several 
judgments, have broadly categorized circumstances that are deemed relevant. A first 
classification is usually made between geographical and non-geographical factors. 
Geographical factors are considered the primary factors to be taken into account in the 
resolution of conflicts of delimitation of areas under sovereignty or sovereign rights of 
States.
719
 Among non-geographical factors, the following are mentioned: socio-economic 
factors, conduct of parties, historic rights, security interests, navigation, environmental 
factors, and traditional livelihood.  
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 Kolb, supra note 587, at 317. 
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Because of their usefulness for the analysis of allocation of fishing opportunities, 
two of them will be addressed in more detail: the socio-economic factors, and the conduct 
of parties, or historic rights.  
 
a) The Socio-Economic Factors 
It has been already explained that the ICJ makes a distinction between equitable 
delimitation of an area already, in principle, appertaining to the coastal State, and the 
apportionment of a ―just and equitable share‖ of a previously undelimited area.
720
 The 
latter is considered an exercise of distributive justice. It has also been mentioned that the 
principle that there can be no question of distributive justice has resulted in a refusal to 
take social and economic factors into consideration in the settlement of maritime 
boundary delimitation disputes. This is the time to take a closer look at this issue. 
As a general statement, it is often said that economic factors are not considered 
relevant circumstances by the ICJ and thus, that they have no influence in the maritime 
delimitation process. However, a more precise analysis of the jurisprudence warrants a 
distinction. This distinction is based on two different contents of the socio-economic 
considerations, which Tanaka calls socio-economic factors and economic factors in a 
strict sense. The socio-economic factors include economic dependency on natural 
resources, and national economic wealth. The economic factors in strict sense include the 
existence of natural resources (such as oil, gas, and fish) in the disputed area.  
The analysis of the jurisprudence allows concluding that the ICJ has consistently 
rejected socio-economic factors as relevant circumstances in maritime delimitation 
disputes.
721
 It has been ascertained that those factors are foreign to the legal basis of the 
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 and that political and economic considerations are not proper for a judicial 
organ.
723




In contrast, economic factors in a strict sense have had a role, albeit very limited, 
in maritime delimitations. In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ accepted that, 
as far as known or readily ascertainable, the existence of natural resources constitutes a 
factor to be taken into account in a negotiation.
725
 That opinion was repeated in 
subsequent judgments.
726
 However, albeit recognizing economic factors in a strict sense 
as relevant circumstances, they actually have not been applied for delimitation.
727
 Three 
exceptions can be cited in this respect: the Gulf of Maine case, the St. Pierre and 
Miquelon case, and the Greenland/Jan Mayen case.  
In the Gulf of Maine case, the Chamber did not consider socio-economic factors 
in the operational stage of the delimitation, but did consider them during the verification 
stage when testing the equitableness of the boundary established. The Chamber verified if 
the result was ―radically inequitable, that is to say, as likely to entail catastrophic 
repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the populations of the 
countries concerned.‖
728
 The ICJ was convinced that the boundary drawn by geographical 
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criteria alone did not produce those results. However, through this a posteriori test, it 
introduced social and economic factors in the maritime delimitation process, albeit in a 
rather limited way. Equity, in this approach of the ICJ, requires a ―negative minimum‖: 
avoidance of catastrophic repercussions. In this limited way, ―the old restrictive attitude 
to socio-economic factors, feared to open an excessively wide path towards the 
redistribution of wealth, was translated into the strictly negative configuration of this new 
ex post facto test.‖
729
 
This ―negative minimum‖ was to be applied, once again, in the St. Pierre et 
Miquelon (Canada v. France) case.
730
 
A different approach was taken in the Greenland/Jan Mayen case. In this case, 
the ICJ actively adjusted the boundary so as to ensure equitable access to the important 
capelin (fish) resources. Although justified in certain particular circumstances of this 
case,
731




In summary, with respect to the role of economic and social factors in the process 
of judicial maritime delimitation, a distinction has been made between socio-economic 
factors, and economic factors in strict sense (which relate to the presence of natural 
resources in the disputed area). The position of the ICJ has been to deny a role to socio-
economic factors as maritime delimitation excludes questions on distributive justice. 
Economic factors in a strict sense have been, theoretically, considered relevant 
circumstances. It has been recognized that in practice, the sharing of resources ―cannot be 
ignored since it is in reality the heart of the matter [of maritime delimitation].‖
733
 
However, the ICJ has, in most cases, afforded these factors a very modest role in the 
adjudicatory process.  
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b) Historical Rights and Prior Uses 
In many conflicts on maritime delimitation, States have justified their claims on the 
basis of historical rights or conduct of the parties. In several cases, those rights and 
conduct were based on the development of fishing activities. That was the case, for 
example, in the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) case, the Gulf of 
Maine case (Canada v. U.S.A). The argument of the parties in those cases was to assert 
their presence in a disputed area, with the consent or at least tolerance of the other party 
to the dispute.  
In the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) case, the ICJ recognized 
the importance of the conduct of the parties as a legal circumstance. The ICJ noted that 
―historic rights must enjoy respect and be preserved as they have always been by long 
usage‖. The judgment applies the ―well established principle of the law of nations that the 
state of things that actually exists and has existed for a long time should be changed as 
little as possible,‖ already asserted in the Grisbådarna case.
734
 The Court considered it 
unnecessary, however, to make a reference to these historical rights in the operational 
part of the judgment.
735
  
In further cases, the ICJ has either disregarded historical presence in the disputed 
areas, or considered that the maritime boundary delimitation was independent, or not 
conditioned, by the findings of historical or traditional fishing regimes.
736
  
Weil argues that ―not only did the Chamber in Gulf of Maine reject the arguments of 
the parties based on their previous conduct, but it was careful to make it clear that equity 
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did not require that present exploitation practices be maintained in the future.‖
737
 In his 
view, accepting the conduct of the parties would result in including efficiency as one 
criterion for maritime boundary delimitation, in circumstances that occupation does not 
constitute a legal title.
738
 Therefore, he concludes that this ―questionable relevant 
circumstance is likely, from now on, to come into play only very exceptionally.‖
739
 
In the same line, Tanaka acknowledges a theoretical incompatibility between the 
consideration of historic rights and the ipso facto and ab initio nature of the continental 
shelf rights.
740
 However, his view is that the limited jurisprudence and the lack of general 
views of the Court in relation to the relevance of historic rights in maritime delimitation, 
joined by an unclear State practice, do leave the issue unsettled.
741
  
Section 5. The Principle of Equitable Utilization in the Law of Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses 
Equitable utilization (also referred to as ―equitable use‖ or ―equitable and 
reasonable utilization‖
742
) is a legal standard (―principle‖) for allocation of resources and 
benefits. It has been characterized as ―a maxim which implies that the use of a common 
resource by each country, while aiming in principle at optimum exploitation, must be 
compatible with the safeguard of the interests of other countries concerned, on the basis 




Equitable utilization is widely included in international law as the guiding 
principle for the use of, access to and sharing of shared resources. It has been included in 
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 Equitable and reasonable use is used here as a name for one legal standard, equivalent to equitable 
utilization. It will be explained further below that most authors considered equitable use and reasonable use 
are two different, albeit related, standards.  
743
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the UNEP Environmental Guidelines and Principles on Shared Natural Resources.
744
 It is 
also considered as a guiding principle for the allocation of radio-frequency spectrum and 
any associated orbits, including the geostationary-satellite orbit.
745
 But it is in the area of 
the law of non-navigational uses of international watercourses where the concept has 
been considered to have originated.
746
 The legal principles of law applicable in this field 
are considered as the ―archetypical‖ for the international law of shared natural 
resources.
747
 In addition, its importance in this field has been underlined by extended 




 international instruments, inter-State 
and international jurisprudence, the work and commentaries of the International Law 
Commission
750
 and the International Law Association,
751
 and considerable scholarly 
work.  
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Equitable Utilization: Theoretical Foundation 
The principle of equitable and reasonable utilization finds its legal and theoretical 
basis in the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty, widely accepted by States as the 
basis upon which the substantive rules of international watercourse have evolved.
752
 The 
doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty means that: a) watercourse States enjoy equal 
rights to the utilization of an international watercourse; and b) each watercourse State 
must respect the correlative rights of other watercourse States.
753
 The doctrine relies, 
thus, on the notion of equality of rights. As stated in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, 
each riparian State has a right to the use of the international watercourse that is perfectly 
equal to the right of any other riparian State, which excludes any preferential privilege of 
any one in relation to the others.
754
 As a consequence, no State has an inherently superior 
claim to the use of the watercourse.
755
 It has been stressed, however, that equality of right 
does not mean equal apportionment of water.
756
  
This equality not only provides an equal right to use the waters, but also imposes 
the obligation to recognize the equal sovereignties of other States. Thus, riparians have 
reciprocal rights and duties in the use of waters of international watercourses.
757
   
A consequence of the legal acceptance of the theory of limited territorial 
sovereignty is the recognition of two guiding principles for decisions on non-navigational 
uses of international watercourses, and the apportionment of water resources among 
States: the principle of equitable utilization, and the principle of no harm.  
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Both are considered part of customary international law of non-navigational uses 
of international watercourses.
758
 As such, they were included in the ―earliest complete 
formulation of this body of law‖
759
: the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of International 
Rivers, adopted by the International Law Association in 1966 (1966 Helsinki rules).
760
 
They were also included in the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-
navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997 Watercourse Convention),
761
 text 
prepared by the International Law Commission over a period of almost three decades. 
They were, as well, included in the 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use 
of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes.
762
 
In 2004, ILA reformulated the Helsinki rules, consolidating it with the various 
supplementary rules approved by the Association since 1966, and including in their 
formulation some developments in the field of international environmental law and 
international human rights law that were absent in the earlier formulation. In addition, it 
expanded the scope of the rules to address the obligations of customary international law 
that govern the management of waters within the State as well as transboundary waters 
(and including groundwater).
763
 The work was approved by the Association as the 2004 
Berlin Rules on Water Resources (2004 Berlin rules).
764
 Again, the text recognizes 
equitable utilization and the principle of no harm as substantive norms governing the 
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Equitable Utilization in International Law of Watercourses 
The principle entails recognition of the real and substantial interests of all States 
involved, and of the need to ―reconcile those interests as best they may‖.
766
 It requires, 
thus, an ―exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration of many factors.‖
767
 As 
summarized by the United States Supreme Court, it is ―a flexible doctrine which calls for 
the ‗exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration of many factors‘ to secure ‗a 
just and equitable‘ allocation.‖
768
 
A first thing that should be noted is that the standard in all these documents is the 
―equitable and reasonable use‖. For example, article 5 of the 1997 Watercourse 
Convention reads: 
Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation 
1.Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international 
watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to 
attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking 
into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with 
adequate protection of the watercourse. 
2.Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and protection of 
an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such 
participation includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to 




The terms equitable and reasonable can be considered synonyms, since one of the 
meanings of equity is ―fairness, reasonableness.‖
770
 However, most authors considered 
that the term involves two different standards: the use of international watercourses must 
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be both equitable and reasonable. While the equitable use standard looks at the quantity 
of water vis-à-vis the requirements of other States, reasonable use looks at what the State 
in question does with the water.
771
 Some authors consider that a use, in order to be 
equitable, needs to be reasonable. 
A second aspect that is important to remark is that the standard of ―equitable and 
reasonable use‖ is applicable only in cases of conflict of interests among riparian States, 
i.e., when one or more of the riparian States is not able to satisfy its needs as a result of 
another State‘s use of the international watercourse. In the absence of such a conflict, 
each State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, is entitled to use the watercourse to satisfy 
its needs without substantive restrictions. 
In this regard, it is also important to note that typically, those conflicts of interests 
will not arise simultaneously. The ―questions involving the uses of the waters of a river 
will not arise among all the coriparian states at a particular point of time. On the contrary, 





The Content of Equitable Utilization 
Is has been noted that equitable utilization requires an act of balancing the rights, 
interests and other relevant factors in the decisions on the non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses. International law provides some guidance on what the 
relevant actual circumstances may be. The 1997 Watercourse Convention includes a non-
exhaustive list of factors that shall be taken into account while determining equitable and 
reasonable use in accordance with article 5. The factors in article 6 are the following: 
(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors 
of a natural character; 
(b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned; 
(c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State; 
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on 
other watercourse States; 
(e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse; 
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(f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water 
resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect; 
(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or 
existing use. 
The 1966 Helsinki rules and 2004 Berlin rules also include similar factors.
773
 Neither the 
Convention nor any other document addresses the weight that each factor should have. 
On the contrary, the 1997 Watercourse Convention, following the Helsinki rules, states 
that 
[t]he weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in 
comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a 
reasonable and equitable use, all relevant factors are to be considered together and 
a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole.
774
 
This necessity of flexibility in the implementation of equitable utilization to 
particular situations is noted by all scholars. ―It seems clear that the problems of each 
river are normally unique and general rules are valid only insofar as they are feasible in 
the particular situation.‖
775
 McCaffrey even suggests that the indicative lists of factors in 
the Helsinki Rules and the 1997 Watercourse Convention are ―neither exhaustive nor 
even necessarily fully relevant. Everything depends upon the unique characteristics of the 
case at hand.‖
776
 This approach to equitable utilization resembles the theory of the 
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unicum that, according to Kolb, prevailed in the maritime delimitation case law during a 
time of the evolution of the legal standard.
777
  
Not surprisingly, this lack of guiding rules for the balance of different relevant 
factors has been criticized. Bourne states that  
[t]he substantive law on the utilization of the waters of international drainage 
basins is defined in the vague language of the doctrine of ‗equitable utilization‘ 
and offers little guidance to states on how they may proceed lawfully with the 
utilization of these waters in their territories. 
In the same line of thought, Hey, commenting on the 1997 Watercourse 
Convention, concludes that it ―leaves watercourse states with the situation in which they 
are to balance the various interests in good faith, without any significant guidance, by 
way of substantive obligations, on how such balancing is to take place.‖
778
 
Fuentes, in turn, acknowledges the importance of the circumstances of the 
particular situation in the weighting and balancing of interests. However, she also 
postulates that some general guidelines can be drawn on the role that the prospective 
relevant factors may play in the process of determining an equitable utilization of an 
international watercourse. Those guidelines, it is asserted, should be followed by States 




The Relevant Circumstances 
Fuentes identifies, in the 1997 Watercourse Convention, five different categories 
of relevant factors that are likely to be in issue in disputes concerning the utilization of 
international rivers. Those are: 
(a) the economic and social needs of the States; 
(b) existing uses; 
(c) local customs; 
(d) the efficiency of the different uses; and 
(e) the geography and hydrology of the river. 
                                                          
777
 See: previous section. 
778
 Ellen Hey, ―The Watercourses Convention: To What Extent Does it Provide a Basis for Regulating Uses 
of International Watercourses?‖ (1998) 7 RECIEL 291, at 294. In this regard, she adds that ―without the 
prioritization of certain interests, such as vital human needs and the protection of the environment, the 
result is a situation in which no substantive guidance beyond that provided by customary international law 
is available to watercourse states‖ (ibid).  
779
 Fuentes, supra note 602, in particular at 340; McCaffrey states that ―achieving equity is not an exercise 




Because of their relevance to fisheries disputes, this thesis will analyze in this section 
the circumstances listed in paragraphs (a), (b), and (e), in a different order. 
 
a) Geography and Hydrology of the River 
Article 6 of the 1997 Watercourse Convention identifies, as one of the relevant 
factors or circumstances for the determination of an equitable utilization: a) the 
geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the drainage area in the 
territory of each basin State; b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the 
contribution of water by each basin State; and c) the climate affecting the basin.
780
 
Similar factors were included in the Helsinki and Berlin rules, although the Berlin rules 
included other environmental factors as a consequence in the emphasis on environmental 
protection, as well as concepts particular to groundwater. 
The ILC considers that  
‗Geographic‘ factors include the extent of the international watercourse of each 
watercourse State; ‗hydrographic‘ factors relate generally to the measurement, 
description and mapping of the waters of the watercourses; and ‗hydrological‘ factors 
relate, inter alia, to the properties of the water, including water flow, and to its 




With respect to the weight of geographic, hydrographic and hydrological factors, 
Fuentes identifies two extreme positions that have been advocated by scholars. On one 
extreme, some scholars consider that geography and hydrology have no role to play in the 
determination of equitable utilization, need being the only factor relevant for allocation of 
water.
782
 On the other extreme, some scholars consider that geographical and 
hydrological elements of an international watercourse are the most important criteria in 
the process of allocation as they are factors creating legal rights.
783
  
The two positions relate to the unresolved issues underlying the legal status of shared 
natural resources.  
Many States and scholars view transboundary resources as being within the 
sovereignty of each State, to the extent that the resource is located therein.  There 
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have been challenges to this notion for more than two centuries, however, by those 
who have claimed that no part of a shared resource can belong exclusively to the 
individual State if the entire resource extends over the territory of several States; 
instead, the resource must be considered the common property of all.
784
  
While the first doctrine would naturally conclude that geography and hydrology are 
the main criteria for determining equitable use, the latter would deny them such a role. 
The legal consequences of qualifying an international watercourse a shared resource, 
and particularly the legal consequences over territorial sovereignty, provoked 
considerable discussion in the ILC.
785
 A reference to shared resource included in earlier 
drafts was omitted from the final text. This circumstance, joined by State practice, allows 
Fuentes‘ conclusion that geography and hydrology have a role in the determination of 
equitable utilization.
786
 However, she denies it being a prominent role based on the 
fundamental principle of equality of rights.
787
 Her opinion, supported by federal 
jurisprudence, is that the appropriate role of the above mentioned criteria should be low 
in the hierarchy of relevant factors, and limited to adjusting provisional allocation figures 
established by other criteria. Furthermore, in her opinion, that adjustment should only 





b) Prior and Existing Uses 
The 1997 Watercourse Convention includes ―existent and potential uses of the 
watercourse‖ as one of the factors and circumstances that needs to be taken into account 
while determining the equitable utilization of an international watercourse. An equivalent 
factor is included in the Berlin rules. This constitutes a partial innovation to the criterion 
included in the Helsinki rules, which emphasized past and current uses rather than 
‗potential‘ ones.
789
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Once again, different scholarly opinions exist on the weight that prior and existing 
uses deserve in the balancing act of determining an equitable utilization of watercourses. 
Some authors consider that past uses (historical entitlement) are the most important factor 
to be considered in the allocation of water resources.
790
 Most authors, however, conclude 
that affording a special protection to past uses is actually a contradiction to the principle 
of equitable utilization.
791
 McCaffrey adds that it is unsound as a matter of both policy 




Fuentes analyzes these arguments in the light of the jurisprudence in maritime 
boundary delimitation. She observes that  
[w]hat these decisions make clear is that in a dispute over access and 
apportionment of natural resources, the historic argument based on utilization of 
the resource by the parties ought to be accompanied by and evaluated on the basis 




On this basis, she concludes that existing uses as a relevant factor should not 
operate independently of the considerations of the social and economic needs of the 
parties.
794
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c) Economic and Social Needs of the States 
The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned, including the 
population dependent on the watercourse in each of the watercourse States and the 
availability of alternatives, are recognized explicitly as relevant factors in the 
determination of the equitable utilization of the international watercourse.
796
  
It has already been noted that the inclusion of socio-economic aspects does not 
transform the decision from a legal to a political one.
797
 In this respect, Fuentes makes a 
distinction between relevant and non-relevant social and economic factors.
798
 The 
concept of non-pertinent socio-economic criteria refers to the comparison between levels 
of economic development of the States concerned.
799
 As non-pertinent factors, she denies 
them a role in the legal principle of equitable utilization. The pertinent socio-economic 
factors, in turn, relate to social and economic needs of the parties in so far as the 
satisfaction of these needs depends on the use of the disputed waters.
800
 
The distinction drawn by Fuentes coincides, in general terms, with the distinction 
between socio-economic factors and economic factors in strict sense identified by Tanaka 
in the field of maritime boundary delimitation. And as in the case of maritime 
delimitation, social-economic factors in a broad sense are denied a role and considered a 
matter of world politics. Economic factors in strict sense not only are recognized as 
having a role in determining equitable utilization, but indeed are considered the most 
relevant factors to be considered in disputes concerning water use.
801
 In this respect, their 
relevance is more significant than the role played in maritime boundary delimitation. 
In this regard, it is worth mentioning a study undertaken by Aaron Wolf in which 
he described the practice of international water allocations as exemplified in 49 treaties 
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that address the question of allocation of water resources.
 802
 As a general trend observed 
during this analysis, he notes that: ―[a] tendency for a shift in positions to occur during 
negotiations, from ‗rights-based‘ criteria, whether hydrography or chronology, towards 
‗needs-based‘ values, based on e.g., irrigable land or population.‖
803
 Since this shift is 
perceived in the negotiation process, it can be justified in negotiation strategy or practical 
advantages.
804
 However, if the observed trend is accurate, it reflects the relative 
importance of social and economic needs in the allocation of international watercourses. 
 
Concluding Remarks   
Equitable and reasonable utilization is widely considered a legal standard for the 
determination of the use of an international watercourse. However, its precise content is 
open. It requires the consideration of all the relevant factors, but identification of the 
relevant factors, and how much weight they should be afforded, depend on the specific 
situation. The concept of equitable utilization thus resembles the autonomous equity 
mentioned in previous sections. 
Nevertheless, the principle relies upon some principles or doctrines of 
international law: the limited territorial sovereignty doctrine, and their corollaries of 
equality of rights of all riparian States, and correlative duties to acknowledge and respect 
the sovereign rights of other States. 
These theoretical foundations, combined with a particular analysis of the criteria 
included in the international instruments, allow at least some trends on the consideration 
of the factors. In particular, the factors that are of interest for the purpose of this thesis are 
as follows: 
a) geographical and hydrological factors may have a limited role considering the 
equality of right; 
b) prior utilization requires protection by the principle of equitable utilization, but not 
absolute protection; 
                                                          
802
 Aaron T. Wolf, ―Criteria for equitable allocations: the heart of international water conflict‖ (1999) 23 
Natural Resources Forum 3.  
803






c) socio-economic factors in strict sense, i.e. social and economic needs of the parties in 
so far as the satisfaction of these needs depends on the use of the shared waters, have 
an important, even predominant, role in the determination of equitable utilization; and   
d) general socio-economic factors, i.e. comparison between levels of economic 
development of the States concerned, has no role in the legal concept of equitable 
utilization. 
Section 6. Intra-generational Equity and the Principle of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibility 
The previous sections have analyzed t he application of equitable principles in 
cases of delimitation or distribution of resources – equitable delimitation and equitable 
utilization. In recent years, another principle rooted in the concept of equity has risen in 
international environmental law: the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility (CBDR).  
The principle of CBDR has two elements: a) common responsibility, which 
derives from the increasing interdependence and globalization of environmental problems 
and the subsequent realization that the solution to them cannot be found domestically;
805
 
and b) differentiated responsibility. 
The concept of differentiated responsibility has traditionally rested on two 
justifications.
806
 The first is the different capacity and ability of developed States to 
address the environmental problems,
807
 and the fact that the most devastating effects of 
environmental degradation are going to be felt by developing States that have the least 
capacity to prepare and adapt to them.
808
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The second justification is the bigger impact that developed countries have had on 
the environment, i.e., their contribution to the environmental problem.
809
 For some, this 
justification includes not only the negative impacts that developed States have inflicted 




Both of these arguments are reflected in principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, which 
includes CBDR as an independent, and fundamental, principle of sustainable 
development.
811
  Principle 7 reads: 
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and 
restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different 
contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but 
differentiated responsibilities.  
The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the 
international pursuit to sustainable development in view of the pressures their 
societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial 
resources they command.  
CBDR ―is based on the perception that global environmental risks have mainly 
been caused by, and should therefore be tackled primarily by, developed states‖.
812
 This 
perception legitimizes a differential treatment for developing States, differential treatment 
that is a deviation from the principle of sovereign (formal) equality among States but is 
then justified by the existence of substantive inequalities among them.
813
 As pointed out, 
this is an application of the old principle that like cases be treated alike and that 
dissimilarly situated people should be treated dissimilarly.
814
 As such, it can be seen as 
―defining an equitable balance between developed and developing States.‖
815
  
It has been pointed out, however, that the justification of CBDR, as reflected in 
the first paragraph of principle 7 of Rio Declaration, rests on contribution to 
environmental degradation and not on the socio-economic development of the State in 
question. Currently, it is widely considered that the States that have contributed to global 
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environmental degradation are developed States (i.e. the North). In other words, CBDR 
reflects today a relationship between developed and developing States. But conceptually, 
it can be the case that in the future, developing States have the bigger share of that 
contribution and thus a bigger share of the responsibility.
816
  
The practical implementation of the principle of CBDR can result in various 
forms of differential treatment. These different forms have also enjoyed different levels 
of acceptance in international environmental agreements. A first form relates to 
differential environmental standards, either in the form of exceptions for developing 
States or less stringent measures for developing States. This differential treatment can be 
drafted explicitly, but it can also result from the text allowing the consideration of other 
factors in the implementation of an otherwise generally applicable standard. That is the 




A second form is the concession of ―grace periods‖ for the implementation of 
environmental standards. Another expression of practical application of the CBDR is the 
requirement for provision of technical and financial assistance to developing States. A 
fourth form suggested as a variant of the former is to condition the implementation of 




The principle of CBDR has had recognition both in binding and non-binding 
instruments. It is explicitly recognized in the Rio Declaration
819
 and the Johannesburg 
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 Furthermore, it is identified as one of the principles of 
sustainable development.
821




The principle of CBDR has also been implicitly applied in several recent 
environmental agreements that establish exceptions for developing States,
823
 extended 
timeframes for implementation of environmental standards by developing States,
824
 or 
less restrictive conservation measures for developing States. Its relevance in binding 
instruments has been highlighted in the climate change regime, since it has been 
explicitly included in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
825
 
and the Kyoto Protocol.
826
 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the principle is not 
uncontroversial in international law. There are debates about its precise meaning, its legal 
status either as soft law or legal principle of international environmental law, the areas of 
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responsibilities to conserve and protect the environment.‖  
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CBDR in High Seas Fisheries 
The purpose of this section is to analyze if the principle of CBDR can have a role 
in the search of equitable solutions for allocation of fishing opportunities. At first sight, 
the principle seems to operate at a different level. The focus of the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibility is on the burdens, costs, and restrictions imposed by 
environmental protection. It calls those who have the bigger share of responsibility for 
environmental deterioration, and the technological and financial capacity to do so, to 
―take the lead‖
828
 in the resolution of the environmental problem (and thus bear the 
bigger burden of that solution). In contrast, the allocation of fishing opportunities is a 
case of distribution of resources, or more precisely, of the possibility of engaging in an 
economic activity and its extent.  
However, allocation of fishing opportunities can also be viewed from the 
perspective of the restriction to fishing activities that are necessary for the conservation 
of stocks and the protection of living marine resources and their ecosystem, in general.
829
 
Indeed, a quota imposes a restriction on national fishing activities that otherwise would 
not have a quantifiable limit according to international law. Therefore, the question can 
be framed as: who should ‗take the lead‘ in assuming the costs of the necessary 
restrictions in fishing activities? This perspective can be perceived more easily in cases 
where the TAC has already been established and allocated but the quota needs to be 
reduced for conservation purposes. 
A first aspect to be analyzed is whether the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility is included in the global or regional agreements on high seas 
fisheries management. A crucial aspect for this thesis is whether the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibility can be recognized as a principle guiding allocation 
decisions. Both aspects will be analyzed in turn. 
A review of the texts allows a conclusion that, although it is not explicitly 
mentioned as such, at least some of its elements are recognized in the legal framework for 
international fisheries. According to LOSC and UNFSA, all States have the obligation to 
conserve the fishing stocks and living resources from the high seas and to cooperate with 
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other States to that end.
830
 Article 17 of UNFSA reinforces that common responsibility by 
establishing that States non-members to RFMOs and which do not otherwise agree to 
apply the conservation and management measures established by such organization, are 
not discharged from the obligation to cooperate in the conservation and management of 
the relevant straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. This cooperation includes, 
according to article 17(2), the obligation to restrain from fishing for the relevant stocks. 
According to these provisions, the conservation of straddling and highly migratory stocks 
is a common responsibility. Furthermore, it can be considered a universal responsibility, 
although the application of this provision to non-parties and non-signatories to UNFSA 
may be disputed.  
Both LOSC and UNFSA also request that, in implementing the obligation of 
cooperation for the conservation of fisheries resources, consideration should be given to 
the special requirements of developing States.
831
 In the LOSC, that special consideration 
is provided: 
a) In the design of conservation and management measures for the conservation 








c) Technical and financial assistance and capacity building;834 
UNFSA, in turn, considers the special requirements of developing States in 
different provisions, and devotes a special part, Part VII, to the requirements of 
developing States. The special requirements of developing States shall be considered, 
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according to UNFSA, at three different stages. The first stage is in the adoption of 
conservation and management measures. According to article 5(b) of UNFSA 
In order to conserve and manage straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish 
stocks, coastal States and States fishing on the high seas shall, in giving effect to 
their duty to cooperate in accordance with the Convention: 
(b) ensure that such measures are based on the best scientific evidence available 
and are designed to maintain or restore stocks at levels capable of producing 
maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic 
factors, including the special requirements of developing States, and taking into 
account fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks and any generally 
recommended international minimum standards, whether subregional, regional or 
global; 
Article 24(2) adds  
In giving effect to the duty to cooperate in the establishment of conservation and 
management measures for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, 
States shall take into account the special requirements of developing States, in 
particular:  
(a) the vulnerability of developing States which are dependent on the exploitation 
of living marine resources, including for meeting the nutritional requirements of 
their populations or parts thereof; 
(b) the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by, 
subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers and women fishworkers, as well as 
indigenous people in developing States, particularly small island developing 
States; and 
(c) the need to ensure that such measures do not result in transferring, directly or 
indirectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing 
States. 
 
A second stage is the implementation, mutatis mutandis, of the principles of 
UNFSA in the conservation and management of straddling stocks and highly migratory 
stocks within the EEZs of the coastal States. Article 3(3) reads 
States shall give due consideration to the respective capacities of developing 
States to apply articles 5, 6 and 7 within areas under national jurisdiction and their 
need for assistance as provided for in this Agreement. To this end, Part VII 
applies mutatis mutandis in respect of areas under national jurisdiction. 
A third stage is through the enhancement of the developing States abilities to 




however, this participation is subject to articles 5 and articles 11 on fishing opportunities 
for new entrants. Article 25(1) paragraphs a) and b) read: 
1. States shall cooperate, either directly or through subregional, regional or global 
organizations: 
(a) to enhance the ability of developing States, in particular the least-developed 
among them and small island developing States, to conserve and manage 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and to develop their own 
fisheries for such stocks; 
(b) to assist developing States, in particular the least-developed among them and 
small island developing States, to enable them to participate in high seas fisheries 




A fourth level for the consideration of special requirements of developing States 
is in the participation, establishment and strengthening of RFMOs,
836
 and the 
implementation of the Agreement, including assisting developing States to meet the costs 




Regional agreements follow different trends in the way they address the special 
requirements of developing States. Most pre-UNFSA agreements do not have references 
to developing States.
838
 Some modern agreements, in turn, follow closely the provisions 
of UNFSA.
839
 The Antigua Convention establishes only a general provision on assistance 
to developing States.
840
 The IOTC Convention is the only text that explicitly addresses 
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It has already been pointed out that there are different interpretations on whether 
these provisions provide for a preferential allocation of fishing opportunities in the high 
seas.
842
 Some authors, based on article 25(2), conclude that the only obligation with 
respect to developing States is in the provision of financial and technical assistance and 
transfer of technology. Article 25(2) reads 
Cooperation with developing States for the purposes set out in this article shall 
include the provision of financial assistance, assistance relating to human 
resources development, technical assistance, transfer of technology, including 
through joint venture arrangements, and advisory and consultative services. 
That interpretation appears to be too narrow in light of the text of both LOSC and 
UNFSA. Firstly, article 25(2) does not limit the recognition of developing States to 
technical and financial assistance, but only States that this shall include such assistance. 
Secondly, and most importantly, that interpretation does not take into account article 119 
of the LOSC and 5(b) of UNFSA, which explicitly state that, in the design of 
conservation and management measures, States shall take into account the special 
requirements of developing States. Those conservation and management measures 
include the TAC, and, at least in some interpretations, its allocation in national quotas.  
Furthermore, article 24(2) reiterates that obligation and specifies what the special 
requirements of developing States are. In particular, it includes the ―need to ensure that 
such measures do not result in transferring, directly or indirectly, a disproportionate 
burden of conservation action onto developing States.‖
843
  
What this provision recognizes is that required conservation and management 
measures could, in some cases, imply different actual burdens for the participants. It also 
requires that a disproportionate burden shall be avoided. These provisions allow 
                                                                                                                                                                             
countries‖; and ―Recognizing, in particular, the special interests of developing countries in the Indian 
Ocean Region to benefit equitably from the fishery resources‖. In addition, article 5 establishes, as 
functions of the commission, to: ―(b) encourage, recommend, and coordinate research and development 
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Commission in the fisheries and the special interests and needs of Members in the region that are 
developing countries; and to (d) to keep under review the economic and social aspects of the fisheries based 
on the stocks covered by this Agreement bearing in mind, in particular, the interests of developing coastal 
states.‖ 
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concluding that if a required conservation measure imposes a disproportionate burden 
upon developing States, a differential treatment may be necessary.  
The question that follows is: disproportionate in respect to what? In the theoretical 
foundation of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, the sources of 
that differentiation can be either the difference in capacity, or the difference in historical 
responsibility, i.e., the contribution to the environmental problem. It seems that the lack 
of capacity is considered as a source of differentiation in UNFSA. This is implicit in the 
requirement of article 25 to provide developing States with financial and technological 
assistance, transfer of technology, as well as assistance to enhance their human resources. 
But lack of capacity can also be interpreted in a wider sense. On the basis of article 24, it 
can be interpreted that a lack of capacity exists in cases of vulnerability of developing 
States and their population. Thus, a burden can be disproportionate either because it 
imposes costly arrangements that developing States are not in a position to afford, or 
because the social, economic, or cultural impact of the conservation measure demands a 
much higher sacrifice than the measure demands of developed States. 
With respect to the second source of differentiated responsibility—the historical 
responsibility—the situation is different. There is no reference in UNFSA, in the regional 
agreements, or in the allocation criteria, that imply historical responsibility of traditional 
fishing States in the over-exploitation of a stock, much less in connection to allocation of 
fishing opportunities.
844
 Thus, the fact that past fishing patterns were unsustainable 
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The interpretation that the principle of CBDR should be applied in the allocation 
decisions, based on the vulnerability of some States, seems to be sustained in the specific 
allocation criteria considered by some RFMOs. The SPRFMO and WCFPC Conventions 
include, among their allocation criteria, references to the needs and aspirations of 
developing States in the region, in particular small island developing States and territories 
and possessions; and the particular interests of developing coastal States. ICCAT 
guidelines also make explicit reference to ―the interests of artisanal, subsistence and 
small-scale coastal fishers‖ and ―the socio-economic contribution of the fisheries for 
stocks regulated by ICCAT to the developing States, especially small island developing 




CBDR in Practice 
An analysis of current practices in RFMOs supports a conclusion that the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibility has had practical applications in 
allocation exercises through various forms of differential treatment. In particular, RFMOs 
have often adopted the practice of establishing exceptions to conservation and 
management measures limiting fishing effort or catches, and differentiated levels of 
fishing restrictions.  
A common practice, and usually the first step, towards allocation is to limit 
fishing mortality by limiting the fishing effort and/or catches of participating States to the 
level of a certain reference point. This ‗freezing‘ of the fisheries activities is not an 
explicit allocation. It involves, however, an implicit allocation recognizing current 
catches as a baseline, and thus entitlement as primary principle for distribution.
847
  
Often, measures limiting fishing effort or catches have exceptions or differential 
(less restrictive) rules for some category of States. These exceptions or differential rules 
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apply usually either to (fishing or coastal) States with low catches,
848
 to States whose 
catches have one particular use,
849
 or to coastal States.
850
 The differential treatment can 
consist of either an exception to the restrictions on fishing,
851
 or a fishing restriction that 
nevertheless allows for some development of the fishery.
852
  
The technique of differential treatment has also been used in cases where an 
allocation has been agreed to, but adjustments to the TACs require a revision of national 
allocations. According to the principle of formal equality, the reductions (or increases) 
should be equal for all participants. However, in many cases, the adjustments have a 
differential component to protect vulnerable fishing sectors (either developing States, or 
coastal communities particularly dependent upon fisheries).
853
 This differentiated 
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Section 7.  Lessons for International Fisheries Law 
The previous chapters have described how the international community is in 
search of a framework for allocation of high seas fishing opportunities that is equitable, 
transparent, and predictable. This chapter has analyzed the role that a legal concept of 
equity can fulfill in that search. From the analysis of the legal concept of equity, and the 
implementation and evolution of equitable principles (equitable delimitation – equitable 
utilization - CBDR) in other areas of international law, some observations can be made in 
relation to allocation of fishing opportunities. These observations are presented in three 
separate sections, following the different levels of normativity of the concept of equity. 
Thus, the first group of observations relates to the applicability of equity as a 
fundamental norm to guide allocation decisions. The second group of observations 
addresses the normative elements of the substantive concept of equity, or controlled 
equity, in high seas allocation frameworks. Finally, the third group of observations 
analyzes some of the normative elements of the concept of equity, and particularly 
equitable principles and relevant circumstances, as developed in other areas of 
international law, and their applicability to the distributional conflicts identified in 
chapter 3. 
This third group of observations is necessarily a tentative exercise. It is tentative, 
firstly, because the areas of international law that have been examined are limited. 
Secondly, the conclusions that can be drawn from the implementation of equitable 
principles and the different categories of relevant factors are more aptly defined as trends 
in an evolutionary process. Thirdly, the analysis has to take into account the different 
features of the analyzed fields of international law. 
In this respect, it is worth making the main differences explicit. A first difference 
relates to the nature of the exercise: establishing a geographical or spatial boundary is 
different from apportioning a common resource. The ICJ has already pointed out that 
                                                          
854
 The rule of paragraph 35 of the WCPFC CMM 2008-01, supra note 848, for example, was established 
considering the interests of the USA. See T. Aqorau, ―Current legal developments: Western and Central 




difference. This difference has consequences both in the role of geographical factors in 
the delimitation and allocation process, as well as in the stability of the solution. While 
delimitation is a permanent decision, the allocation of water or fish resources may, and 
indeed should be, revised periodically.  
Another important difference relates to the number of participants. In the case of 
maritime boundary delimitation and water allocation conflicts, the number of 
participating States is limited and defined by geography. That is not the case in 
international fisheries, as a consequence of the principle of freedom to fish in the high 
seas. The number of participants in the allocation of fishing opportunities is undefined 
and, if not unlimited, at least clearly inconsistent with the renovation capacity of any fish 
stock. 
 
The Applicability of Equity in International Fisheries 
It has been noted in this chapter that States have a general reluctance to make 
references to equity in the context of the high seas fisheries regime. The main 
Conventions and non-binding instruments adopted by the international community do not 
make explicit references to equity in the context of high seas fisheries. Furthermore, in 
several cases explicit references to equity were deleted from earlier drafts.  
Two related reasons can explain this reluctance. The first reason is that traditional 
high seas fishing States want to maintain the ―first-come first-served‖ principle regulating 
access to high seas fisheries. It has been noted, indeed, that many authors consider the 
absolute protection of prior uses as incompatible with equity. The second reason may lie 
in the different meanings of equity in international law. States avoid making references to 
equity in documents that, due to their scope and forum, may be interpreted as calling for a 
re-distribution of the resources of the ocean.  
Nevertheless, this does not preclude the application of equity understood in its 
classical meaning, i.e., as the act of balancing the interests and rights of States and other 
relevant circumstances of the particular case. Several legal arguments, some State 
practice, and scholarly opinions support this interpretation. 
Equity in international fisheries law has the character of autonomous equity. 




any rule of law or fundamental norm governing the allocation of fishing opportunities. 
Thus, equity would act as such a fundamental norm, and not as an equitable correction of 
a rule of law.  
Autonomous equity, however, has been criticized as a discretionary concept with 
no normative content. It does not, so it is argued, restrict the discretionary powers to 
decide on what is equitable, and therefore opens a door for unpredictability and 
inconsistency. Therefore, the application of a legal concept of equity requires providing 
the concept with some normative content. 
 
Constructing a Normative Content of Equity  
Maritime boundary delimitation law provides valuable lessons for the 
construction of an equitable standard with normative (i.e. legal) content. A normative 
concept of equity consists of equitable principles, relevant circumstances, and equitable 
methods. These elements constrain the discretion of the decision-maker and allow greater 
transparency, objectivity, and predictability in the process of achieving an equitable 
result. 
It is useful to compare the developments of the standard of equitable delimitation 
and utilization against the limited developments in international fisheries, to assist the 
construction of a normative framework for allocation of fishing opportunities. The global 
fisheries instruments, and for a large part also the regional regimes, provide for just one 
of the elements identified in maritime law as pertaining to a normative concept of 
equitable utilization: relevant circumstances. ―Relevant circumstances‖ in international 
fisheries are called ―allocation criteria‖. By focusing exclusively on identifying these 
criteria, the international community and the regional regimes have neglected the 
development of equitable principles and equitable methods, which provide the special 
circumstances and the process as a whole with purpose and direction to achieve an 
equitable distribution. In other words, it has failed to provide those with decision-making 
powers with any substantial guidance on how to balance those special circumstances.  
In relation to maritime delimitation, Weil makes the following remarks regarding 




It follows from this that relevant circumstances must always be taken into 
consideration. But it also follows that (…) they (…) do not constitute a self-
sufficient factor in delimitation.  
It is important to note that the facts do not dictate the solution (…) Facts are 
silent. What is equitable? What is not? By themselves, the facts have no answer to 
these questions. Only human judgment can fulfill this task. The consideration and 
balancing-up of relevant circumstances are deliberate legal acts. They presuppose 
what might be called a philosophy of equity. (…) This philosophy is expressed by 
equitable principles. 
The concept of equitable principles implies a judgment on these elements of facts 
and a particular view of the purpose of the delimitation. Relevant circumstances 
are nature‘s gift. Equitable principles exist on the level of value judgments. They 
are man-made. 
(…) relevant circumstances and equitable principles go hand in hand (…). In 
short, equitable principles acquire substance only by reference to the relevant 
circumstances in the case, and the relevant circumstances in the case operate only 
with the help and in the context of equitable principles.
855
 
Although RFMOs, for the great extent, have not explicitly identified equitable 
principles that can act as direction-finders of equitable solutions, it should be noted that 
two organizations have taken some steps in that direction. ICCAT is the organization that 
has taken the most steps towards identifying ―considerations‖ that can act as direction-
finders, in a way similar to the way in which equitable principles act as direction-finders 
in maritime boundary delimitation law. According to ICCAT‘s Resolution 2001-25, the 
allocation criteria should be applied by the relevant Panels on a stock-by-stock basis; they 
should be applied in a fair and equitable manner with the goal of ensuring opportunities 
for all qualifying participants;  they should be applied to all stocks in a gradual manner 
(…) in order to address the economic needs of all parties concerned, including the need to 
minimize economic dislocation; they should be applied so as not to legitimize illegal, 
unregulated and unreported catches; they should be applied in a manner that encourages 
cooperating non-contracting parties, entities and fishing entities to become contracting 
parties, where they are eligible to do so; and they should be applied to encourage 
cooperation between the developing States of the region and other fishing States for the 
sustainable use of the stocks. 
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 Another, rather different, example is offered by the WCPFC. In 2008, the 
organization adopted a non-binding Resolution on the Aspirations of Small Islands 
Developing States (SIDS) and Territories.
856
 According to this resolution, contracting 
parties and cooperating non-contracting parties ―commit to achieve the goal of ensuring 
that by 2018, the domestic fishing and related industries of developing States, in 
particular, the least developed SIDS and Territories, accounts for a greater share of the 
benefit than what is currently realized of the total catch and value of highly migratory 
fish stocks harvested in the Convention Area.‖
857
 This measure appears closer to a policy 
objective for distributional justice, rather than an equitable principle emerging from the 
legal framework. However, it reflects what the parties consider equitable considering the 
specific situation of the WCFPC. And as a policy objective, it provides at least some 
guidance on how to allocate fishing resources in the future. 
 
The Allocation Conflicts in the Light of the Experience of Other Fields of 
International Law 
 This last group of observations attempt to analyze some of the elements of a 
normative concept of equity, as developed in other fields of international law, to shed 
some new light on the conflicts of allocation of fishing opportunities described in chapter 
3. In particular, the potential role of some equitable principles identified in maritime 
delimitation law and the law of international watercourses, and the role and relevance of 
different categories of relevant factors, is taken into account. The purpose is not to 
―solve‖ the distributional conflicts, but to identify aspects and trends to be taken into 
account in the construction of a normative framework of equity. 
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a) The EEZ/High Seas Distributional Conflict in the Light of Other Experiences 
The EEZ/high seas distributional conflict can be analyzed in light of the experiences of 
maritime boundary delimitation and international law of watercourses. Of particular 
interest is the consideration of the relevant circumstances related to features of nature 
rather than man-made: geography, hydrography, hydrology, and distribution of the 
stocks.  
In the case of maritime boundary delimitation, geography is a predominant relevant 
circumstance. The focus on geography is a logical consequence of the nature of the 
process. Firstly, the objective of maritime boundaries is precisely to define areas of 
jurisdiction over the oceans. Secondly, the legal source of the powers that the State can 
exercise in the marine areas is the land.
858
 Therefore, ―geographic considerations inspire, 
if they do not dictate, most delimitations.‖
859
  
The case of international watercourses presents, in this respect, more similarities with 
international fisheries for straddling and highly migratory stocks. In both cases, the 
boundaries of areas under different jurisdiction are identified; but the object of 
distribution moves across boundaries. It has already been pointed out that, in the case of 
the law of international watercourses, there are different interpretations with respect to 
the role of geographical, hydrographical and hydrological factors. While some consider 
that it is the most important factor, since it derives from the legal title of sovereignty, 
others consider that it does not enjoy such preference because the waters of the 
international watercourse are a common resource for all States on the basis of State 
equality. 
This particular distributional conflict can be revisited in the light of equitable 
principles identified in previous sections. Particularly relevant are the principle of 
sovereignty, proportionality, the principle that equity does not seek to make equal what 
nature has made unequal, and the principle of equality. They are addressed in turn. 
Respect for national sovereignty is one of the pillars of international law. As such, it 
has influenced the legal framework of international watercourses. Indeed, the legal 
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framework is constructed on the basis of the theory of (limited) sovereignty of the States. 
The theory of a ‗community of interests‘, also proposed as a theoretical foundation, has 
not been followed by States.
860
 That is demonstrated also by the ILC lengthy debated on 
the use of the term ‗shared resources‘ in law of international watercourses, and its 
potential implications for national sovereignty. It was based on the respect to national 
sovereignty that the term was dropped from the final document. 
The importance of sovereignty is also latent in the evolution of the law of the sea, in 
general. Its importance is evident in the extension of maritime jurisdictions. And it is also 
present in the establishment of TACs and allocations.  As it may be remembered from 
chapter 2, in the origin of TACs and allocations, this measure had as one of its 
justifications the respect and protection for the sovereign rights of States. They were 
implemented so as to allow States to pursue their own economic and social objectives, 
without being affected by the behavior of the other States over a common resource.  
Thus, an international regime should respect the sovereign rights of States. The 
question is: how should that respect be reflected in the allocation of fishing 
opportunities? There are two arguments supporting that the respect should be based 
mainly on the application of the criterion of zonal attachment for distribution of resources 
between EEZ and HS. 
A first argument is the principle of proportionality used in maritime boundary 
delimitation. The principle of proportionality reflects the need that the maritime space 
adjudicated to each State is proportional to the coast length, being the coast length what 
provides the basis of the title for that maritime space. Applying the same legal reasoning, 
the proportionality in allocation of straddling and highly migratory stocks would require 
that the distribution of TAC between EEZ and high seas would be proportional to the 
presence of the relevant stock in each area, since it is the area (EEZ) and not the stock 
that provides the basis of the legal title.  
The second argument lies on the principle that equitable use does not seek to make 
equal what nature has made unequal. Thus, an equitable allocation of fishing 
opportunities shall not compensate for a presence, or absence, of distribution of the 
relevant stock in a particular side of the man-made boundary. 
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It has been noted that Fuentes considers that the geographic and hydrologic criterion 
in the application of equitable utilization of international watercourses, albeit having a 
role, should not be a predominant factor. This opinion is based on the perfect equality of 
rights among participating States, perfect equality that in turn derives from the national 
sovereignty. Whether one shares this argument for the law of international watercourses 
or not, it should be noted that the perfect equality of States in the distribution of high seas 
fishing opportunities between EEZ and high seas can be questioned. Albeit all States 
have a right to fish, the title for that right is not equal. The coastal State has a right to fish 
that derives from a sovereign right, while the right to fish of DWFNs derives from a 
freedom to fish in areas where no spatial and exlcusive jurisdiction is exercised. This 
difference in the legal title, it can be argued, allows also making a distinction in the 
allocation process. 
The particular relevance of zonal attachment as a criterion for the distribution of 
fishing opportunities between EEZ and high seas appears to be confirmed by State 
practice. In the case of straddling stocks, zonal attachment has been always a determinant 
factor in the allocation of fishing opportunities. It appears, as well, that its importance is 
increasing. Evidence thereof is, for example, the sharing agreement for cod, haddock and 
yellowtail flounder on Georges Bank, proposed by the Gulf of Maine Transboundary 
Management Guidance Committee and accepted by the fisheries administrations of USA 
and Canada in 2001.
861
 The sharing agreement considered a gradual shift (over a period 
of 8 years) from an allocation key based 60% on the distribution of the stock, and 40% on 
historical catches, to an allocation key that considered each criterion on a 90% and 10% 
basis, respectively.  
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Table 10. Weighting of resource distribution v. historical landings (express in 
percentage) in the sharing agreement adopted by the Gulf of Maine Transboundary 
Management Guidance Committee on December 2001 




60/40 60/40 65/35 70/30 75/25 80/20 85/15 90/10 
 
This agreement governs the allocation of transboundary resources within the EEZs of 
two coastal States. However, it reflects a preference for a neutral and objective criterion 
that can be also applicable in the distribution of stocks between the areas of EEZ and the 
high seas.  
In the case of highly migratory stocks, and as has been pointed out already in chapter 
2, the zonal attachment was initially not considered a relevant criterion and today its 
applicability is, in practice, limited. However, it should be noted that its initial exclusion 
in tuna RFMOs was influenced by one particular historical factor that no longer holds 
relevant.
862
 Currently, the trend in tuna RFMOs is also to give broader recognition to the 
distribution of the stocks in the allocation of fishing opportunities. A clear example 
thereof is the ICCAT Criteria for the Application of Fishing Possibilities, which 
explicitly includes the following criterion: ―the occurrence of the stock(s) in areas under 
national jurisdiction and on the high seas.‖
863
 Even more remarkable were the opinions of 
many States after the adoption of the non-binding criteria. The inclusion of this criterion 
was widely considered as recognition of the legal rights of the coastal States, and it even 
removed the practical and legal impediments of some coastal States to become parties to 
ICCAT. Thus, the interpretation and expectation of States is that the distribution of the 
stock shall be a significant factor in the distribution of fishing opportunities.  
The preference for zonal attachment criteria can be found not only in the fact that it 
respects sovereign rights of coastal States, but also in that it is a neutral and objective 
criterion. This neutrality has also been one consideration for the preference for physical 
geography in maritime boundary delimitation. It has been argued, however, that the value 
of the criterion is diminished because the migration patterns are unknown, uncertain, or 
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variable. This is held particularly in respect to highly migratory stocks. This uncertainty 
and variability may arise because of the characteristics of the migration patterns, or 
because of insufficient scientific knowledge. Despite the reasonableness of this argument, 
both circumstances can be taken into account explicitly and objectively in the 
determination of the role of the criterion in the allocation process. The more uncertain or 
variable the migration or distribution patterns, the less weight that should be given to this 
criterion. As a consequence, it would need to be supplemented by other criteria. This can 
be either on a permanent or temporary basis, until scientific knowledge is acquired and 
adjustments can be made. 
A particular aspect that should be analyzed, in the applicability of the criterion, are 
the situations where the stock is fully exploited, but the coastal State has not developed 
the fishing capacity to catch its proportion of the quota.
864
 In these cases, the fishing 
activities of the coastal State do not represent its theoretical share of the stock according 
to the distribution of the stock; but any adjustment to its national quota will imply a 
sacrifice by DWFNs. This situation, in turn, may arise for two reasons: because the 
coastal State attempts, not to fish its quota, but to give access to the TAC surplus in its 
EEZ; or because the coastal State aspires to fully develop its fishing capacity.  
There are three theoretical responses to these questions: a) it can be decided that the 
coastal State shall be allocated its share in any case, leaving to the coastal State the 
possibility to afford access to its EEZ and quota to DWFNs; b) it could be decided to 
allocate a share according to distribution of the stock only when the coastal State is 
developing its own fishing capacity (and as a consequence, the share of DWFNs shall be 
reduced); or c) it could be decided that the national quota of the coastal State cannot be 
accommodated if it implies a reduction of the share of DWFN.  
The latter response should in principle be rejected as contrary to the equitable 
principles identified above. A further analysis that could be introduced, to answer this 
question, is the assessment of the new activities by a coastal State according to standards 
of reasonableness. This aspect will be addressed further below. 
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b) Historical Catches, Intergenerational Equity and New Participants  
Historical catches play a considerable role in the allocation of fishing opportunities in 
the high seas. It has been the predominant allocation criterion since its inception, and it is 
the main criterion used today.
865
 The ―first-come first-served‖ or ―first in time, first in 
right‖ philosophy seems to have been, and in many respects still is, the predominant 
philosophy for high seas fisheries. 
According to international law, historical rights or prior uses deserve legal protection. 
As noted above, the Permanent Court of Arbitration considered a ―well established 
principle of the law of nations that the state of things that actually exists and has existed 
for a long time should be changed as little as possible.‖
866
 The ICJ has reaffirmed this 
principle by stating that ―historic rights must enjoy respect and be preserved as they have 
always been by long usage.‖
867
  
The historical rights or prior uses that are offered legal protection are, however, uses 
that exist now and have existed for a long time. Without doubt, the requirement of long 
usage is warranted in the cases of maritime delimitation because their effect is to 
establish the legal basis for a claim to sovereignty or sovereign rights. Nevertheless, the 
requirement that prior uses have existed for long time is also warranted by the 
justification of this protection: to protect the stability of situations.  
Furthermore, as Fuentes notices in relation to non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses, the prior use is a demonstration of socio-economic dependency. As a 
consequence, she asserts that legal protection is afforded to prior uses inasmuch as they 
are reflections of such dependency. This interpretation seems to have support in the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case.
868
 The case involved the 
unilateral extension of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction by Iceland in an area where, 
according to the judgment, international law recognized only a preferential right of the 
coastal States. In the Fisheries case, the court acknowledged the need to balance the 
preferential rights of coastal States with the concurrent rights of other States, 
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and particularly of a State which, like the Applicant, has for many years been engaged 
in fishing in the waters in question, such fishing activity being important to the 
economy of the country concerned. The coastal State has to take into account and pay 
regard to the position of such other States, particularly when they have established an 




Furthermore, in the following paragraph the ICJ considered not only the long time 
that the applicant, United Kingdom, had been fishing in the area, but also the fact that its 
catches were remarkably steady, and that it constituted its main distant water fishing 
grounds for demersal species. All these elements denoted, in the opinion of the ICJ, not 
only the dependency on the fish grounds, but also an interest in their conservation.
870
  
This paragraph of the ICJ decision supports, therefore, the principle that prior uses 
deserving legal protection, or at least particular legal protection, are the uses that have 
continued for a considerable time and that have, therefore, created both a dependency and 
an expectation for the respective State. 
The analysis of the practices of RFMOs in allocation of fishing opportunities 
described in chapters 2 and 3, and in particular the use of the criterion of past 
performance or historical catches, demonstrates a rather different trend. The allocation of 
fishing opportunities tends to favour a ―short-term history‖. This is done in some cases 
directly and explicitly. That has been the case with the allocation key discussed by NAFO 
in 1969, or in the allocation keys recently discussed for the shrimp fishery.
871
 It is also 
done indirectly, by establishing recent reference periods for the limitation of fishing 
effort or fishing mortality, as discussed in earlier chapters.  
The consideration of a short-term fishing history creates wrong incentives for 
fisheries conservation, as has been analyzed in chapter 4. Indeed, in the expectation of 
receiving a bigger share, States have incentives to increase the fishing activities in the 
period prior to the establishment of a management regime that includes TAC and 
allocations. This increased short-term fishing activity is then ―protected‖ through its 
recognition and relevance in allocation decisions, even though it may have been 
deliberately inconsistent with conservation objectives.  
                                                          
869
 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), ibid, para. 62 at 27-28; similarly, Fisheries 
Jurisdiction (Germany v. Iceland), ibid, para. 54 at 196. 
870
 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), ibid, para. 63 at 28, and para. 66 at 29; similarly, 
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Germany v. Iceland), ibid, para. 55 at 197 and para. 58 at 197-198. 
871




 But in addition, the consideration of a short-term history creates wrong signals for 
equity. Indeed, the recognition of ―last minute history‖ implies that recent activities 
would deserve the same protection than activities that have been developed for decades 
or centuries. This conclusion does not follow and even contradicts the legal reasoning for 
the protection of prior uses, as understood in international law.  
A task that needs to be addressed in the construction of a normative framework for 
allocation of fishing opportunities is to determine, therefore, the requirements that 
historical catches have to fulfill to receive legal protection in the allocation process. 
Provided that prior uses comply with the requirements to deserve legal protection, the 
further question that needs to be asked is if this protection is absolute. The experience in 
other areas of international law demonstrates that historical titles or prior uses do not 
receive absolute protection. Indeed, absolute protection is, in the opinion of most 
scholars, incompatible with the principle of equitable utilization.  
The recent experiences in RFMOs allow the conclusion that allocation of fishing 
opportunities does not provide absolute protection to prior uses either. Indeed, RFMOs‘ 
recent work on allocation criteria is an attempt to move away from historical catches as a 
sole or predominant criterion of distribution. However, it should be noted that this 
attempt has mostly been related to a new approach to address the distributional conflict 
between EEZ and the high seas. With respect to high seas fishing opportunities, it has 
only been timidly raised.  
In this latter respect (i.e. the distribution of fishing opportunities for the high seas 
component of the stock), a crucial difference between the international fisheries 
management regime and other areas of international law analyzed in this chapter should 
be noted. That crucial difference is the number of potential participants in the regime. 
While in maritime delimitation and international watercourse the number of participants 
is limited and defined by natural factors, the potential number of participants exercising 
the ―freedom of the high seas‖ is, if not unlimited, at least incompatible with a 
sustainable and economically viable activity.  
In addressing this particular reality, UNFSA does not recognize the right of 
participation in the RFMO to all States, but only to States with a real interest. 




meaning. An alternative way to address this particular problem would be to address the 
problem from the perspective of legal protection of prior or historical uses. The task, 
then, would not be to positively answer what the content and conditions of ―real interest‖ 
is, but rather to answer the reverse: to which interests, and in which circumstances, does 
the legal protection to prior uses retreat.  
A few answers on this latter question can be attempted. On the basis of the arguments 
of the previous section, it can be concluded that the prior or historical do not prevail 
against the exercise of sovereign rights by the coastal States. It can also be concluded that 
prior uses do not receive absolute protection in cases of economic and social dependency 
from States fishing for the resources, and in particular from developing States in the 
region, as will be explained in the next section. In respect to other new entrants, the 
protection of prior uses should indeed be higher, albeit not necessarily absolute. A few 
guidelines can also be proposed in balancing the protection to prior uses and the 
aspirations of new entrants:  
a) New entrants shall have the capacity to perform responsible fisheries.  
b) New entrants shall qualify as such, to avoid providing quota to actors that recur to 
flags of convenience to increase their fishing opportunities in the RFMO.  
c) Limitations to new entrants shall only be applicable in case of scarcity, i.e., in 
case of conflict between new entrants aspirations and the status of the stock.  
d) States with historical entitlement shall ensure optimum and reasonable 
exploitation of the stocks. Underexploited quotas shall be re-allocated. Unjustified 
wasteful fishing activities should not be protected. 
 
c) The Developing States/Developed States Conflict: Socio-Economic Factors 
The consideration of socio-economic factors is undoubtedly the most difficult aspect 
of the normative concept of equity. Socio-economic considerations lean the concept 
towards distributive justice in its broad sense, and therefore taint the decision with 
political rather than legal considerations.  
The approach adopted by the ICJ distinguishes between relevant and non-relevant 
socio-economic factors. The social and economic development of the respective States is 
deemed irrelevant for delimitation or allocation purposes: they are a matter of distributive 




in the disputed area, on the contrary, have been considered a relevant circumstance and 
given a role, albeit limited, in maritime delimitation. A similar approach has been 
suggested for the law of international watercourses. Socio-economic development of the 
State is deemed a political consideration irrelevant for the concept for equitable 
utilization. The social and economic dependency on the resources of the particular 
watercourse, on the contrary, are considered not only relevant but, in the opinion of some 
authors, the most important criterion to be considered in the determination of equitable 
utilization. 
This approach can be compared to the provisions of the global and regional 
frameworks for allocation of fishing opportunities. As has been explained in chapter 3, 
the allocation criteria in UNFSA include explicitly socio-economic factors and the 
special requirements of developing States. In particular, they recognize:  
 Dependence of coastal States, including:   
 needs of coastal fishing communities which are dependent mainly on fishing 
for the stocks 
 the coastal States whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent on the 
exploitation of living marine resources  
 the particular interests of developing coastal States 
 Dependence of States fishing on the high seas on the stocks concerned  
 Needs and dependence of developing States, including:  
 vulnerability of developing States which are dependent on the exploitation of 
living marine resources 
 vulnerability of developing States to meet the nutritional requirements of their 
populations or parts thereof;  
 the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by, 
subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers and women fishworkers;  
 the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by, 
indigenous people in developing States, particularly small island developing 
States;  
 the need to ensure that such measures do not result in transferring, directly or 
indirectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing 
States. 
 
RFMOs Conventions and allocation guidelines, if available, also include socio-
economic factors and special requirements of developing States as factors to be taken into 




A first aspect that needs to be addressed is the nature of the socio-economic factors 
considered in the global and regional frameworks. Indeed, LOSC, UNFSA and the 
regional frameworks explicitly call to take into account the special requirements of 
developing States. Is this an aspect of the allocation of fishing opportunities that cannot 
be included in a normative content of equity? 
There are reasons to believe that that is not the case. The special requirements of 
developing States are not mentioned in isolation of any other circumstance. They are 
mentioned either in conjunction with their character of coastal State; with a particular 
dependency on the exploitation of living marine resources (including for meeting 
nutritional needs); and with exploitation patterns of subsistence, small-scale and artisanal 
fishers and indigenous populations. Thus, it is not the stage of development alone what 
deserves special consideration in international fisheries law, but the special vulnerability 
of the developing States, their population, or part thereof, based on their dependency on 
the resource managed by an RFMO. Considered from that perspective, allocation of 
fishing opportunities is again not an exercise of distributive justice but of equitable 
principles within the law. 
The next aspect that needs to be addressed is the practical implementation of socio-
economic factors in an equitable allocation. Few RFMOs have developed indicators to 
assess economic and social aspects of the fishing activities. The performance review 
panel of NEAFC, for example, expressed its frustration with the lack of focus and 
information available on economic and social benefits;
872
 and recommended that the 
organization develops an annual fisheries status report which encompasses not just 
biological factors for the fish stocks concerned but also social, environmental and 
economic performance.
873
 Mooney-Seus and Rosenberg, in turn, note that few RFMOs 
have ―well-articulated strategies for identifying and accounting for (…) socio-economic 
needs.‖
874
 Allen, as well, notes that ―[t]una RFMOs have given little attention to 
economic criteria in determining management standards‖.
875
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This ―veil of States‖ on social and economic factors probably has as one of its causes 
the fact that allocation was designed precisely to allow each State to decide and pursue 
their own social and economic objectives with independence from the international 
management regime. As a consequence of this, socio-economic data is usually not 
collected. But the issue is not only a problem of data collection but an issue that has much 
deeper implications. Indeed, allocating fishing resources on the basis of socio-economic 
criteria would entail a comparison and even prioritization of socio-economic objectives 
that, in isolation, may differ considerably,
876
 but that are also rooted in broader social and 
economic contexts. Judge Gros refers to this difficulty by stating that 
[t]o hold the balance between the economic survival of a people and the interests of 
the fishing industry of other States raises a problem of the balanced economic 
development of all, according to economic criteria, in which fishing is only one of the 
elements taken into account, and of which the bases are international interdependence 
and solidarity. (...) it is clear that differences of views on these questions do not give 
rise to justiciable disputes, since these are problems of economic interests which are 
not the concern of the Court. But the Court cannot make them disappear by refusing 




Two alternatives to deal with this difficulty can be proposed. The first is to abandon 
the State approach to define fisheries socio and economic objectives for high seas 
fisheries, and commend that task to RFMOs. The other is to give effect to the socio-
economic considerations through a more systematic use of the principle of CBDR and the 
technique of differentiation, establishing standards that reflect and take into account the 
different social and economic dependency, and in particular the special needs of 
developing States. RFMOs already have used this approach, albeit in an unsystematic 
way. Some examples have already been mentioned: exceptions to fishing effort or 
catches limitations considered in WCPFC and ICCAT conservation and management 
measures; and the differentiated ―sacrifice rate‖ required by CCSBT to one developing 
contracting member.  
Thus, differentiated treatment can be a practical tool to give effect to socio and 
economic factors (dependency, need) in allocation of fishing opportunities. The criteria 
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would not be used as a positive factor in the allocation process (which would require a 
comparison of very different social and economic objectives) but as a negative factor (in 
order to avoid disproportionate negative impacts on one State). As such, the consideration 
of socio-economic factors resembles not only the CBDR but also the test of negative 
minimum used by the ICJ in some of the few cases where socio-economic considerations 
were included in the process of maritime boundary delimitation. 
A few observations need to be made in relation to this suggestion and its implications 
for international fisheries. Firstly, it is worth mentioning that there is a difference 
between utilizing differential treatment as a means to take into account socio-economic 
considerations, and as a means of taking into account the special requirements of 
developing States. It has already been pointed out that the principle of CBDR addresses, 
at least in its current formulation, the relationship between developed and developing 
countries. However, it can be also used to address cases of strong dependency on the 
relevant fish stock, regardless of the development stage of the State in question.  
Secondly, it should be noted that the differential treatment is an exercise of corrective 
justice.
878
 It implies, therefore, that there is one or more factors that serve as primary 
allocation criteria, which application is then tempered through a differentiated restriction 
requirement for States with high dependency on the resource. This can be resisted by 
some countries, and particularly developing countries, which may consider their 
particular social and economic dependency– their need - as an entitlement factor rather 
than a correction factor.  
 
d) Other Fundamental Norms in International Fisheries Allocation 
Another aspect that is worth analyzing is the convenience of supplementing the 
fundamental norm for allocation, equity, with other norms or objectives that can facilitate 
the resolution of conflicts over scarce resources. In particular, a reference to reasonable 
use is warranted.  
It has been noted that the principle for decisions on use of an international 
watercourse is the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. While some scholars 
see these two standards as synonymous, most consider that they act at different levels. 
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While the equitable use standard looks at the quantity of water vis-à-vis the requirements 
of other States, reasonable use looks at what the State in question does with the water. In 
this sense, it is argued that an unreasonable use of the resource is, in itself, inequitable. 
A standard of reasonableness, as has been mentioned above, can be considered a 
relevant supplementary standard to assess conflicts between existing users and new 
entrants, or between coastal States and DWNFs. The protection of existing uses, or of 
potential uses, can be provided only if that existing or future use is reasonable, 
considering the circumstances of the particular case.  
A standard of reasonableness would require the identification of unreasonable, 
wasteful uses. But most importantly, it requires information on the fisheries activities 
developed by participating States. And as has been pointed out, States are reluctant to 
provide that information. This has its basis in the original justification for quota 
allocation: allowing States to use the surplus in the form they consider appropriate. 
However, in cases of increased scarcity and conflict, it can be questioned if this is an 
aspect of the fisheries regime that need, or can, be maintained. Considering that high seas 
fisheries have an international component, and that sacrifices are being made by all 
participating States, the international community and the RFMO should be entitled to 
verify that the use of the resources by the participating States is reasonable (although not 
necessarily the most efficient or cost-effective), considering the particular circumstances 
of the fishery and its participants. 
 
e) Equity as an Open Concept 
This third section has attempted to highlight some of the key aspects that need to 
be addressed in the construction of a normative concept of equity, and to shed some light 
in relation to developments in other fields of international law. It must be acknowledged, 
however, that even a concept of equity with high degree of normativity does not exclude 
a realm of discretion. Excluding it would imply establishing a rule of law, instead of an 
equitable standard that, by definition, has the flexibility to adapt to the particular 






Chapter 6. Institutional and Procedural Implications  
 
The previous chapter analyzed the allocation of fishing opportunities from the 
perspective of equity as a legal standard for allocation of scarce resources. It was 
concluded that, following the jurisprudence of the ICJ in maritime delimitation, a 
normative concept of equity requires the development of equitable principles, relevant 
circumstances, and equitable methods. This chapter addresses some of the institutional 
and procedural implications that arise from this concept. In so doing, this chapter will 
critically assess the wide consensus highlighted in chapter 2, namely, that RFMOs are the 
fora called to develop transparent allocation criteria in accordance with international law.  
For this purpose, the chapter addresses first the adequacy and need of a normative 
concept of equity in negotiated allocation processes. Secondly, it assesses the different 
institutions that, at least theoretically, could participate in the development of a normative 
concept of equity for high seas allocations. This assessment allows determining to what 
extent RFMOs are the only organizations capable of addressing equitable allocation 
frameworks. Finally, the chapter assesses the contribution of a normative concept of 
equity to transparency in the allocation process. This latter aspect also allows some 
general comments on legitimacy and good governance in RFMOs. 
Section 1. Role of Equitable Principles in Negotiated Allocations 
The normative content of equitable delimitation has been developed by and for 
judicial decisions. Decisions on allocation of high seas fishing opportunities, however, 
rest in a political forum: the regional fisheries management commissions or meetings of 
the parties. Allocations are discussed and negotiated by States through the decision 
making process of RFMOs. The first question that arises, therefore, is if a normative 
content of equity is applicable in this different setting. 
In the field of maritime delimitation, the ICJ has asserted that States are under the 
requirement, not only to negotiate in order to arrive at an equitable delimitation, but also 
to take equitable principles into account in that negotiation. The ICJ stated that 
[t]he normative character of equitable principles applied as a part of general 
international law is important because these principles govern not only 








Nevertheless, scholars have objected the idea that States are under the obligation 
to apply, in negotiated delimitations, identical rules than the dispute settlement bodies. In 
this respect, Weil states:  
States may enjoy complete contractual freedom. Courts and arbitrators, called on 
to decide on the basis of international law, do not. The judge or arbitrator, as we 
have seen, is required to find a solution which not only seems equitable to him but 
is also grounded on legal considerations. And, whereas the equity applicable to 
governments in a negotiation has a very broad, ill-defined meaning, the equity of 
the judge or arbitrator is narrowly confined infra legem.
880
 
In the same line, Kolb noted that  
[t]he parties can negotiate and compromise on their rights. Thus the equitable 
principles can be analyzed, from their perspective, as flexible obligations to be 
taken into account, indicating a general objective. Here the equitable principles 
are neither obligations of means nor, strictly speaking, obligations of result. This 
is so because the consent of the parties eo ipse brings about the result and is not 
subject to external criticism to want of equity.
881
  
According to these opinions, therefore, States are free to part from a substantive 
normative concept of equity to favor bargaining and negotiation. In other words, equity in 
the negotiated agreement does not necessarily imply a form of ―controlled equity‖, but 
equity as a form of discretion. Following this line of thought, member States of an RFMO 
would have discretion to adopt any allocation agreement they consider appropriate. This 
agreement would be reputed equitable by the sole fact that it has been agreed. In other 
words, an ―equitable‖ agreement would be the result of bargaining, and bargaining alone. 
The premise of this thesis has been, however, that a substantive and normative 
framework for allocation of fishing opportunities is useful and even necessary for 
allocation of high seas fishing opportunities. Indeed, previous chapters have described 
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how the evolution of TAC and allocation demonstrate that there is an ongoing search for 
some substantive framework or standard that makes the decision-making process on 
allocations transparent, predictable, non-discriminatory, and fair. Some reasons can be 
proposed for this perceived need.  
A first reason may be found in the multiplicity of actors engage in the bargaining 
process. In a two State negotiation, it is comparatively easier that an ad-hoc bargaining 
leads to satisfactory trade-offs for all parties involved. In a 30 State negotiation (which is 
often the case in RFMOs negotiations) such an ad-hoc bargaining may prove inadequate.  
A second reason can be found in the iterative nature of the process. Allocation 
decisions cannot be permanent because of natural variability of the fish stocks, scientific 
uncertainty, and variability in the participants. The iterative negotiation process, if done 
in conditions of ad-hoc bargaining, imposes to the participants a degree of uncertainty 
that affects the cooperative behavior and the stability of the cooperative regime. 
A third reason relates to the international character of high seas fisheries. The fish 
in the high seas are a global common, open for the exploitation of all States. It has been 
already highlighted that this freedom to fish in the high seas is qualified by the obligation 
to cooperate in the conservation of fish stocks. If the terms of that cooperation are, 
however, established by bargaining alone, again the cooperative behavior of non-
participants may be eroded. Regional cooperation is improved in respect to non-
participants if it is based on a transparent and substantive normative framework for 
distributing fishing opportunities, instead of the result of bargaining power.  
Section 2. Constructing a Normative Concept of Equity: RFMOs’ Role  
If agreed that the development of a normative content of equity is useful and 
necessary for international fisheries law, the next issue that needs to be addressed is the 
appropriate forum to develop it. Traditionally, as has been noted, the international 
community has considered that this is best done at the regional level. Indeed, it is argued, 
an equitable allocation needs to consider the particularities of each region and fish stock.  
This understanding of an equitable allocation resembles the theory of unicum 
briefly sustained, but later abandoned, in maritime boundary delimitation law. As it may 




entirely upon the facts of the particular case.
882
 The approach of the ICJ changed, 
however, towards the application of an equitable framework with normative content, a 
framework that requires a combination of elements: a) equitable principles; b) relevant 
circumstances; and c) equitable methods; to achieve an d) equitable result.  
This equity framework has different components with different levels of 
generality. Accordingly, each of them can be developed at different levels as well. While 
it has to be agreed that the fact-intensive task of identifying relevant circumstances and 
equitable methods are best suited for RFMOs (as will be addressed in further detail in the 
next section), there is no such requirement in the case of equitable principles. Equitable 
principles are, indeed,  
means to an equitable result in a particular case, yet also having a more general 
validity and hence expressible in general terms; for as the Court has also said, 




A consequence of this generality inherent in equitable principles is that their 
development is not necessarily restricted to RFMOs. This opens the door for different 
avenues that could participate in the development of equitable principles.  
Before entering into an analysis of which those organizations may be, it should be 
noted that the role of RFMOs is, nevertheless, central to a normative concept of equity 
for, at least, two reasons. Firstly, equitable principles need to be endorsed by the RFMOs. 
Equitable principles do not arise ―from any natural or logical necessity; it is the result of a 
legal choice.‖
884
 Secondly, equitable principles have a limited role in the normative 
structure of equity. Indeed, equitable principles are an element, but only one element, of 
this normative structure. Equity requires, by its own essence, the blending of the 
generalities of the principles with the particularities of the facts. This has been clearly 
explained by Weil while noting that  
(…) relevant circumstances and equitable principles go hand in hand (…). In 
short, equitable principles acquire substance only be reference to the relevant 
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circumstances in the case, and the relevant circumstances in the case operate only 
with the help and in the context of equitable principles.
885
 
As noted, the fact that a normative concept of equity has some elements that are 
of general character opens the door for the participation of other agents in its 
development. This conclusion supports some proposals of a more active role for the 
global fora in the search for a substantive framework for allocation.
886
 Theoretically 
perspective, these avenues could be global or regional; they could be public or private; 
and they could have a political or technical emphasis. 
Global fora with a strong political component are represented by instances such as 
the UN General Assembly, the Informal Consultations of the State Parties to UNFSA, the 
Review Conference of UNFSA, or the Informal Consultative Process of the United 
Nations for the Ocean and the Law of the Sea (UNICPOLOS).
887
 FAO provides a global 
fora with a stronger technical component; while the joint tuna RFMO meetings offer an 
opportunity to analyze the particular issues of highly migratory stocks.
888
  
Academia has a lot to offer in this exploration. It seems apparent that a better 
understanding of the concept and different expressions of equity for the allocation of 
scare resources, in general, and for high seas fisheries, in particular, is required.  
Independent reports, also common in recent years,
889
 may also provide valuable insights 
to this process. A current avenue is represented by the International Law Association or 
the International Law Commission, both of which have been instrumental in the 
development and codification of the law of international watercourses and the law of the 
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sea. The current work of ILA Committee on International Law on Sustainable 
Development may provide opportunities for the analysis of at least some of the 
difficulties of high seas fisheries allocation.
890
 They ILC, on the contrary, has manifested 
certain reticence to address global commons issues.
891
  
The participation of international dispute settlement bodies could also be 
considered, but the probability of allocation conflicts being resorted to third party 
settlement is likely low.
892
 However, some mechanisms to facilitate negotiations have 
been included within the structure and processes of some RFMO. Indeed, newly-
established RFMOs or revised constitutional texts have included negotiation facilitators 
— including conciliators and expert panels —in the decision-making process.
893
 
Negotiation facilitators may be instrumental for the explicit definition of substantive and 
procedural standards that a particular RFMO needs to take into account when deciding on 
allocation of fishing opportunities.  
Another avenue is the work of performance review panels. Review panels are 
usually given the task to assess the extent to which an RFMO is adopting compatible 
                                                          
890
 The objective of the Committee is to study the legal status and legal implementation of sustainable 
development. For this purpose the Committee‘s mandate includes: (i) assessment of the legal status of 
principles and rules of international law in the field of sustainable development, with particular reference to 
the ILA New Delhi Principles (now also published as UN Doc. A/57/329), as well as assessment of the 
practice of States and international organizations in this field; (ii) the study of developing States in a 
changing global order, particularly the impact of globalization on the sustainable development 
opportunities of developing countries; (iii) in the light of the principle of integration and interrelationship, a 
re-examination of certain topics of the international law of development, including analysis of a. the 
position of the least developed countries in international law; b. the right to development, and; c. the 
obligation to co-operate on matters of social, economic and environmental concern‖ (ILA, First Report of 
the International Committee on International Law on Sustainable Development, Berlin Conference 2004, 
online: ILA <http://www.ila-hq.org>). 
891
 The topic of shared resources was proposed for the long-term working program of the ILC in 2000. The 
proposal restricted the scope to resources shared within jurisdictions of 2 or more States, since 
―environment and global commons raise many of the same issues, but a host of others as well‖ (ILC, 
Report on the work of its fifty-second session , 1 May-9 June and 10 July-18 August 2000, Supplement No. 
10 (A/55/10), Annex, Syllabuses on topics recommended for inclusion in the long-term programme of 
work of the commission, Annex 3 Shared natural resources of states (Robert Rosenstock), at 141, oline: 
ILC <http://www.un.org/law/ilc>). 
892
 For an analysis of the different interpretations on the application of compulsory settlement of disputes to 
conflicts over management of straddling and highly migratory, see: Oude Elferink, supra note 357, at 598–
602. 
893
 The SEAFO Convention considers, at the request of any member State, the intervention of an ad-hoc 
expert panel in case of objections to any conservation and management measures. In this case, the ad-hoc 
expert panel can make recommendations on interim measures only. (SEAFO Convention, article 23.1 
subparagraph g). The WCFPC Convention considers the possibility of appointing a conciliator for the 




conservation measures, the extent to which the RFMO agrees on the allocation of 
allowable catch or levels of fishing effort, and the extent to which the RFMO provides 
fishing opportunities in accordance with article 11 of UNFSA.
894
 In performing their 
mandate, the expert and independent panelists may also provide a useful platform for the 
definition of some explicit guidelines. 
Table 11. Institutions potentially involved in the development of equitable principles for 
allocation of high seas fishing opportunities 











UNFSA Review Conference 


















Meeting of Tuna RFMOs 
Review panels 




Each of these fora has something to offer to the process of giving equity a 
normative content to allocation of high seas fishing opportunities. International 
organizations at the global level have the advantage of creating a political momentum for 
development, as has been the case for several issues in high seas fisheries, not to mention 
other fields. Clear examples thereof are the UNGA Resolutions on large-scale pelagic 
drift-net fishing and its impact on the living marine resources of the world's oceans and 
seas,
895
 and the protection of deep sea vulnerable marine ecosystems in the high seas.
896
 
Technical fora would have the advantage of their expertise and impartiality. Regional 
initiatives would have the advantage of addressing concrete situations in a more 
pragmatic way. If proved successful, the solutions may then be adopted by other 
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Although all these organizations and mechanisms could potentially participate in 
the definition of equitable principles, as one element of a normative concept of equity for 
high seas allocation, the real issue is which of these organizations or mechanisms is in a 
practical situation to do so. In this regard, it should be recalled that the processes for 
development of allocation criteria in NAFO and ICCAT revealed the interests of many 
States to maintain the status quo. This incentive has also been reflected in the complex 
relationship between allocation and conservation, as explained in chapter 4 on 
intergenerational equity. In that scenario, State-led global fora are probably not 
promissory avenues.  
In other areas where change was also resisted by at least some States – and 
particularly the conservation agenda – the efforts of environmental non-governmental 
organizations (ENGOs) have been fundamental for progress in legal frameworks and 
regional practices.
898
 However, ENGOs have not intervened in the distributional 
problems of RFMOs, limiting themselves to point out the negative environmental 
consequences of current allocation practices that have been extensively described in 
chapter 4. 
It is apparent that, for the reasons described above, the introduction of equitable 
principles and procedures to high seas fisheries allocation is not currently, and is not 
likely to be in the near future, on the agenda of most of these organizations. Therefore, 
from practical feasibility rather than legal imposition, each RFMO remains the most 
suitable avenue to develop an equitable allocation framework that is tailored to its 
particular needs. It is, nevertheless, possible that the equitable principles and methods 
developed would then be adopted by other RFMOs, if they prove successful in avoiding 
or minimizing conflict.  
The process could, however, be assisted by scholarly work, whether general or 
directed to one RFMO or fish stock in particular. Indeed, and as has been illustrated in 
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the previous chapter, the concept of equity is evolving in international law, in 
international environmental law, and in international law in the field of sustainable 
development. The analysis of these developments, both substantial and procedural, and 
their implications for high seas fisheries, may contribute in the ongoing search for 
equitable and transparent allocation frameworks. 
Section 3. Transparency in Allocation: the Contribution of Equity 
The potential avenues to develop and propose equitable principles for the 
allocation of high seas fishing opportunities do not preclude the central role of RFMOs, 
or more precisely, their member States. RFMOs not only can participate from the 
development of those equitable principles, but they have a crucial role in two respects: a) 
they have to accept and adopt those equitable principles if they are going to translate into 
effective practices; and b) they are the only organization that can construct a complete 
substantive framework for allocation of fishing opportunities. Indeed, RFMOs are 
responsible for the blend between normativity and flexibility
899
 that is the essence of the 
concept of equity. The process of particularizing general substantive norms so that they 




Current Allocation Procedures in RFMOs 
The decision-making process in RFMOs has been extensively described 
elsewhere.
901
 It suffices to say here that decisions in RFMOs require consensus or 
qualified majority of the participating member States.
902
 In some of the RFMOs where 
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decisions are generally made by qualified majority, the Convention text requires that 
allocation decisions be made by consensus.
903
 In addition, most RFMO Conventions 
consider an objection or ―opt-out‖ procedure, by which individual member States can 
unilaterally decide not to be bound by an adopted conservation and management 
measure. These opt-out procedures may be simple or ―ring-fenced‖, i.e. subject to certain 
requirements and conditions.
904
 Only WCPFC does not consider an objection 
procedure;
905
 however, its decisions on allocation are made by consensus.
906
 
With respect to the procedure for decision-making itself, UNFSA generally 
establishes that States ―shall provide for transparency in the decision-making process and 
other activities of subregional and regional fisheries management organizations and 
arrangements.‖
907
 A similar provision is established in the FAO Code of Conduct.
908
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Recent RFMO Conventions usually consider a similar provision on transparency 
requirements.
909
 These transparency requirements can generally be categorized as 
directed towards ―external transparency‖: they address mostly participation of non-
governmental organizations and stakeholders, as well as appropriate dissemination of 
non-confidential information.
910
 Transparency in the internal processes of decision-
making is less addressed. It appears to be the opinion that the consensus-based decision-
making process of most RFMOs is sufficient warrantee of participation of, and 
transparency among, contracting parties.
911
 
However, this assumption is not necessarily warranted by practice, as can be 
concluded from the historical review of TAC and allocation negotiations, from the 
performance reviews, and from public opinion. The historical overview provided in 
chapter 2 has explained that, since its inception and to this day, decisions on allocation 
are often made in closed meetings, with the participation of head of delegations only.
912
 
In some cases, negotiation take place among a limited number of participants.
913
 In 
others, allocation negotiations have taken place outside the framework of the RFMO.
914
 It 
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also has highlighted that allocation negotiations, and particularly the data, criteria and 
relative weights used in the allocation decisions, are usually not reflected in the records 
of the meetings.
915
 Decisions on allocations are made through ―black-box processes‖ in 
which both the decision-maker and the decision-process are obscured.
916
  
It is of no surprise, then, that complaints of lack of transparency abound. Lack of 
transparency in allocation decisions has been noted and criticized during performance 
reviews. For example, the NEAFC Performance Review Panel recommended providing 
more transparency of the meetings of coastal States on allocation issues.
917
 The ICCAT 
Performance Review Report explicitly noted issues on transparency. In particular some 
complained to the panel about an unduly influence and even arbitrariness exercised by a 
limited number of important participants in the decisions on allocation.
918
 It is no surprise 





Towards Transparency: Procedural Aspects of Equity 
It seems evident that allocation decisions in RFMOs are in need of improved 
transparency. The adoption of a normative concept of equity, and one of its elements in 
particular, may provide a solid basis to achieve that objective.  
According to scholars
920
 and, arguably, recent jurisprudence,
921
 the normative 
concept of equity includes ―equitable methods.‖ Equitable methods, in maritime 
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delimitation law, is understood at the technical methodologies to draw the boundary line: 
equidistant or median line, line perpendicular to the general direction of the coast, 
prolongation of the land boundary, or thalweg system.
922
 In a first approach, and 
considering the differences in the task, it seems that a technical ―method‖ for allocation 
of fishing opportunities is indeed unnecessary. However, the issue can be viewed more 
broadly. Weil notes that: 
It would be a mistake to think that the argument about the ‗legalization‘ of 
methods boils down to the question of equidistance as the starting point for the 
delimitation operation. (…) There is no reason why there should not be rules for 
every stage of the operation.
923
 
This broader view of ―stages of operation‖ coincides with van Dijk‘s reference to 
procedural criteria in the normative concept of equity.
924
 Thus, equity requires not only 
equitable principles, but also procedural criteria or rules that operationalize those 
equitable principles in the particular situation, considering the relevant circumstances of 
the case. Procedure acts as a bridge between the abstract and general equitable principles 
and the particular circumstances of the case, establishing a clear flow of the decision-
making process to avoid ―black-box‖ processes.
925
 In so doing, the transparency of the 
decision-making process is improved.  
 
Procedure in RFMOs Allocation Frameworks: Some Examples 
A normative concept of equity, thus, contains not only equitable principles, but 
also equitable methods, or procedural criteria, which allow operationalizing those 
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equitable principles in the particular situation. The RFMOs allocation frameworks can be 
re-assessed through this perspective, then, to more accurately identify the source of their 
shortcomings. Two rather different examples of frameworks are used for this purpose: 
ICCAT allocation criteria, and the CCSBT Memorandum of Understanding. Both were 
analyzed with some detail in chapter 3.  
ICCAT Resolution 01-25 on allocation criteria contains only three criteria that 
can be considered to have a procedural character. Those criteria are the following: 
a) These criteria should apply to all stocks when allocated by ICCAT.926 




c) The allocation criteria should be applied to all stocks in a gradual manner, 
over a period of time to be determined by the relevant Panels, in order to 




With no further guidance on how the equitable principles and the relevant 
circumstances (the ―allocation criteria‖) shall be operationalized to have concrete 
expression in particular cases, it shall amount to no surprise that they are reduced to little 
more than ―a well constructed shopping list‖
929
 from which each party chooses the most 
convenient to support its national interest. The allocation guidelines would benefit, 
therefore, not only by the explicit identification of further equitable principles that act as 
direction-finders of equitable results, but also with the definition of the procedure or 
method that gives those equitable principles a concrete and objective expression in the 
decisions.  
A rather different example is given by the CCSBT allocation framework 
contained in the memorandum of understanding signed by the three original parties to the 
Convention.
930
 Although the memorandum of understanding has not been published and 
therefore their details have not been available for this research, it can be concluded that 
the memorandum has a focus on procedural aspects. It identifies landmarks to be 
achieved that trigger a certain pre-determined variation of allocations and allocation 
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 This allocation framework is, therefore, predictable, objective and transparent to 
the parties.
932
 The CCSBT memorandum of understanding, however, apparently failed in 
making explicit the equitable principles that parties considered in the design of the 
procedure. Therefore, it has not provided any guidance with respect to the allocation of 
fishing opportunities to the new actors that have entered the fishery. As such, the 
allocation framework of CCSBT has been incomplete, resulting in its adequacy to 
address the particular allocation challenges of this organization.
933
 
These two examples show that, albeit not sufficient in themselves, the explicit 
description of procedural aspects in the allocation frameworks is desirable and even 
necessary to increase normativity, and thus predictability and transparency, of the 
allocation decisions. Those procedural aspects may vary from case to case, thus no one 
particular procedural framework can be proposed. However, it is possible to suggest 
some of the aspects that RFMOs may tackle in the development of procedural aspects of 
equitable allocation. These may include, are inter alia: 
a) the precise scope of relevant circumstances  
b) the objective measurement of the relevant circumstances 
c) a time frame for submission of data and its analysis 
d) the sequential or simultaneous application of allocation criteria 
e) the organs or groups in charge of the different steps of the procedure: in this 
respect, it may be worth considering if the relevant data should be gathered, 
compiled and analyzed by a ―fact-finding group‖ or even external consultant. It 
may also be considered, as suggested by Willock and Lack, to resort to arbitrated 
negotiation or an advisory panel of external experts ―in order to facilitate a more 
transparent and focused discussion‖.
934
  
f) the timeframe for revision of allocations935 




 The transparency of the Memorandum was not sufficient to ease the allocation problem, though. The 
parties had serious differences regarding the status of the stock and, thus, the allowable catch. These 
differences led to an arbitration process that was later dismissed because of lack of jurisdiction. See: 
Butterworth and Penney, supra note 15, at 176-181.   
933
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g) a time frame for the re- assessment of the allocation framework itself. 
Some of the proposals for the allocation problem made by scholars and 
practitioners are also oriented to method or procedure and can be considered by RFMOs 
in this context. One of those suggestions is the use of the mechanism of attrition of 
national quotas for the allocation of fishing opportunities to new entrants.
936
 Similarly, a 
mechanism for re-allocation of unused quotas can be part of an allocation method or 
procedure. More broadly, Cox has suggested several options of flexible arrangements, 
including two-tiered system of allocation for permanent and flexible quotas;
937
 permanent 
and seasonal entitlements; senior and junior rights; high security and low security 
entitlements. These proposals do not provide substantive guidance on how to allocate 
fishing opportunities, but they provide mechanisms to gradually reallocate fishing 
opportunities according to previously identified equitable principles. As such, they can be 
valuable components of the procedure necessary to arrive to equitable, predictable and 
stable allocations.  
Section 4. Concluding Remark: a Digression 
This chapter has addressed some institutional and procedural implications of the 
normative concept of equity discussed in the previous chapter. The emphasis has been in 
three main considerations. The first consideration relates to the role of a normative 
content of equity in negotiated agreements. The second is the opportunity for different 
fora to participate in the construction of a normative structure of equity, albeit with 
important limitations. The third is the need to establish procedural criteria, or methods, 
acting as a bridge between the general equitable principles and the relevant circumstances 
of a particular case. This third component of equity further enhances the normative 
content of the concept. 
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This third element of equity deserves a digression to outline two aspects that are 
related to this requirement of the definition of equitable procedures or methods in the 
construction and transparent implementation of equity. The first of those aspects is the 
concept of good governance, which is a component of the concept of sustainable 
development
938
 and, indeed, a one of the principal themes of UNCED.
939
 Schrijver, citing 
the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, provides the following account of the term:  
[G]ood governance is the transparent and accountable management of human, 
natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and 
sustainable development. It entails clear decision-making procedures at the levels 
of public authorities, transparent and accountable institutions, the primacy of law 
in the management and distribution of resources and capacity building for 




If good governance entails clear decision-making procedures, transparent 
institutions, and the primacy of law in the management and distribution of resources, then 
a normative concept of equity, and indeed its procedural aspects, are instrumental to 
achieve good governance in RFMOs.  
A deeper look on this issue allows suggesting yet another aspect for 
consideration. Franck‘s theory of justice in international law and institutions suggests that 
fairness is ―a composite of two independent variables: legitimacy and distributive 
justice.
941
 Legitimacy, in his definition, is ―the attribute of a rule which conduces to the 
belief that it is fair because it was made and is applied in accordance with ‗right 
process.‘‖
942
 He also identifies four indicators of legitimacy: determinacy, symbolic 
validation, coherence, and adherence. The ICJ‘s construction of a normative concept of 
equity seeks, indeed, to find some determinacy and coherence to an otherwise content-
less concept of autonomous equity.
943
 Following Franck‘s analysis on legitimacy, then, 
the search for a framework of controlled equity increases the legitimacy of the allocation 
decisions adopted by RFMOs, and of the organizations themselves.  
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Both the principle of good governance and legitimacy of RFMOs and their 
allocation decisions support the need to make progress in a structured and substantive 
equity. 
These two aspects provide a good framework to analyze one of the solutions for 
the problem of allocation of high seas fisheries that has been proposed in different fora 
and by academics and practitioners, in particular economists. That solution is to keep the 
scope of bargaining as broad as possible,
944
 and to use ―side-payments‖ or ―negotiation 
facilitators‖ in the negotiation process.
945
 The proposal emerges from economical 
analysis based on game-theory that concludes that any cooperative arrangement will only 
be stable if 
(...) each and every participant in a cooperative arrangement must anticipate 
receiving long term benefits from the cooperative arrangement that are at least 





Since that is a difficult objective when the problem is the distribution of a limited 
resource among too many, and increasing number, of participants, the solution proposes 
to increase the bargaining scope with negotiation facilitators and side-payments. Munro 
considered that   
[s]ide payments become truly significant when the management goals of the 
coastal states sharing the resource differ. (...) when there are differences in 
management goals, it is invariably the case that one player places a higher value 
on the fishery than does the other. (...)When side payments are possible, then the 
optimal policy is one in which the management preferences of that player placing 
the highest value on the resource should be given full reign.
947
 
This proposal assumes an unstructured process for negotiation of national quotas, 
where States would have the freedom to incorporate in the negotiation not only any 
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allocation criteria but also any number of interests or ―bargaining chips‖. Although it may 
be a sound economic proposal, it may enter into conflict with other values, and in 
particular with good governance and legitimacy as expressed above. A compromise 
between those different values may be necessary.
948
  
The aspects briefly introduced here fall outside the scope of this thesis and even 
outside the field of law and into political science. However, while there is no attempt to 
analyze those issues further, the linkages of good governance and legitimacy with the 
legal notion of equity, as constructed by the ICJ, should at least be mentioned. 
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Chapter 7. Quota Trading: Efficient and Equitable? 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze whether, and under what conditions, a 
legal concept of equity can provide assistance to the allocation of high seas fishing 
opportunities. For this purpose, previous chapters have analyzed equity as a legal 
standard for allocation of scarce resources, its status in international law, its acceptance in 
international fisheries law, and its content. Also, some institutional and procedural 
implications of the normative concept of equity for high seas fisheries have been 
highlighted. To finalize this study, this chapter addresses one particular aspect of 
allocated TAC: the possibility of trading national quotas. The analysis of quota trading in 
the light of equity considerations is relevant for two reasons. The first reason is that it has 
been widely recommended by scholars and practitioners as a mechanism that would 
provide some solutions to current allocation problems. The second reason is that these 
recommendations do not fully address equity considerations. 
The chapter starts by describing the potential benefits of quota trading in a high 
seas fisheries regime. To better understand the rational of those benefits, a brief overview 
of right-based management in fisheries is included. This provides a good framework to 
analyze a concept of particular relevance: the legal nature of national quotas. The chapter 
further summarizes the discussions on quota trading that have been carried by some 
RFMOs, as well as current practices. Finally, the implications of quota trading for 
intergenerational and intra-generational equity are presented. The chapter ends with a 
summary of the main conclusions on this topic. 
Before addressing these issues, a few words are necessary on three concepts that 
have some relationship. Indeed, in the case that a RFMO member is not able to catch its 
allocated quota, there are four options available to the organization. The first is the 
obvious option of doing nothing: the quota remains uncaught. Three other approaches are 
available to the organization and its members: the yearly adjustment of over and under-
catches, vessel chartering or leasing agreements, and quota trading. 
The adjustment of under and over-catches consists on a transfer of quota from one 
fishing year to the next, without changing the quota holder. Under-catches are added to 




it. From a management and conservation perspective, an unrestricted transfer from one 
year to another is not desirable. Thus, in some cases restrictions to this transfer have been 
placed by RFMOs.
949
 These restrictions usually include penalizing over-catches with a 
certain percentage of the over-catch. 
Another option is to charter or lease
950
 a vessel from another State to catch the 
quota. This possibility has been seen with certain caution by RFMO members, both 
because of their implications for allocation agreements and because of control, 
monitoring and enforcement challenges.
951
 For these reasons, albeit generally allowed, it 
is usually subject to certain obligations and limitations.
952
  
Lastly, quota trading involves the transfer of whole or part of the quota allocated 
to a State to another State, whether the recipient is or is not holder of quota in the same 
fishery. In theory, this transfer can be temporary or permanent. A temporary transfer 
would involve the transfer of the allocated quota for a particular year or number of years. 
This latter option is usually resorted to when there is a multi-year scheme in place, and 
there is certainty or at least reasonable certainty of the quota allocated and susceptible of 
trade. A permanent trade, on the other hand, would involve the transfer of the 
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participatory rights of a State in a fishery, or parts thereof. This last figure – quota trading 
– is the subject of this chapter. 
Section 1. Trading Quota: the Golden Solution 
Trading national quotas was already proposed in the early discussions on TAC 
and national allocations in international fisheries. In the panel discussion that took place 
at the Law of the Sea Institute in 1968, participants identified the negotiability of the 
quotas as a central element of the system.
953
 The suggestion was not further considered at 
that time, but more recently different scholars and policy advisors, and particular 
economists, have supported trade of national quotas in international fisheries 











 among others, have praised the 
benefits of such a feature in the TAC and allocation system. OECD, more cautious, 
suggests it as a topic to be explored by governments.
959
 
The benefits of a tradable system of national allocations rest mostly in economic 
efficiency. It is proposed that allowing States to trade their national quotas will allow 
fishing opportunities to be used by those fishers who produce the greatest economic 
benefits,
960
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It is also suggested that trade mechanisms would invest the quota regime with the 
required flexibility to cope with extraordinary circumstances. Examples of these 
extraordinary circumstances are the situation of fishing fleets taking by-catches of what 
are target stocks for others;
962
 and the situation of resources that are highly mobile, 
particularly between areas under different jurisdiction.
963
 
It is proposed further that such a system would improve prospects for 
cooperation
964
 and lead to more stable fisheries regimes.
965
 In particular, trade of national 
quotas are suggested as a way to respond to the apparently insurmountable problem 
represented by new entrants to the fisheries.
966
 Trade mechanisms, it is argued, would 
strike an appropriate balance between three interests: the interests of current participants 
in the fishery, the aspirations of new participants, and the conservation of the stock. With 
a trade mechanism, current participants would be rewarded for their past efforts; new 
participants would have the opportunity to participate in the fisheries based on a non-
discriminatory basis; and the fishing activity over the stock would remain at sustainable 
levels. 
Since the benefits assigned to quota trading are multiple, the system of quota 
trading can also be designed with an emphasis on one or more of them. In particular, the 
quota trading system can be designed so as to represent flexible management options, 
complementing but not substituting national quota allocations; or it act as a mechanism 
for access to quotas (and thus, to fishing in the high seas). This latter option is mostly 
presented as an alternative to allow new entrants to the fisheries.  
 
Section 2. Towards Right-based Management in High Seas Fisheries? 
To better understand the reasons to advocate for tradable quotas, it is useful to 
give an overview of rights-based fisheries management. It is widely believed that 




 Lodge et al., supra note 11, at 36-37. 
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 Lodge et al., supra note 11, at 37. It is also an implicit objective in the section on tradability of rights, 




property rights are a necessary element of sustainable fisheries.
967
 An ―open access‖ 
regime necessarily leads to a tragedy of the commons.
968
 Property rights, on the contrary, 
provide incentives for their holders to invest in long-term conservation of the stocks 
because ―higher future returns from fishing will be incorporated into the value of their 
asset.‖
969
 This higher future returns are represented by stable and higher quotas, or better 
price for their quotas if trade is allowed.  
While property is often used to refer as a thing, legally property is a description of 
a legal relationship with a thing,
970
 or, in other terms, a ―bundle of rights‖ over a thing.
971
 
The powers included in the bundle are identified as: the power to use a thing, the power 
to take its yield, and the power to dispose it.
972
 From an economic perspective, Scott 
identifies four characteristics of property: exclusivity, duration, security, and 
transferability.
973
 The stronger these characteristics are, the stronger the power 
relationship with a thing or, in other words, the stronger the property. As stated by Gray, 
―[p]ropertiness is represented by a continuum along which varying kinds of property 
status may shade finely into each other.‖
974
 In Gray‘s analysis, the most important 
characteristic, and which determines ―propertiness‖, is excludability.
975
 ―A resource is 
excludable only if it is feasible for a legal person to exercise regulatory control over the 
access of strangers to the various benefits inherent in the resource‖.
976
 As a consequence, 
he asserts that property is not about enjoyment of access but on control over access.
977
 
The history of fisheries regulation can be viewed as a history of measures that aim 
at establishing rights that attain, as far as possible, the characteristics of exclusivity, 
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duration, security and transferability. At a national level, those characteristics were 
included by introducing regulatory measures: limitation on access, quotas, individual 
quotas, and eventually individual transferable quotas. 
At the international level, the same trend can be observed. The introduction of the 
EEZ was an important step to introduce (national) exclusivity to vast fisheries resources 
that were, by then, subject to an (international) open access regime. The obligation of 
cooperation to conserve high seas fisheries resources, and in particular the provision of 
UNFSA that bans fishing activities outside the regional management frameworks, can be 
considered a further step to increase exclusivity in high seas fisheries.
978
 Additional 
efforts to improve exclusivity are undertaken through the plethora of initiatives aimed at 
stopping illegal, unregulated, and unreported catches, which include IUU black lists, flag 
State measures, trade documentation schemes, market measures, and port State 
measures.
979
 The TAC and national allocations were also measures that attempted to 
increase the exclusive character of fishing in the high seas. As was mentioned in chapter 
2, the goal of TAC and allocations can be viewed as an effort to establish ―boxes of 
jurisdiction‖ in the high seas. These functional ―boxes of jurisdiction‖ were supposed to 
allow States access to the fishery without interference by other States. Quota trading, 
therefore, can be regarded as yet another progressive step aimed at improving the 
property qualities of high seas fisheries regime. And, it is claimed, if the property 
qualities of high seas fisheries regimes are stronger, then the benefits described in the 
previous section could be achieved.  
The property right system faces, however, a fundamental contradiction with the 
high seas legal regime. Property rights require exclusivity or excludability; the 
fundamental principles of international fisheries law are freedom of the high seas and 
sovereign State equality. It is true that UNFSA and recent developments have made 
important legal and practical progress in improving exclusivity, as was just pointed out. 
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But it is also true that important legal and practical obstacles remain and make that 
exclusivity somewhat illusory. Among those obstacles, it is important to mention: the 
consensus-based decision making in RFMOs and the objection procedures; the 
inapplicability of UNFSA provisions to non-parties to the agreement; flags and ports of 
convenience; and compliance and enforcement challenges for both members and non-
members.  
Because of these circumstances, the exclusivity – the control of access – is limited 
in the high seas both from a legal and practical perspective. Thus, property in its full legal 
and economic sense cannot exist. This is the conclusion to which Serdy arises while 
analyzing the question: ―national allocations under open access – what are they?‖
980
 He 
argues, therefore, that in agreeing to national allocations, States are not establishing a 
property right but departing inter se from the residual freedom of fishing on the high 
seas
981
 by agreeing on a limit to their own catch in return from the acceptance of similar 
limits by other member States.
982
 In this interpretation, the practice of quota trading is not 
legally a transfer of rights, but an amendment to the reciprocal limitation agreement that 
requires, therefore, the waiver of all participating States.
983
  
In this regard, it is however worth remembering the relative nature of the concept 
of property, as explained by Gray. He asserted that ―[p]ropertiness is represented by a 
continuum along which varying kinds of property status may shade finely into each 
other.‖
984
 Thus, depending on the practical barriers for exclusivity, the duration of quota 
allocations, and the conditions of quota trading, a national quota can in practice, if not 
legally, become close to property. If not a right, a quasi right.
985
 
Section 3. Trading Quotas in RFMOs: Theory and Practice 
Despite the multiple benefits advocated by scholars and policy advisors, trade 
mechanisms for national quotas have faced the reluctance of RFMOs member States.  
None of the Conventions make a reference to this possibility. At the framework level, 
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only ICCAT has an explicit reference to trade of national quotas, prohibiting its 
practice.
986
 Quota trading practices are not common either. Serdy identifies three 
organizations where quota trading has been reported: ICCAT, NAFO, and NEAFC.
987
  
What follows is a review of the way quota trading has been addressed by different 
RFMOs, both at the level of discussions and practical implementation. 
 
Quota Trading in ICCAT 
Quota trading was explicitly discussed in the ICCAT ad-hoc working group on 
allocation criteria. The approach to the subject can be categorized as dual. Selling and 
trading of quota had a widespread condemnation.
988
 Some delegations insisted that, if 
allocation was adjusted to the needs of each contracting party, no trade would be 
necessary.
989
 At the same time, the advantages of allowing temporary transfers were also 
acknowledged and indeed some transfers had already taken place in some fisheries.
990
 In 
the opinion of the members of the ad-hoc working group on allocation criteria, quota 
transfers were not an allocation but rather a management issue.
991
  
The topic could not be solved by the working group and was raised to the 
Commission for its resolution.
992
 The draft criteria presented by the working group 
included a prohibition on selling and trading quota, but its chair explained to the 
Commission that there was a wide-spread acceptance of temporary transfers. As a 
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consequence, the Commission kept the prohibition in the allocation guidelines,
993
 but 
adopted Recommendation 2001-12 regarding the temporary adjustments of quotas. This 
recommendation limited itself to state that ―any temporary quota adjustment shall be 
done only under authorization by the Commission.‖
994
  
Thus, ICCAT has generally proceeded on a case by case basis allowing temporary 
transfer of quotas according to Recommendation 2001-12. The authorized transfers are 
usually reflected in the stock-specific conservation and management recommendations, 
identifying the parties involved in the quota trade and the amount traded.
995
 A novel 
approach, however, was introduced in the rebuilding program of Western Atlantic bluefin 
tuna. Recommendation 2006-06 introduced a blank authorization to transfer quota for 
contracting parties with quota allocation, subject to various restrictions. The system was 
maintained, with a slight modification, by Paragraph 10 of Recommendation 08-04. The 
current text reads: 
Notwithstanding the Recommendation by ICCAT Regarding the Temporary 
Adjustment of Quotas [Rec. 01-12], in between meetings of the Commission, a 
CPC [Contracting Party] with a TAC allocation under paragraph 6 may make a 
one-time transfer within a fishing year of up to 15% of its TAC allocation to other 
CPCs with TAC allocations, consistent with domestic obligations and 
conservations considerations. The transfer shall be notified to the Secretariat. Any 
such transfer may not be used to cover overharvests. A CPC that receives a one-
time quota transfer may not retransfer that quota. For parties with a quota 
allocation of 4 t, the transfer may be up to 100% of the allocation.
996
 
 OECD has noted that ―[t]he use of quota exchanges has reportedly become 
increasingly common in ICCAT (...), although there is limited transparency on such 
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 The ICCAT performance review panel, in turn, noted that the prohibition 
of quota trading contained in the ICCAT Resolution 01-25 is reasonable in this particular 
case, considering that ICCAT ―catch reporting is unreliable for most species and the 
ability to trade quota would only further confuse the data reliability.‖
998
 Considering 
these difficulties, but also the advantages of allowing quota trading both to new entrants 
and existing contracting parties, the panel recommends the Commission to analyze the 




Quota Trading in NAFO 
Quota trading was not explicitly discussed in the NAFO working group on allocation of 
fishing opportunities to contracting parties. Only some tangential references were made 
while discussing possible margins for reallocation of fishing opportunities for stocks 
under TAC.
1000




The quota trading practices in NAFO are limited. The Fisheries Commission 
adopted, at least with respect to squid Illex in subareas 3 and 4, a ―blank‖ authorization 
allowing an increase in the national allocations resulting from a transfer from any coastal 
State.
1002
 Some trade has apparently occurred without prior explicit authorization.
1003
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Quota Trading in NEAFC 
As in the case of NAFO, trade of quotas has not been explicitly discussed in NEAFC. 
Nevertheless, the organization has allowed, or more precisely acknowledged, the practice 
of quota trading in one particular fishery. Recommendation I:2010 on conservation and 
management of blue whiting in the Convention Area establishes in para. 6 that 
[q]uotas that are transferred to a Contracting Party to be fished within national 
waters of another Contracting Party may be fished in the areas defined in 
paragraph 3 a, subject to agreement between the Contracting Parties concerned. 
No communication to the secretariat is explicitly required; however, control of 




 It should be noted, however, that NEAFC management system for some species 
rely on coastal States agreements. Thus, bilateral agreements regarding quota trading and 
access to EEZ are not necessarily reflected in the NEAFC recommendations. 
 
Quota Trading in WCPFC 
The working paper on allocation prepared for the WCPFC Secretariat included quota 
trading as one of the aspects to be considered by the Commission in the design of 
appropriate allocation criteria. Although the authors of the paper apparently endorse 
quota trading for high seas fisheries management, they were cautious to recommend 
annual, or short-term, transfer at the beginning of the system.
1006
  
The discussion of allocation has been postponed in the WCPFC agenda, and to 
this day it has not been resumed.  
 
Quota Trading in CCSBT 
More interesting is the discussion process that took place in the CCSBT. In 2003, the 
issue was raised in the commission, which recommended further analysis including 
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 This legal opinion concluded that trade of national quotas 
was feasible with the authorization of the Commission but not as a unilateral act of any 
member. Access to members EEZ, on the other hand, could be arranged on bilateral 
arrangements without the approval, but with advice to, the Commission.
1008
  
Despite the favourable opinion, most members remained reluctant to address the 
issue and declared that they were ―not generally disposed towards quota trading in the 
current situation of the [Southern bluefin tuna] stock and where Members were 
considering a reduction in catches‖.
1009
 The different opinions expressed by the delegates, 
as summarized in the respective meeting report, were: 
• That quota trading should be considered when the Management Procedure is 
implemented since at that stage, the TAC would be based on scientific 
information and a procedure should be in place for deciding national allocations 
of the TAC; 
• While the stock was considered to be in a serious state, unused quota should not 
be re-allocated through quota trading which would increase catch; and 
• That in principle quota trading was not desirable because a Member should not 
profit by trading its unused quota with another Member and because allocations 
are not conferred on a permanent basis.
1010
 
Despite the insistence and support expressed by two members,
1011
 the issue was 
not brought up again in the Commission since it was not considered a priority.  
It should be noted that CCSBT has initiated a process to adopt a Strategic Plan for 
the Commission. A draft Strategic Plan was presented for consideration of the 
Commission at their 2009 meeting.
1012
 The draft plan includes the implementation of 
flexible management arrangements, including quota trading; and considers, among the 
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activities of the plan, developing a framework for quota trading between members and 
cooperating non-members.
1013
 This activity was assigned a low to medium priority.
1014
 




Quota Trading in CCAMLR 
As has been mentioned above, CCAMLR management regime does not rely on national 
quotas, but on a TAC distributed to specific geographical areas. Thus, transfer of quotas 
has not arisen as an issue for discussion. However, it is worth mentioning that the 
performance review panel of CCAMLR encouraged the analysis of the implementation of 
a system of tradable quotas. This recommendation derives from the concern expressed by 
the panel on a potential blow-out of fishing capacity and effort in the CCAMLR, 
considering that the management regime does not provide disincentives for overcapacity. 
To address this issue, the Panel recommended the establishment of a small group of 
experts to explore and report on the advantages and disadvantages of approaches and 
actions to prevent or eliminate excess fishing capacity, to afterwards review and adopt 
appropriate approaches and actions as a matter of urgency.
1016
 The panel included, as one 
of the approaches which analysis it was recommended, ―a system of annual tradable units 
of quota with a very clear understanding that they bestow no ongoing rights and will be 
reallocated for each successive fishing period.‖
1017
 The Commission has not yet acted on 
this particular suggestion. 
 
A Summary of RFMOs Practice 
Quota trading faces a mixed reaction by RFMOs members. Quota trading as a general 
mechanism to enter the fishery has generally a negative response by State members. 
There is a preoccupation and reluctance to transform RFMOs in quota seller 
organizations, or for quota holders to have a financial benefit from selling its quota. 
Quota trading as a mechanism to allow some flexibility in quota management is, on the 
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other hand, more accepted. This dual approach is clearly reflected in the ICCAT 
framework and practices. 
The practices of quota trading are limited, albeit reportedly growing in ICCAT. In 
all cases, trade occurs exclusively between traditional fishing States for the relevant 
stock, i.e., between members of the RFMO with a previously allocated quota in the same 
fishery. Thus, in practice, quota trading does not act as a mechanism to accommodate the 
fishing aspirations of new entrants or of existing members without a quota in the fishery. 
It should be noted, as well, that transfers from coastal States participating in the 
international management, in particular with respect to straddling stocks
1018
 but also in 
the case of highly migratory stocks,
1019
 appears to be more frequent and less of a concern 
for contracting parties. 
The agreements to trade quota trading are made on a yearly or multi-year basis, 
but not indefinitely. In other words, what States transfer is not their participation in the 
fishery as recognized in the allocation agreements, but more limited, the annual allocation 
that the participation creates.
1020
  
From a procedural point of view, quota trade requires agreement of the respective 
Commission. This agreement can be given either on a case-by-case basis, or as a prior, 
but conditioned, authorization. These conditions usually refer to the number of 
transactions allowed any given year, limits on the quantities to be transferred, and 
limitations on re-transfers of quota. In the case of a quota trade pursuing a prior blank 
authorization, communication to the secretariat is required.  
Section 4. Quota Trading in Light of Equity   
The previous sections provided a brief background on the rationale for quota 
trading, and of actual trade practices in RFMOs. This chapter analyzes them critically 
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from the perspective of equity. Before entering that analysis, however, a few remarks are 
warranted in regard to the main objective of quota trading: efficiency.  
The objective of establishing TAC and national quotas, and of allowing quota 
trading, is to provide the high seas fisheries access with more characteristics of property. 
Property right based management is believed to increase the incentives for long-term 
conservation and to make the use of resources more efficient. Indeed, quota trading, so it 
is believed, would allow the resources to be allocated to the most efficient fisher. 
Efficiency, as may be remembered, was also the main reason to adopt TAC and national 
allocations in the first place. The rationale behind these measures was that, by eliminating 
competition with other States over a common resource, States would have incentives to 
improve the efficiency of the fishing activity and therefore improving net economic 
benefit. During those early analyses, however, it was recognized that there are other 
rational, non-economic, reasons driving fisheries management, and that those reasons 
may lead States not to adopt efficient management measures.
1021
 Among the non-
economic objectives of fisheries management, particular mention was made to the 




This parallelism deserves three observations. The first observation is that the 
proponents of quota trading as a solution for the efficient allocation of resources may be 
overlooking, once again, the importance of non-economic objectives in national fisheries 
management. Indeed, and although TAC and quota provided with the incentives to 
improve economic efficiency, that is far from being the case in reality.
1023
 Undoubtedly 
this is the consequence of several factors, including the already mentioned feeble nature 
of ―property rights‖ of high seas fisheries resources. However, non-economic objectives 
for fisheries management may also be part of the explanation. 
The second observation relates to the pertinence of one of the efficiency 
arguments presented for the advocates of quota trading to high seas fisheries. Quota 
trading, it is proposed, would reward quota holders in case they exit the fishery. It is 
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precisely because the quota share has a value for the retiring fishermen that it provides 
incentives for long-term conservation. This makes a strong case at the national level. But 
allocating quotas to fishing companies or fishworkers is different from allocating fishing 
opportunities to States. Before considering the option of trading quota, it is a more logical 
pattern of State behaviour to re-allocate available fishing opportunities among their own 
nationals. 
This logic is even more appalling if one considers the past experience of 
allocation of fishing opportunities in the high seas. As has been extensively described in 
chapters 3 and 4, allocation agreements are usually possible only after States have 
engaged in a race to fish that increases their participation in the fishery to levels 
unsustainable for the fish stocks. As a consequence, fishing opportunities allocated are 
almost inevitably below the existing fishing capacity of States participating in the fishery. 
In a scenario where there has already been a sacrifice for each participating State and 
their fishing companies and communities, it is doubted that any ―surplus‖ will be 
available for trade. 
It has to be acknowledged, though, that this logic does not follow from situation 
where the coastal State has been allocated a share according to criteria different than past 
performance or historical catches, and particularly if the allocation has been made 
according to the criterion of geographical distribution of the stock (zonal attachment). 
That requires, though, that zonal attachment becomes the main criterion for allocation of 
fishing opportunities regardless of the fishing capacity of the coastal State. This is, as has 
been pointed out in chapter 5, an option available for RFMOs in the design of their 
allocation framework, and a practice that can be considered established for straddling 
stocks
1024
 and increasing for highly migratory stocks.
1025
 
The most important observation, however, is this: once again, equity 
considerations have remained, for the most part, unaddressed. This section is an attempt 
to fill that gap but identifying some equity considerations that should be taken into 
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account in the design of a quota trade system. For this purpose, the following sections 
address the implications of quota trading in intergenerational and intra-generational 
equity, respectively. 
 
Quota Trading and Intergenerational Equity 
In chapter 4 it was asserted that, in a first approach, allocation should not have 
implications for the long-term conservation of the fish stocks. Indeed, allocation of 
national quotas requires that the TAC has already been set, and it is in the setting of the 
TAC that precautionary and ecosystem considerations have to be taken into account to 
ensure long-term conservation of the stock. But it was also analyzed how allocation does, 
nevertheless, create perverse incentives for long-term conservation. 
What was said for allocation applies as well to quota trading. Trading of quota 
takes place only after the TAC is set (and therefore, in theory, long-term conservation of 
the stock has already been ensured); and even after national allocations are made. 
Nevertheless, quota trading produces and even exacerbates some undesirable incentives 
for short-term gains and against long-term conservation of fish stocks. First, if the regime 
considers the possibility of trading quota, there are more incentives for each State, 
individually, and for all States, collectively, to increase the initial TAC above 
scientifically recommended levels and even above their fishing capacity. By doing so, 
they can benefit from quota trading even though they may not have the capacity to 
actually engage in fishing activities. In other words, trading quota increases the incentives 
to have ―paper fish‖.  
Cox acknowledges this perverse effect by stating that ―[a]nother potential issue 
that arises in the use of tradable rights schemes is the potential for rights holders to resist 
any reductions in the TAC as this will reduce the value of their rights.‖
1026
 The 
consequence of this potential issue is, once again, that TAC and allocations would not act 
as a limit or restriction of fishing capacity, and that long-term conservation would 
probably be postponed in favour of short-term gains.  
There is, in addition, a second perverse effect of quota trading: they allow quotas 
to be fully caught. This can be viewed, and is actually presented, as a beneficial effect of 
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quota trade: it ensures the optimum utilization of the fish stock. Indeed, if one State is not 
efficient to catch its quota for any reason, the quota can be transferred to some other State 
that has that capacity. Although this is a reasonable objective, it assumes that the TAC is 
set strictly at scientific recommended levels. And it has already been noted in chapter 4 
that there are many incentives for States not to adopt those sound TACs, including, as 
just described, quota transfers.  
One example illustrates this risk. During the discussion on conservation and 
management measures for South Atlantic swordfish in ICCAT for the 2003-2006 period, 
a group of States tabled a proposal of a TAC of 15,631tons for 2003, increasing up to 
16,055 tons in 2006.
1027
  Another group of States manifested their concern, considering 
that the scientific advice was that the TAC should not exceed 14,000 tons.
1028
 The report 
of the meeting cites one delegate stating that  
the real catches will, without a doubt, be less than 15,000 t since the developing 
countries were seeking fishing opportunities but the unused portion of TAC 
would be significant (although the total amount of the autonomous quota was 




Other delegates also endorsed this position, reaffirming that ―this TAC limit 
would not be reached, and therefore the (...) concerns were not justified.‖
1030
 Quota 
trading, however, may allow that the TAC be reached (unless the stock is already 
depleted and there is no fish available, a possibility that does not taint the theory with any 
brighter light). 
States seem to be aware of those undesirable incentives. The limitations to quota 
trade in the Western Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery imposed in ICCAT Recommendation 
08-02 probably respond to those concerns. Furthermore, as was described previously, the 
members of CCSBT stated them explicitly: quota trading should be considered when 
TAC is based on scientific information and according management procedures, and 
procedures for national allocations are in place; in over-exploited or seriously threatened 
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Quota Trading and Intra-generational Equity 
It has been noted in a previous section that a system of tradable quota can have 
one of two emphases: a mechanism of flexible management of quotas for extraordinary 
cases; and a system of access to the fishery. It is this latter aspect that has more acute 
implications for intra-generational equity, and the following sections are devoted to this 
mechanism.  
A tradable quota system can theoretically be constructed on the basis of initial 
allocations made through auctions, and subsequent transfers through transactions among 
States. This system has been suggested by few scholars,
1032
 but no RFMO is really 
considering it. What has been more widely proposed, instead, is to resort to a system of 
quota trade as a mechanism for new entrants to access the fishery.  
Considering that design for analysis, the first aspect that needs to be stressed is 
that quota trading does not substitute or eliminate the equity concerns that have occupied 
most of this thesis. Indeed, a system of quota trading does not eliminate, at the very least, 
the initial allocation. That has been recognized by all authors while analyzing the 
introduction or enhancement of quota trade schemes in RFMOs.
1033
  
On the contrary, it can be expected that conflict over that first allocation will be 
even more intense. First, the effects of the initial allocation would be permanent, since 
any modification to an agreed allocation would be based on quota trading rather than re-
allocation by agreement. Secondly, and as has been explained in the previous section, the 
first allocation would have a value of its own (―paper fish‖) independent from the fishing 
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capacity of the State. In other words, the tradability of national quotas brings them closer 
to a property right, rather than a mutually agreed limitation on fishing activities. As a 
consequence, what is distributed in that first allocation would be, if not property right, a 
quasi-right. 
Adopting quota trading as a mechanism to accommodate new entrants to fisheries 
poses, however, additional equity problems. Two of such problems are: discrimination, 
and the consequences for developing States.  
An allocation regime based on quota trading as the mechanism allowing 
participation of new entrants to the fisheries would make a distinction between two 
groups of States: charter members, and new participants. While the first would be 
allocated the quota according to some criterion or combination of criteria, the second 
group would pay for access to the resource (whether that payment is money or other 
advantages given to the quota holder). In words of Lodge et al., this system would 
involve ―(non-coastal State) new members in effect buying their way into the 
RFMO‖.
1034
 Is this different treatment discrimination?  
The question is legally relevant in light of article 119(3) of LOSC: ―States 
concerned shall ensure that conservation measures and their implementation do not 
discriminate in form or in fact against the fishermen of any State.‖ Article 8(4) of 
UNFSA, in turn, states: 
The terms of participation in such organization or arrangement shall not preclude 
such States from membership or participation; nor shall they be applied in a 
manner which discriminates against any State or group of States having a real 
interest in the fisheries concerned. 
A first aspect that needs to be addressed is how a mechanism that requires new 
entrants to ―buy their way into the RFMO‖ is different than a system that requires new 
entrants to comply with the measures adopted by an RFMO, including measures that 
eventually may lead to non-access to the fishery. Most authors conclude that there is no 
discrimination in this latter situation. Burke states that it is non-discriminatory simply to 
expect adherence to the same regulatory structure as applies to all participants.
1035
  Thus,  
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[i]f shares are determined on historical grounds, then the problem is averted. The 
new entrant gets the same share as all other non-participants, which is zero. On 
the other hand, if the regime is established on the basis of an auction or other 
means of allowing the purchase of a share, then the new participants may compete 
for a share in the same basis as any other participant.
1036
 
The same conclusion is exposed by Orrego Vicuña:  
[t]o the extent that the non-discrimination clause is observed, the new entrant will 
be bound to comply with the obligation so established and could not claim a right 
to fish separate from the arrangements lawfully made under the Convention. 
The two situations, however, are considerably different. While in one case the 
same rule applies to both groups of States (albeit the result of that regulation may imply 
that the extent of the rights of each State is different), in the second case it is the access 
regime itself which is different. Thus, the assumptions of Burke and Orrego Vicuña, 
namely that new entrants ―may compete for a share in the same basis as any other 
participant‖ is precisely what is missing. The basis of access is not the same. Does that 
distinction amount to discrimination according to international fisheries law?   
  The non-discrimination provision of article 8(4) prohibits discrimination against 
any State or group of States having a real interest in the fishery. It may be argued, on the 
basis of article 8(4) of UNFSA, that a lawful distinction can be made between States with 
real interest in the fishery, and other States. However, caution should be exercised with 
this interpretation since it presents three problems. The first problem is the non-universal 
ratification of UNFSA.
1037
 The second problem has already been explained in some detail 
in chapter 3: UNFSA does not define ―real interest‖, introducing an element of ambiguity 
to the provision that would make the practical implementation of such a distinction 
extremely difficult. A third difficulty is that the non-discrimination provision is narrower 
than the non-discrimination clause of the LOSC, which states that high seas conservation 
measure and their implementation cannot ―discriminate in form or in fact against the 
fishermen of any State”
1038
 (and not just States with a real interest). It is hard to find an 
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interpretation that harmonizes these two provisions, but harmonization is required by 
article 4 of UNFSA. 
The concern on an eventual breach to the obligation of non-discrimination arises 
with more strength considering the interpretation of discrimination given in a complaint 
against the Icelandic transferable quota regime that, like in the case in analysis, made a 
distinction between original quota holders and successive buyers or renters. The 
complaint was presented in 2007 to the United Nations Human Rights Committee to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
1039
 in application of its Optional 
Protocol,
1040
 by two Icelandic fishermen.
1041
  
In this situation, the Human Rights Committee considered that the distinction 
amounted to discrimination.
1042
 The Committee reasoned that the Icelandic quota-based 
fisheries regime made a distinction between groups of fishers: the first group receives a 
quota share for free; the second group has to buy or rent a quota share for the simple 
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reason that they were not owning and operating fishing vessels during the reference 
period. It concluded that this distinction was based on grounds ―equivalent to those of 
property‖. Next, it analyzed if this distinction was legitimate, i.e., if it was based on 
reasonable and objective criteria. In this regard, it concluded that ―the State party has not 
shown that this particular design and modalities of implementation of the quota system 
meets the requirement of reasonableness.‖ They based this conclusion on two pillars: a) 
the fact that according to section 1 of the Icelandic Act, fishing banks around Iceland are 
common property of the Icelandic nation; and b) the fact that the distinction, when 
established as a permanent measure, transformed original rights to use and exploit a 
public property into individual property.
1043
  
Although applicable to a national fisheries regime, the interpretation of 
discrimination may be useful for the analysis of quota trading as access mechanism for 
new entrants in the high seas. The first of the arguments on which the Committee based 
its view was the fact that section 1 of the Icelandic Act explicitly states that fishing banks 
around Iceland are common property of the Icelandic nation. There is no equivalent 
provision in high seas fisheries; however, it can be concluded that the freedom to fish in 
the high seas establishes that common property. 
The second element of the view of the Committee is that the tradable quota 
system established on a permanent basis transformed the right of the holder from a right 
to use a common property to an individual property. Indeed, the benefits of conservation 
efforts accrue to the quota holder and not the Icelandic society, and are reflected in the 
price of the quota share. The same would apply in a high seas regime with improved 
exclusivity where new entrants had quota trading as their only option to access the 
fishery. Following the views of the Human Right Committee, thus, this distinction in the 
access mechanism for high seas fishing would entail unlawful discrimination. 
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There is, however, one argument that may provide some legitimate basis for a 
distinction. Members of RFMOs make costly investments in form of financial 
contributions, scientific research, data gathering, and control and motoring efforts. These 
elements are indispensable for the sound management of the stock, and thus the value of 
the national quotas. A new entrant, on the contrary, could benefit from those investments 
without incurring in equivalent costs. It could be argued, then, that the need to buy quota 
is justified in the financial and non-financial contribution to sound management that the 
quota holder has made. The different access regime demands from both quota holder and 
new entrants a financial contribution, albeit that financial contribution is provided in 
different forms. 
 Beside the potential of discrimination in quota trading as a mechanism to allow 
access to fishing by new entrants, there is still another aspect of intra-generational equity 
that needs to be highlighted. That aspect is the special requirements of developing States. 
The system assumes that quota trading provides all States with equal opportunities to 
participate in high seas fishing. It has long being acknowledged, however, that this formal 
equality does not translate into substantial equality. It is to be presumed that only States 
with more means, either in terms of financial resources or of other tradable interests, will 
be able to access high seas fishing. This, as stated by Cox, will only exacerbate the 
conflicts between developing and developed States.
1044
  
Section 6. Some Concluding Remarks 
Quota trading has been presented as a necessary, albeit not sufficient, solution to 
high seas problems. It is argued that tradability increases the characteristics of property 
rights in the high seas, which in turn increases the incentives for long-term conservation. 
It is also proposed as a solution for the problem of new entrant. In addition, it is argued, it 
provides flexibility to address by-catch and seasonal population variations. With these 
varied benefits in sight, it can be concluded that a system of quota trading can be 
designed either as providing flexibility in quota management; or as providing access to 
high seas fisheries for new entrants. 
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However, several aspects need to be taken into account in the design of a quota 
trading system. This chapter has highlighted some of them.  
The applicability of a right-based management regime to the high seas faces legal 
and practical challenges that need to be taken into account. Without improving 
exclusivity in the high seas, quota trading is less attractive or bluntly impracticable. 
Secondly, the efficiency arguments that support quota trading may face challenges in 
high seas fisheries, both because of the quota holder (State instead of companies) and 
because it assumes that efficiency is the only fisheries objective of the participating 
States. As has been shown in the past, this is far from being a reality.  
More importantly for the purposes of this thesis, the emphasis on efficiency 
arguments has mostly relegated one again the consideration of equity implications of 
such a measure. This is particularly troublesome considering that quota trading has 
negative incentives for both conservation (and thus intergenerational equity), and intra-
generational equity.  
Quota trading creates incentives to maintain a high value to that asset, which is 
associated with the TAC. Thus, although design to create incentives for long-term 
conservation, it also creates at least short-term incentives for unsustainable management. 
Quota trading as a mechanism to allow accommodation of the interests of new 
entrants faces particular intra-generational equity problems. Firstly, its compatibility with 
international law is less than clear. Indeed, there are several arguments that allow 
concluding that it entails discrimination against States, discrimination that is prohibited in 
the international law of the sea. In addition, quota trading would leave developing States 
in a disadvantaged position to participate in high seas fisheries. It is to be expected, 
therefore, that conflicts between developed and developing States would intensify, rather 
than ameliorate, with such a system. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that RFMOs have been cautious in the 
implementation of quota trade mechanisms. Progress has been made towards providing 
flexible mechanisms to quota management that allow making an efficient use of 
resources in extraordinary circumstances. In some cases, quota trade appears to be used 












Chapter 8. Conclusions 
 
TAC and allocations have been widely recognized as best practices with respect 
to conservation and management measures of high seas fisheries. UNFSA and regional 
agreements include them as the responsibility or function of the RFMOs. However, while 
UNFSA and the regional agreements consider substantive guidance on how to adopt a 
TAC (mainly by application of precautionary and ecosystem approaches), the legal 
frameworks do not provide equivalent guidance with respect to the allocation of national 
quotas or effort. This lack of guidance has become one of the main conflicts for high seas 
fisheries management. The inability to resolve allocation issues in a timely and 
satisfactory manner has become a threat to the sustainability of fisheries.  
This thesis had the purpose of exploring if, under what conditions, and with which 
shortcomings, a legal concept of equity can provide assistance in the allocation of high 
seas fishing opportunities. To this end, it has reviewed the historical origins of allocation 
of quotas, and it has summarized the current global and regional legal frameworks for 
allocation, as well as the common features of allocation practices. It has reviewed 
whether intergenerational and intra-generational equity is considered in the international 
legal framework for high seas fisheries. It has also analyzed what the legal and practical 
implications of their inclusion in high seas fisheries regime are.  
The purpose of this final chapter is not to review each of the key concepts and 
findings identified throughout the thesis. Rather, it will attempt to provide an answer to 
the initial question: does the legal concept of equity provide any useful guidance for the 
allocation of high seas fishing opportunities? For this purpose, the following sections 
address several related issues drawing upon different sections of this thesis. 
 
Balancing Efficiency and Equity: Losing the Battle? 
The first adoption of TAC and allocation of national quotas in the high seas 
fisheries in the early 1970s, and its rapid acceptance as best management practice, have 
been guided by economic objectives. Chapter 2 dwelled extensively on the theoretical 
background and rationale that were key in the promotion of allocation as a conservation 




net economic benefits of the fishing activity by eliminating international competition for 
a common resource and, consequently, creating the appropriate incentives for States to 
increase efficiency. Despite the obvious distributional consequences of the measure, 
equity considerations were raised but not addressed. ―[W]ho is to define equity?‖
1045
 was 
a question left unanswered. The evolution of the allocation framework and the allocation 
practices of RFMOs demonstrate the struggles to fill that gap. 
Almost forty years later, the main approach to address the ―common pool‖ 
resource problem is, once again, economic efficiency. Chapter 7 looked at one widely 
accepted suggestion that, so it is claimed, would contribute to alleviate the allocation 
problem: a system of tradable quotas. According to its proponents, tradable quotas would 
allow fishing opportunities to be used by those fishers who produce the greatest 
economic benefit, i.e., the most efficient fishing States.
1046
 The same rationale underlies 
another proposal that has been presented in chapter 6: the suggestion for RFMOs to 
widen the scope of bargaining through side payments or negotiation facilitators. As stated 
by Munro,  
[s]ide payments become truly significant when the management goals of the 
coastal states sharing the resource differ. (...) when there are differences in 
management goals, it is invariably the case that one player places a higher value 
on the fishery than does the other. (...)When side payments are possible, then the 
optimal policy is one in which the management preferences of that player placing 
the highest value on the resource should be given full reign.
1047
 
Thus, by allowing side payments, all participants are better off than without side 




These modern proposals have the same vacuum that the original proposal for 
TAC and allocation had in the 1960s and 1970s: they rely on economics, failing to 
incorporate equity considerations into the analysis. Therefore, as in the case of allocation 
of national quotas, they may prove to be incomplete and finally unsatisfactory solutions 
to address the complicated problem of ―who gets what‖. 
                                                          
1045
 See: supra note 319 and accompanying text. 
1046
 See: supra note 960 and accompanying text. 
1047
 Munro, supra note 119, at 14. 
1048




The experience of high seas fisheries is not unique. The same can be ascertained 
more broadly with respect to fisheries management. Cochrane has noted that the balance 
between sustainability, economic efficiency and equity ―is yet to be pursued 
seriously.‖
1049
 With respect to water allocation, it has been ascertained that  
(…) the conceptual framework for resolving water disputes on which much of 




This emphasis on economics and efficiency contrasts with the increasing concerns 
for equity in international environmental law, generated by the scale of the environmental 
challenges and the necessary interdependence in their solution. Brown Weiss noted that 
equity has become a central concern.
1051
 This concern can be evidenced in the 
proliferation of equity principles in main concepts shaping international law and 
international environmental law: sustainable development, ecosystem approach, 
precautionary approach, common but differentiated responsibility. It has permeated 
maritime delimitation, water law, biodiversity conservation, and climate change. Equity 
in international relations is here to stay. 
It is evident that more and better efforts have to be made to introduce equitable 
considerations into the design and implementation of international regimes, and of high 
seas fisheries regimes in particular. But efforts, so far, have been scarce: equity has had a 
stormy road in international fisheries law. 
 
The Stormy Road of Equity 
After the initial establishment of TAC and quota allocation as management 
practice in high seas fisheries regimes, which mostly did not include equity 
considerations, the RFMOs have struggled to achieve a framework for allocation that is 
regarded as equitable and transparent by their members and new entrants. This struggle 
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has been marked by a tension between the need to achieve equitable allocations, and the 
reluctance of States to address equity issues.  
This reluctance is reflected in international fisheries instruments addressing high 
seas fisheries. References to equity, either as intergenerational or intra-generational 
equity, are remarkably absent in such instruments. Furthermore, explicit references to 
equity, or equitable allocation, have been consciously avoided on several occasions. This 
vacuum has led to a necessary analysis on whether equity is even considered as a 
principle of high seas fisheries management. 
With respect to intergenerational equity, it can be confidently argued that, despite 
the lack of explicit references to the principle or the needs and aspirations of future 
generations, the principle has entered the international framework. Its ―port of entry‖ is 
through substantive obligations and guiding principles that have an inter-temporal 
component: the obligation of conservation; the principle of sustainable use; the 
precautionary approach; and the ecosystem approach. All these obligations and principles 
entail the need to ensure the long-term conservation of the stocks and their ecosystem and 
thus, implicitly if not explicitly, protect the interests of future generations. Furthermore, it 
can be argued that the principle of intergenerational equity has been strengthened through 
recent developments that emphasize long-term conservation as a fundamental pillar of 
fisheries management. Whether this recognition translates into effective implementation 
is another matter, an issue that has been dealt with extensively in chapter 4. 
The acceptance of intra-generational equity in the legal framework for 
international fisheries appears more doubtful. There is an apparent contradiction between 
an outright rejection to any mention of equity in international instruments, and the 
explicit recognition of equity as a guiding principle for allocation in other (mostly 
regional) fora. This cautious, and even contradictory, approach to equity considerations 
may be explained by the existence of different interpretations of the concept of equity 
itself. In particular relation to this thesis, equity – or distributional justice - has been 
understood with two different emphases: as an act of balancing the interests, rights and 
relevant circumstances of a particular situation; and as a requirement for redistribution of 




meaning of equity in the high seas fisheries regime. The former meaning of equity, 
however, appears to be generally accepted by States, practitioners and academics.  
On this basis, it can be concluded, therefore, that equity understood as a principle 
that seeks to balance the different rights, interests, and relevant circumstances of the 
particular situation, can be considered a guiding principle for the allocation of high seas 
fisheries opportunities. 
 
Equity: a Useful Concept? 
Accepting that equity can be considered a guiding principle for the allocation of 
high seas fishing opportunities, it must be concluded that it acts as autonomous equity. 
Indeed, it cannot act as corrective of the harshness of the applicable legal rule precisely 
because the legal framework does not contain such a rule. What does that mean for 
allocation decisions? What is the guidance that autonomous equity provides for the 
decision-making process? 
Many authors would answer: nothing. Equity has been considered a content-free 
concept. Judge Rosalyn Higgins asserted: ―I don‘t find justice either a useful decision-
making tool or a recognizable objective for international law.‖
1052
 Lauterpacht, as well, 
concluded that equity and equitable principles were elements in a legal decision which 
had no objectively identifiable normative content.
1053
 Ian Brownlie argued that  
[w]hatever the particular and interstitial significance of equity in the law of 
nations, as a general reservoir of ideas and solutions for sophisticated problems it 
offers little but disappointment.
1054
 
As was noted in the introduction to this thesis, this is also the opinion of Oda 
referring particularly to high seas fisheries. He noted, in this respect, that ―[e]quity 
comprises no objective legal criterion and varies in each circumstance.‖
1055
 It is, thus, 
because he considers equity a concept free of any normative content that he denied a role 
for law in the allocation problem. 
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But this view of equity in international law has been contested. Franck has noted 
that ―[f]ar from being contentless, equity is developing into an important redeeming 
aspect of the international legal system.‖
1056
  
An important contribution to this equity with normative content has been the 
jurisprudence in the field of maritime delimitation law. Through several decisions that 
deal explicitly with equity considerations, the ICJ defined the elements of a concept of 
equity that is not ex aequo et bono but an equity within the law. Those elements, which 
represent higher levels of normativity of the concept of equity, are: equitable principles, 
relevant circumstances, and equitable methods. Equity within the law, or controlled 
equity, does have substantive and procedural content that limits the discretion of the 
decision-maker. 
The developments in international fisheries law, as the analysis of this thesis 
shows, have focused on the identification of categories of relevant circumstances that 
need to be taken into account in the process of balancing the different interests and rights 
at stake. By so doing, the international community has neglected the development of 
equitable principles, which give purpose and direction to those relevant circumstances 
and allows balancing and weighting them. It also has neglected the development of 
equitable methods or procedures, which bridge the abstractness of equitable principles 
and the particularities of the relevant circumstances. It is the equitable method or 
procedure which allows an objective and systematic implementation of the equitable 
principles to the particular circumstances of the case. The development and definition of 
those three elements allow applying a concept of equity that is far from pure discretion. 
With some cynicism, it can be argued that this construction of a normative content 
of equity implies precisely that RFMOs have to adopt the tough decisions that they have 
been unable to make. In other words, if such a normative content of equity needs to be 
constructed, how is that better than the situation that exists today? What is the 
contribution of equity to the allocation problem? 
The contributions are basically three. Firstly, the jurisprudence in maritime 
delimitation law does not answer the question ―what is equitable?‖, but it does answer the 
question ―what needs to be done in order to achieve an equitable framework that has a 
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substantive normative content?‖ Showing the path towards a possible solution is already 
part of the solution. 
Secondly, it demystifies that the solution to allocation problems have to be found 
in RFMOs, by RFMOs alone. Although it remains true that equity varies in each 
circumstance, it can be acknowledged that at least some of its normative elements – 
namely equitable principles – are general and abstract in character. This acknowledgment 
has a clear consequence: it is unquestionable that RFMOs‘ role is central and 
unavoidable; but there is also room for other fora to participate in the debate. In 
particular, it is proposed that scholars can make a contribution to the process, for reasons 
that will be highlighted further below.  
Related to this latter point, there is a third contribution of equity to the ―allocation 
problem‖. Allocation can be viewed not subject to bargaining and bargaining alone, but 
also subject to certain equitable principles. This opens the door for analysis of the 
developments of equity as a legal standard for the fair distribution of benefits or burdens, 
a standard that is evolving in international law, international environmental law, and 
international law of sustainable development.  
This thesis has attempted part of that analysis in chapter 4 and 5. With respect to 
intergenerational equity, it reviewed the possible avenues to incorporate explicitly the 
needs of future generations in the TAC and allocation regime. With respect to intra-
generational equity, the evolving concept of equitable delimitation and equitable use were 
analyzed to identify principles that have underlined their progress in international law:  
the respect to sovereignty and sovereign rights; the protection of historical uses, its 
limitations and conditions; the timid but increasing role of socio-economic factors in 
need-based allocation schemes; the principle of substantive equality operationalized with 
the consideration of special requirements of developing States and importantly, the 
principle of CBDR. All these shed some new light in addressing the distributional 
conflicts of high seas fisheries, as extensively addressed in chapter 5. 
The process of translating those influences into concrete and substantive 
frameworks in high seas fisheries is certainly not an easy one, and it definitely requires 




and controlled mechanism to arrive at acceptable distributional results – can change the 
paradigm in addressing the problem. 
 
Allocation: Pure Policy? 
The introduction of the thesis highlighted that allocation of fishing opportunities 
is widely considered to be a political issue.
1057
 Agreements are the result of bargaining 
without any significant guidance by legal norms. Against that background, this thesis has 
explored the guidance that could be provided by one concept that is part of international 
law: equity. This analysis does not provide sufficient basis to refute the assertion that 
allocation of fishing opportunities is a political issue, but it does allow qualifying it. 
Allocation of high seas fishing opportunities is in urgent need of guidance in the 
form of a substantive structure or framework that allows equitable and transparent 
allocation of fishing opportunities. This need is manifested in the struggles of RFMOs to 
develop such a framework. Equity is invoked to play a prominent role in it.  
Equity is not a content-free concept, but a concept that is in evolution in 
international law. Brown Weiss asserted in 1995 that ―there is a search, though 
unsystematic, for a new definition [of equity].‖
1058
 She added that ―[p]articularly as our 
international system becomes more complex, we will need to consider carefully how to 
reconcile competing equitable demands and move toward normative frameworks 
acceptable to all members of the international community.‖
1059
  
What is said in respect to international environmental law in general, is also 
applicable to high seas fisheries law: there is currently a search for a definition of equity 
and equitable allocation of high seas fishing opportunities. Equity as a legal standard for 
high seas fishing allocation, therefore, is law in the formation stage. As such, it is 
undoubtedly political. But it is also legal, in that it requires identifying, defining and 
refining substantive and procedural principles and criteria that lead to a crystallization of 
equity in the particular and complex field of high seas fisheries management. This 
process should be forged not in isolation but grounded in current developments in 
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 See: supra note 18 and accompanying text; supra note 574 and accompanying text. 
1058
 Brown Weiss, supra note 1051, p. 9. 
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international law. It is for this reasons that it deserves more legal attention, and more 
academic attention, than it has yet received. 
There is yet a second reason why allocation of high seas fishing opportunities has 
to be considered a political issue. Even if a higher level of normativity is achieved, 
discretion would not be absolutely eliminated from the allocation decisions, and politics 
are bound to enter in this realm. But it is a fairly different to say that there is room for 










Appendix. States Ratification or Accession to LOSC, UNFSA, and RFMOs Conventions 































































1 Albania                       
2 Algerie       
                
3 Angola                       
4 Argentina       
                
5 Australia        
                
6 Barbados                       
7 Belgium       
                
8 Belize                       
9 Brazil       
                
10 Canada                       
11 Cape Verde                       
12 Chile       
                
13 China                       
14 Colombia       
                
15 Comoros                       
16 Cook Islands       
                
17 Costa Rica       
                
18 Côte D'Ivoire                       
19 Croatia       





































































20 Cuba                       
21 Denmark       
                
22 Ecuador                       
23 Egypt       
                
24 El Salvador 
 
                    
25 Equatorial Guinea                        
26 Eritrea       
                
27 European Union                       
28 Fiji     
 
                
29 France                      
30 Gabon         
              
31 Germany                       
32 Ghana                       
33 Guatemala         
              
34 Guinea                       
35 Honduras         
              
36 Iceland                        
37 India                       
38 Indonesia       
  
  
            
39 Iran (Islamic Republic of)                       
40 Italy       
              
  
41 Japan                       
42 Kenya       
  
  





































































43 Kiribiati                       
44 Lybian Arab Jamahiriya         
              
45 Madagascar                        
46 Malaysia       
  
  
            
47 Marshall Islands                       
48 Mauritania                       
49 Mauritius       
  
  
            
50 Mexico                       
51 Micronesia (Federated States of)       
      
  
        
52 Morocco                       
53 Namibia         
          
    
54 Nauru                       
55 New Zealand                       
56 Nicaragua         
              
57 Nigeria                       
58 Niue       
      
  
        
59 Norway                       
60 Oman                       
61 Pakistan       
  
  
            
62 Palau                       
63 Panama         
              
64 Papua New Guinea                       
65 Peru       





































































66 Philippines                       
67 Poland       
              
  
68 Republic of Korea 
     
    
    
  
69 Russian Federation         
      
    
  
  
70 St.Vincent and the Grenadines                       
71 Samoa       
      
  
        
72 Sao Tome and Principe                       
73 Senegal         
              
74 Seychelles       
  
  
            
75 Sierra Leone                       
76 Solomon Islands       
      
  
        
77 South Africa                       
78 Spain       
              
  
79 Sri Lanka                       
80 Sudan                       
81 Sweden         
            
  
82 Syrian Arab Republic                       
83 Thailand       
  
  
            
84 Tonga                       
85 Trindad y Tobago         
              
86 Tunisia         


















1) The RFMOs considered were: IATTC, ICCAT, IOTC, CCSBT, WCPFC, NAFO, NEAFC, SEAFO and CCAMLR.  
2) The table does not consider States that participate as cooperating non-parties to RFMOs.  
3) The table does not consider the fishing entity of Chinese Taipei.  
4) The table does consider members of the EU that participate in RFMOs with respect to their overseas territories, as well as in 
CCAMLR.  
  






























































87 Turkey                       
88 Tuvalu       
      
  
        
89 Ukraine                       
90 U.K.           
          
  
91 United Republic of Tanzania                       
92 United States of America                       
93 Uruguay         
            
  
94 Vanuatu                       
95 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic 
of)         
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